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ABSTRACT
AMOUNT RELATIVES REDUX
SEPTEMBER 2017
JON ANDER MENDIA
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rajesh Bhatt and Professor Vincent Homer
This dissertation provides a novel analysis of Amount Relatives (Carlson 1977a, Heim
1987, Grosu and Landman 1998, Herdan 2008, Meier 2015, a.o). Amount Relatives are a
form of non-intersective relative clause that is usually associated with amount interpretations .
For example, the sentence it will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled
that evening is most naturally interpreted as referring to an amount of champagne, and not any
particular champagne. Previous accounts of Amount Relatives have converged in appealing
to degree semantics in order to extract an amount from the relative clause, suggesting that the
embedded CP denotes a property of degrees.
This dissertation advocates a more nuanced view of Amount Relatives across languages.
I propose that natural languages allow two different strategies for deriving amount interpre-
tations of relative clauses: a degree-based strategy and a degree-less strategy, where degree
semantics does not come into play at all. It is argued that while some languages employ both
ix
strategies, as is the case with Spanish, languages like English only have the degree-less strat-
egy, contra much of the previous literature. Evidence for this division comes from the fact
that Amount Relatives in Spanish, but not English, pass independently-motivated diagnostics
of degree-related operations (e.g. degree-quantification and degree-abstraction).
In the first part of the dissertation, I propose a novel means of arriving at amount interpre-
tations for relative clauses in languages like English, which lack the degree-based strategy to
derive suchmeanings. The account exploits the correlation between kind and amount readings
of relative clauses in English, first noted by Carlson (1977a). Amount Relatives in English
will be argued to be a sub-case of kind-referring relative clauses and an analysis that derives
amounts from (sub)kinds is presented.
The second, more sizable portion of the dissertation examines Amount Relatives in Span-
ish, which can be shown to make use of a degree-based strategy for deriving amount readings,
as they do show all the hallmarks of degree constructions. Moreover, the language allows
amount interpretations more readily, in more environments and with more diverse forms than
languages like English. I will provide a compositional analysis of Spanish Amount Relatives
in their various forms, with the goal of understanding (i) what syntactic and semantic pieces
are implicated in extracting an amount from a relative clause structure and (ii) how different
permutations of these pieces could result in semantic variation within and across languages.
x
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Amount Relatives: relative clauses with quantity interpretations
This dissertation is concerned with Amount Relatives, relative clauses that receive quantity-
oriented interpretations (Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman 1998, 2017, Her-
dan 2008, McNally 2008, Meier 2015, a.o). Consider the following example, from Heim
(1987, p.38).
(1) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled that evening.
The sentence in (1) is ambiguous. On its ordinary interpretation, the relative clause simply
picks out the particular champagne that was spilled that evening, and the sentence on the
whole is about the time it will take to drink that spilled champagne. This is the meaning
we arrive at when, following the traditional analysis (Quine 1960, Partee 1973), we interpret
the relative clause by intersecting the predicate denoted by the head noun with the predicate
denoted by the that-clause. The resulting meaning is of the form “x is champagne and x was
spilled that evening”. This corresponds to what is known as the intersective interpretation of
relative clauses.
But this is not the most accessible interpretation of the sentence. On its most salient read-
ing, (1) refers to the task of drinking the amount of champagne that was spilled that evening.
In this case, the particular champagne that was spilled is not the object of the drinking, rather
any champagne in the same amount will suffice. This interpretation of (1) is more straight-
forwardly captured by both of the following paraphrases.
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(2) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the amount of champagne they spilled
that evening.
b. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink as much champagne as they spilled that
evening.
The examples below provide similar cases. Under the relevant interpretation, they all make a
claim about an amount, not about an individual.
(3) a. Mary saw the birds in thirty minutes that John saw in a day. [Meier 2015]↝ Mary saw the number of birds that John saw
b. We lost the battle because we lacked the soldiers our enemy had. [McNally 2008]↝We lacked the amount of soldiers that our enemy had
c. The money it cost could have fed many people. [Grosu and Landman to appear]↝ The amount of money it cost
Because of their semantic ability to refer to amounts, these relative clauses were named
“Amount Relatives” by Carlson (1977a). I will continue this tradition in this dissertation,
henceforth using the acronym AR to refer to Amount Relatives.
1.2 Why Amount Relatives?
1.2.1 A family of three
Ordinary relative clauses usually refer to individuals. ARs like (1) and (3) got this name
fromCarlson (1977a) because, at an intuitive level, they seem to refer to an amount or quantity
rather than to particular entities. In addition to the ordinary-looking relative clauses in (1)/(3),
Carlson (1977a) argued that ARs come (at least) in two additional syntactic frames: (i) in
relative clauses where relativization occurs out of there-be existential sentences, as in (4a),
and (ii) in Antecedent Contained Deletion constructions, where the trace of the head of the
relative clause is contained within an elided phrase, as in (4b).
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(4) a. There wasn’t the water in the sink that there was in the bathtub.↝ the amount of water [attributed to Lisa Selkirk]
b. Marv put everything he could in his pocket.↝ the amount of things that he could put [Carlson 1977a]
Observe that both sentences in (4) are ambiguous; in addition to the amount interpretation,
the ordinary intersective interpretation is also available. In the case of (4a), this intersective
interpretation yields a truism, namely, that the water in the sink is not the water in the bathtub.
On its most natural interpretation, however, it refers to different amounts of water. Similarly,
on the ordinary intersective interpretation of the relative clause in (4b), for every x such that
Marv could put x in his pocket, Marv did put x in his pocket. However, the most accessible
interpretation of (4b) is one in which Marv got a pocketful of things, without necessarily
putting in his pocket all the objects that would have otherwise fit in it individually.
Thus, on Carlson’s (1977a) account, there are three varieties of ARs, all of which involve
a special sort of relativization that yields the quantity interpretation.
(5) Three types of ARs
a. Ordinary Relative Clauses
It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled that evening.
b. Existential Relative Clauses
There wasn’t the water in the sink that there was in the bathtub.
c. ACD Relative Clauses
Marv put everything he could in his pocket.
Support for the idea of ARs as a homogeneous phenomenon has come from a number of
authors since Carlson, including Heim (1987), von Fintel (1999), Grosu and Landman (1998,
2017) and Meier (2015). But there are dissenting voices as well: for instance, Herdan (2008)
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and McNally (2008) are defendants of the position that not all ARs described by Carlson
belong to the same class.
Carlson’s (1977a) original arguments in favor of treating the three constructions in (5) in a
uniform fashion relied on certain syntactic similarities among the three. For instance, relative
clauses yielding a quantity interpretation seem to show selectional restrictions on the relative
pronoun. As Heim (1987) observed, the availability of the amount interpretation of sentences
like (6) below depends on the presence of the null/that complementizer.1 The use of which
in (6a), at least for most speakers, leads to the clause only receiving an ordinary intersective
interpretation. In the case of existential relative clauses and those involving ACD, the use of
which results in ungrammaticality.2
(6) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne {∅ / that / which} they
spilled at the party.
b. There wasn’t the water in the sink {∅ / that / *which} there was in the bathtub.
c. Marv put in his pocket everything {∅ / that / *which} he could.
Another well-known property of ARs that differentiates them from garden-variety restric-
tive relative clauses is that ARs require definite or universal determiners. Consequently, the
sentences in (7), involving existentially quantified head nouns lack amount readings.
(7) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink some champagne they spilled that evening.
b. Marv put many things he could in his pocket.
c. *I took {some / many} books that there were on the table.
1There are conflicting judgments in Carlson (1977a) and Safir (1982); see Heim (1987) for discussion.
2These judgments are more clear when relative clauses are headed by nouns that are more commonly inter-
preted as referring to amounts (examples from McNally 2008).
(i) a. *The money which costs makes no difference
b. *There wasn’t the money in the wallet which there was on the table.
c. *Marv put every pound of sand which he could in the truck.
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The fact that the three constructions in (5) pattern alike and unlike ordinary relative clauses
led Carlson (1977a) to suggest that they all form a uniform class, different from ordinary
restrictive relatives.
1.2.2 Different interpretations of relative clauses
Of course, beyond these syntactic constraints, the three types of constructions in (5) are
unified by the semantic fact that they can refer to quantities or amounts. As it happens, the
syntactic tests alone are sometimesmisleading. It is not difficult to find relative clauses with the
syntactic properties noted by Carlson (1977a) that do not in fact refer to amounts. Consider:
(8) I took the books that there were on the table.
The sentence in (8) is an AR by the syntactic measures usually taken in the literature to char-
acterize ARs (Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, von Fintel 1999, Grosu and Landman 1998). How-
ever, (8) can only be true if I took the particular books that were lying on the table. That is,
a situation in which I took a different set of books, but equal in amount, to the books on the
table cannot verify (8). In short, despite qualifying as an Amount Relative, (8) cannot refer
to amounts.
For reasons like this, it is useful to differentiate between ARs–as they have been classified
in the literature–and relative clauses that refer to amounts. The goal is simply to provide a
descriptive, analysis independent way to refer to different interpretations of relative clauses.
Thus, I differentiate between three main different interpretations that relative clauses may give
rise to: ♭♠♨♣♡♲, ♟♫♭♳♬♲ and ♩♧♬♢ interpretations. (I will follow the typographical convention
of using small caps when referring to these interpretations.) The following relative clauses
illustrate the differences (with minimal changes to promote the intended interpretation).
(9) It will take us the rest of our lives to…
a. O♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation: ↝ the particular champagne
…pay for the champagne they spilled that evening.
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b. A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation: ↝ the amount of champagne
…drink the champagne they spilled that evening.
c. K♧♬♢ interpretation: ↝ the type of champagne
…find the champagne they spilled that evening.
The ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation corresponds simply to the intersective interpretation of the relative
clause, and it refers to individual objects or tokens. The ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation corresponds
to an interpretation where the relative clause makes reference to an amount of objects, and
not to any particular object. Lastly, the ♩♧♬♢ interpretation also does not refer to a particular
token of champagne; rather, it refers to some kind of champagne.3
1.2.3 Goal of the dissertation
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to shed light on how seemingly ordinary-
looking relative clauses receive ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. I will be concerned here only with
relative clauses like (1), (3) and (5a) above, and will not be examining existential or ACD rela-
tive clauses.4 Answering this question requires, in essence, resolving a compositional problem.
For reasons that will become obvious shortly, I take a cross-linguistic approach to this com-
positional problem, addressing another question along the way: how does the availability and
composition of ARs vary across languages? As it happens, two languages that both allow ARs
may still vary in what environments and how readily they allow them. Here, I take Spanish
3Notice that ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretations may seem to entail both ♟♫♭♳♬♲ and ♩♧♬♢ readings of relative clauses.
If I took all the books there were on the table, I certainly took the same amount of books as there were books
on the table. Similarly, if I found a bottle of Dom Pérignon then I certainly found a certain kind of wine (in
this case one that belongs to an assemblage of Pinot Noir and Chardonnay grapes). This apparent entailment
falls out from world knowledge: we cannot prevent pluralities of books from constituting an amount, nor can we
avoid wines from belonging to a certain kind. In contrast, ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations directly refer to an amount of
objects, irrespective of the particular objects that sum up to constitute said amount–and same with kind-referring
relative clauses.
4Although there has not been much discussion about these two other constructions, McNally (2008) (for
existential relative clauses) and Herdan (2008) (for ACD relative clauses) provide good arguments that neither
of them should be treated on par with ARs–understood as relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. The idea
that not all ARs described by Carlson belong to the same class has not, to my knowledge, been pursued further.
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and English as my case studies. As will be described in the following sections, Spanish differs
from English in allowing ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations (i) more readily, (ii) in more syntactic en-
vironments, and (iii) with different types of relative clauses. Thus, the differences between
English-like and Spanish-like languages bear on the compositional puzzle presented above
by suggesting that there is more than one strategy available in natural languages to generate
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in relative clauses.
1.3 Rethinking ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations
The first question of interest to us is: how do ordinary-looking relative clauses provide
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations? From the point of view of classical analyses to (intersective) relative
clauses (e.g. Quine 1960, Partee 1973), the availability of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations is puzzling.
For instance, the intersective interpretation of the relative clause the champagne they spilled
that evening would simply denote the set of (instances of things) that (i) are champagne and(ii) they spilled that evening.
(10) {x ∶ x is champagne} ∩ {y ∶ they spilled y that evening}
But this, of course, corresponds to the ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation of the relative clause. Thus, in
order to fully understand what the compositional challenge is, we should first look into the
main semantic properties of these interpretations.
1.3.1 Semantic properties of ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations
Pre-theoretically, there are three main semantic properties of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations that
set them apart from ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretations. Their first and most notorious property is that
they do not refer to individuals, but to “amounts”. This observation, albeit obvious, is far
from innocent: it comes with the non-trivial consequence that, in spite of being of the form
the NP, ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations do not refer to that NP. In other words, using our example in
(9), the definitiness of the definite determiner the does not apply to the NP champagne, but to
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an amount; in this case, the definite amount of champagne that they spilled that evening (e.g.
two liters, or perhaps two bottles).
The flip-side of this property is that the NP champagne cannot be interpreted as a definite,
but as an indefinite. In (9), there is no single individual object-level champagne that would
take us long to drink; in fact, any champagne in the relevant amount suffices. This behavior
of the head of the relative clause is puzzling, again, the head noun, on the surface, is a definite
NP (the champagne).
The last distinguishing property of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations is that they always involve a
comparison of two amounts of the same stuff. To appreciate this requirement better, consider
first a classifier relative clause with an overt noun amount.
(11) It would take us years to drink the amount of champagne that you drank of wine.
What (11) shows is that relative clauses headed by the noun amount allow the comparison
of two different sets/instances of stuff; in this case, the comparison is between an amount of
champagne and amount of wine. The same, however, is not possible with ordinary looking
relative clauses.
(12) *It would take us years to drink the champagne that you drank wine.
To be sure, the unavailability of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations that involve comparing amounts of
different stuff does not rest on independent syntactic constraints. Consider for example a
context where I drank two liters of champagne in 3 hours, and you drank two liters of wine
in 30 minutes. In this context, (13) is false.
(13) It took me 3 hours to drink the champagne that you drank in 30 minutes.
Despite its grammaticality, the availability of an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation and the supporting
context, (13) is doomed to be false in this scenario. This points out that comparing amounts
of different stuff, although a natural option for classifier relatives like (11), is not possible with
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses.
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Summing up, any theory of ARs should be able to capture these three empirical facts
about ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses. I summarize them below.
(14) Desiderata for ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations
a. Definiteness: A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations refer to a definite amount.
b. Indefiniteness: The head of the relative clause in interpreted as an indefinite.
c. Identity: A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations require a comparison of two amounts of same
stuff.
A helpful paraphrase to help appreciate the particularities of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations is the
following:
(15) ⟦It would take us years to drink the champagne that they spilled that evening⟧⇔ ⟦It would take us years to drink champagne in that amount⟧
[where that amount = the amount of champagne that they spilled that evening]
As stated in (14), the relative clause is interpreted as referring to a definite amount of cham-
pagne: the specific amount of champagne that they spilled that evening. However, the noun
champagne must be interpreted as an indefinite: there is no particular champagne that it
would take us long to drink. Finally, the referred amount must be an amount of champagne,
not of anything else.
1.3.2 But not just ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခs!
These properties of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations have been known since Carlson’s (1977a,b).
However, he had already noted that the properties in (14) are not unique to amount interpre-
tations. For instance, consider the sentence in (9c), repeated below.
(9c) It will take us the rest of our lives to find the champagne they spilled that evening.
On its most salient interpretation, (9c) receives a form of ♩♧♬♢ interpretation. For instance,
it could be that the champagne is difficult to find because it is very rare. This is only one of
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many possible reasons; it could also be that there is a high demand of that particular kind of
champagne, that it is not usually imported to our country, etc.5 All these interpretations have
the same properties of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations described in (14). For one, the sentence does
not refer to a particular champagne, despite being overtly of the form the champagne that….
This is precisely the condition on indefiniteness of the head of the relative clause described
in (14). Similarly, the sentence refers to a definite kind of champagne, the precise kind of
champagne that they spilled that evening. This is, again, fully parallel to the condition on
definiteness described in (14). Finally, notice that we are not at liberty to choose what is the
thing that would take us the rest of our lives to find; it must be champagne. This is the same
identity restriction that we observed in (14) for ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. To appreciate the
parallelism between ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in full, consider the following equivalent
of the paraphrase in (15).
(16) ⟦It would take us years to find the champagne that they spilled that evening⟧⇔ ⟦It would take us years to find champagne of that kind⟧
[where that kind = the kind of champagne that they spilled that evening]
The conclusion to be drawn is clear: we should not take the facts in (14) to be signatures
of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations alone. We have at least two types of interpretations, ♩♧♬♢s and
♟♫♭♳♬♲s, showing the same type of semantic effects. This state of affairs raises a ques-
tion: are we justified in appealing to degree semantics to account for ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations?
To my knowledge, this is not a question that has been explicitly addressed in the literature.
Historically, analyses of ARs have simply assumed–largely without discussion–that degree se-
mantics should be invoked, in some form of other, in order to derive ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
of relative clauses. Picking up on Carlson’s idea that the work of extracting an amount should
be done at the CP level, the received view has it that in ARs the embedded CP is a degree
5Because this type of interpretation goes beyond what we usually think of taxonomic kinds, it is sometimes
referred to as an “extent” interpretation of the noun phrase. I will continue to call it simply a ♩♧♬♢ interpretation
for consistency, but it should be clear that this interpretation is in fact richer than a well-established ♩♧♬♢.
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expression, denoting either a set of degrees or a maximalized degree (Heim 1987, von Fintel
1999, Grosu and Landman 1998, 2017, Herdan 2008, Meier 2015).6 That is, according to
this view, the CP in (17) should be treated as a degree predicate. For instance:
(17) It would take us years to drink the champagne [♡♮ that they spilled that evening]⟦CP⟧ = λd : they spilled d-♫♳♡♦ champagne that evening
While this is an entirely plausible option, we seem to be missing a generalization, namely, that
♟♫♭♳♬♲ and ♩♧♬♢ interpretations share the key semantic properties that make ARs stand out
and behave unlike intersective relative clauses.
1.3.3 A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခs without degrees
It was Carlson (1977a,b) who first observed that ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of rel-
ative clauses go hand in hand. Following his lead, this dissertation presents a unification of
these two interpretations. While there have been attempts to unify the semantics of kinds
and degrees/amounts (Anderson and Morzycki 2015, Scontras 2017), here I take a different
angle: I argue that ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses are a form of ♩♧♬♢ interpretation.
So far we have seen that English allows ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses. In this
sense, ARs exist in English. The challenge is to determine whether this ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpreta-
tion requires a dedicated “Amount Construction”, i.e. a construction specifically designed to
obtain ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. Previous accounts have answered this question in the posi-
tive, by assuming, as in (17) above, that the embedded CP in ARs must be interpreted as a
property of degrees. This dissertation argues against this conclusion by subsuming ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations in English under ♩♧♬♢ interpretations. Consequently, (i) there is no degree
abstraction/quantification involved, and (ii) whenever a relative clause admits an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ in-
terpretation it also necessarily allows a ♩♧♬♢ interpretation.
6This is usually achieved with the aid of some null measuring predicate ♫♟♬♷/♫♳♡♦, like the ones familiar
form the literature on comparatives and mesure phrases.
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There a number of reasons to believe that such unification is not only possible, but de-
sirable. Here I will only mention two; I refer the reader to §2 for further arguments and the
full analysis. First, ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses do not necessarily rely on the
presence of a relative clause. That is, provided that we have enough contextual support, the
relative clause might be dropped altogether. The examples in (18) show that both ♟♫♭♳♬♲
and ♩♧♬♢ interpretations are possible with nouns modified by PPs.
(18) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ/K࿶࿻࿱ interpretations with PPs
a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers of the Imperial Army.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but we don’t have the students in the department
anymore.
For instance, the sentence (18a) might refer to the fact that the reason for losing the battle
was that we did not have as many soldiers as the Imperial Army did. This is the ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretation. Alternatively, it could be that despite having more soldiers than the Imperial
Army, ours are poorly trained, lack motivation, etc. This is the ♩♧♬♢ interpretation. Thus,
we observe that the relationship between the availability of both interpretations is preserved.
More importantly, however, under an account of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations were we rely on
degree operators and degree abstraction at the CP level, the availability of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ in (18a) is
left unexplained. Similar interpretations are available with bare DPs as well.
(19) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ/K࿶࿻࿱ interpretations with bare DPs
a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but don’t have the students anymore.
Again, a degree-based analysis has nothing to say about why ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are pos-
sible in (19).
The second argument rests on the fact that ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses do
not show the hallmarks of bona fide degree constructions. For instance, the interaction be-
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tween degree operators and negative operators is well known in the literature of compar-
ative constructions (e.g. von Stechow 1984). Under Rullmann’s (1995) popular view, the
ill-formedness of the (20) examples below are attributed to the impossibility of maximalizing
a set of degrees that contain a negative operator in it’s scope.
(20) a. *How many soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
b. *We have more soldiers than the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
c. *We have as many soldiers as the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
The explanation of this ill-formedness goes as follows: the embedded CPs must be closed by
a maximality operator which, as commonly defined, presupposes a maximal degree among all
the degrees in the set that it ranges over (see definitions of ♫♟♶ in §4.3.2.1 and §5.3.1). In the
absence of such maximal degree, the expression is undefined, resulting in ungrammaticality–
in the sense of Gajewski (2002). That is, in the examples above, there cannot be a maximal
number of soldiers that the Imperial Army did not have, and thus the maximalization of the
set of degrees corresponding to the Imperial army has d-many soldiers is undefined.
These types of island violations, however, do not arise in cases where the extractee denotes
an individual, as with the wh-words which and what.
(21) Which soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
If we look at relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, we observe that they pattern like
(21) and unlike (20). The ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation of (22) states that our soldiers exceeded in
number those of the Imperial Army. (Out of the blue, the ♩♧♬♢ interpretation of (22) is also
available.)
(22) We won the battle because we had the soldiers that the Imperial Army didn’t have.
The problem for degree-based analysis of ARs is obvious: if the burden of extracting an
♟♫♭♳♬♲ is located on a degree operator, we would expect ARs to pattern with (20) and not
with (21), contrary to what we observe.
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1.3.4 Conclusion
As I hope was made clear from the above discussion, there are good reasons to believe that
the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses in English should not be analyzed by appealing
to degree semantics. A reductionist approach that subsumes ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations under
♩♧♬♢ interpretations looks more promising, as it is able to capture: (i) the inherent vagueness
of these relative clauses (see §1.3.1 and §1.3.2), (ii) the fact that they do not depend on the
presence of a relative clause, and (iii) the fact that they are not subject to the restrictions that
other degree constructions are. Chapter 2 discusses all this in greater detail.
1.4 ARs as degree expressions
Most investigations about ARs in general have focused on English, and the question of
how languages may vary with respect to the distribution and availability of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ relative
clauses has seldom arisen. An important part of this dissertation is focused on Spanish and
on its ability to produce relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in environments where
English cannot, and using forms unavailable in English.
1.4.1 A contrast between English and Spanish
The theoretical discussion of ARs began with an exploration of English ARs, and the ef-
forts to derive the availability of English relative clauses to denote ♟♫♭♳♬♲s. More mysterious
are the conditions under which English relative clauses do not allow ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations.
For instance, the following sentence in English can only be false.
(23) Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.
Here, the falsity of the sentence hinges on the fact that Pedro could not have written the same
individual books as Tolstoy did. This is an ♭♠♨♣♡♲ (intersective) interpretation of (23). In
contrast, an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation would be perfectly sensible. For reasons that are not well-
understood, however, (23) cannot express that Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy.
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This restriction is useful because it reveals a surprising contrast with the same sentence in
Spanish. Consider:
(24) Pedro
Pedro
ha
♟♳♶
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
escribió.
wrote
‘Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy wrote’
Unlike with its English counterpart, in (24) the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation is perfectly natural, and
it can be used out of the blue to express that Pedro wrote as many books as Tolstoy. This state
of affairs raises questions about cross-linguistic variation in the availability of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ inter-
pretations: what is the source of the contrast between (23) and (24)? The following are two
more examples where the English variants are false, signaling that the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
are not available.
(25) [Context: The same number of friends attended both our birthday parties, but they were
different friends.]
a. The friends that came to your party came to my party. F♟♪♱♣
b. T♰♳♣A
to
mi
my
fiesta
party
vinieron
came
los
the
amigos
friends
que
that
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
tuya.
yours
‘The number of friends that came to your party came to my party’
(26) [Context: There were 3 books on the table, and I read 3 books from the shelf.]
a. I read the books that there were on the table. F♟♪♱♣
b. T♰♳♣He
♟♳♶
leído
read
los
the
libros
books
que
that
había
were
en
on
la
the
mesa
table
‘I read the amount of books that there were on the table’
In this dissertation, I argue that the source of the different availability between the two lan-
guages is the different strategies they employ to generate ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. While in
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English relative clauses can only express ♟♫♭♳♬♲s via ♩♧♬♢ interpretations, Spanish does pos-
sess a dedicated Amount Construction whose exclusive role is to provide ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpreta-
tions.
Evidence for the presence of a dedicated Amount Constructions in Spanish rests on data of
the sort discussed above and others. As will be demonstrated shortly, none of the arguments
I provided in §1.3 in support of a degree-less analysis of English ARs hold for these Spanish
examples. The conclusion, therefore, is that English ARs and their Spanish counterparts are
constructed in fundamentally different ways.
1.4.1.1 No dependency on ࿸࿶࿻࿱ interpretations
Section 1.3 showed that ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses go hand in
hand. In the Spanish examples above, however, this is not the case. For example, (24),
repeated below, only the (false) ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation and the more sensible ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpre-
tation.
(24) Pedro
Pedro
ha
♟♳♶
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
escribió.
wrote
↝ ‘Pedro has written as many books as that Tolstoy wrote’↝̸ ‘Pedro has written the same kind of books that Tolstoy wrote’
Thus, the sentence cannot mean, for instance, that, like Tolstoy, Pedro also wrote novels,
novellas and plays but not biographies, or that Pedro also wrote Russian novels, or novels that
were as long as Tolstoy’s. The same is true of (26):
(26) He
♟♳♶
leído
read
los
the
libros
books
que
that
había
were
en
on
la
the
mesa.
table
↝ ‘I read the amount of books that there were on the table’↝̸ ‘I read the kind of books that there were on the table’
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1.4.1.2 Obligatoriness of the relative clause
The Spanish examples also contrast with English in that the relative clause is obligatory:
it cannot be dropped or substituted by a PP (cf. (18) and (19)). When the relative clause
is dropped, both the ♩♧♬♢ and the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations disappear, and only the ♭♠♨♣♡♲
interpretation of the NP is available.
(27) Pedro
Pedro
ha
♟♳♶
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
( de
of
Tolstoy
Tosltoy
).
↝ ‘Pedro has written some particular books.’↝̸ ‘Pedro has written some amount of books .’
(28) He
♟♳♶
leído
read
los
the
libros
books
( de
of
la
the
mesa
table
).
↝ ‘I read some particular books’↝̸ ‘I read some amount of books’
Thus, the Spanish examples contrast with the English facts discussed in §1.3.3 above, where
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations were accessible also in the absence of a relative clause.
1.4.1.3 Obeys restrictions on islands
The final datapoint to suggest that the Spanish examples at hand truly involve degree oper-
ators comes from island-sensitivity. As in the case of English (see §1.3.3), negative operators
embedded inside degree constructions, like how many questions, comparatives and equatives,
result in an island-violation in Spanish. This is shown in (29),
(29) a. *Cuántos
how many
libros
books
no
not
has
♟♳♶
escrito?
written
‘How many books you have not written?’
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b. *Pedro
Pedro
escribió
wrote
más
more
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
no
not
escribió.
wrote
‘Pedro wrote more books than Tolsoty didn’t write’
c. *Pedro
Pedro
escribió
wrote
tantos
many
libros
books
como
as
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
no
not
escribió.
wrote
‘Pedro wrote as many books as Tolstoy didn’t write’
Again, Spanish patterns with English in that these island violations do not arise in cases where
the extractee denotes an individual. For instance, (30) is a sensible question that one may
ask to George R.R. Martin about his saga A song of ice and fire (whose culmination seems
uncertain as of 2017).
(30) Qué
what
libros
books
no
not
has
♟♳♶
escrito?
written
‘What books have you not written?’
The difference, however, is these Spanish ARs are sensitive to negative islands: in (31), the
variant of (24) with the crucial difference that the embedded CP contains a negative operator,
the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation is unavailable (the ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation unsurprisingly remains).
(31) Pedro
Pedro
escribió
wrote
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
no
not
escribió.
wrote
↝ ‘Pedro wrote some particular books that Tolstoy didn’t write’↝̸ ‘Pedro wrote an amount of books that Tolstoy didn’t write’
The conclusion that I extract from these different behavior of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ relative clauses in
English and Spanish is that they involve two different types of derivations. In particular, I
suggest the following:
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(32) Available strategies to generate ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations by language
♟♫♭♳♬♲♱ via ♩♧♬♢♱ ♟♫♭♳♬♲ via degrees
Spanish 3 3
English 3 8
Notice that nothing precludes Spanish from deriving ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations via ♩♧♬♢s, as
English does. This is a welcome result: if a relative clause allows a ♩♧♬♢ intepretation, then
the properties observed for English ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations hold of Spanish as well:
(33) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ/K࿶࿻࿱ vagueness
a. The Imperial Army has some soldiers that are {good/big/well trained} and although
we have more soldiers, they always win.
b. Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
tenía
had
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial.
Imperial
‘We lost the fight because we didn’t have the kind of soldiers that the Imperial Army
had’
(34) No relative clause
a. PP modifier
Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
de
of
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial.
Imperial
‘We lost the fight because we didn’t have the amount of soldiers of the Imperial
Army’
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b. Bare DP
Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados.
soldiers.
‘We lost the fight because we didn’t have the amount of soldiers’
(35) No islands
a. Ganamos
won
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
no
not
tenía
had
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We won the battlw because we had the amount of soldiers that the Imperial Army
didn’t have’
Thus, it is only by looking at cases where (i) ♩♧♬♢ interpretations are not available and, there-
fore, (ii) do not allow ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in English, that we can identify the Spanish
cases that showcase the true dedicated Amount Construction.
1.4.2 More ARs in Spanish
In this section I introduce the full family of ARs in Spanish. In this language, not only
are ARs more readily available than in English, we also find them in more environments and
in different forms than in English. The richness of the AR constructions in Spanish provides
further support to the idea that Spanish has dedicated machinery for extracting ♟♫♭♳♬♲s in
relative clause constructions.
1.4.2.1 Nominal ARs
So far, we have only considered ARs with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations that appear in positions
typically occupied by (entity-denoting) arguments. For this reason, I will refer to them as
“Nominal ARs”. The distinguishing property of Spanish, as we have observed in the previous
section, is that it shows a greater degree of freedom in the construction of nominal ARs, and
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allows them in environments where they seem to be impossible in English (see the contrasts
in §1.4.1).
Furthermore, Spanish nominal ARs are semantically parallel to their counterparts with
wh-pronouns. Spanish has the ability to form quantity free relatives, which are not cross-
linguistically very common. Quantity free relatives are free relatives formed with the quantity
relative pronoun cuanto (“how many”).
(36) a. He
aux
visto
seen
cuantos
how many.♫♱.♮♪
pájaros
birds
has
♟♳♶
visto
seen
tú.
you
b. Pedro
Pedro
ha
♟♳♶
escrito
written
cuantos
how many.♫♱.♮♪
libros
books
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
Nominal ARs in Spanish are the object of Chapter 3.
1.4.2.2 Propositional ARs
In Spanish ARs can appear as complements to wh-embedding predicates, predicates that
typically select for either interrogative or exclamative complements. I refer to this type of
ARs as “Propositional ARs”. The interest of propositional ARs lies in the fact that they seem
to be DPs that are selected for by predicates that usually select interrogative complements,
like wonder. In cases of predicates like know, propositional ARs are grammatical even when
the corresponding bare DP is not.
(37) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
ask
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I wonder how many apples Pedro brought’
b. Sé
know
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
(* que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
).
‘I know how many apples Pedro brought’
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Semantically, the sentences in (37) have an interpretation that is equivalent to a subordinate
question with the wh-pronoun how many.7
(38) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
cuántas
how many.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I wonder how many apples Pedro brought’
b. Sé
know
cuántas
how many.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
‘I know how many apples Pedro brought’
Propositional ARs are thus similar to the ARs discussed in the literature in being about an
amount rather than about an individual. But the syntactic distribution of the ARs in English
is radically different; unlike the counterparts of (38), the English variants of (37) are either
ungrammatical or lack an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation.
(39) a. I wonder {*the apples that / how many apples} Pedro brought.
b. I know {#the apples that / how many apples} Pedro brought.
Chapter 4 discusses these constructions at length.
1.4.2.3 Degree Neuter Relatives
The last construction of Spanish considered in this dissertation are the so-called Degree
Neuter Relatives. These are relative clauses headed by a gradable predicate and the form lo
(translated here as the definite determiner the; see footnote 1 in Chapter 5).
(40) a. Jose
Jose
admiró
admired
lo
the
alto
tall.♫♱.♱♥
que
that
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building.♫♱.♱♥
‘Jose admired how tall the building is’
7But this is not the only interpretation; see Chapter 4 for full discussion.
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b. Jose
Jose
no
not
entendió
understood
lo
the
hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
que
that
era
was
la
the
novela
novel.♤♫.♱♥
‘Jose did not undestand how beautiful the novel was’
Intuitively, the examples in (40) are not about amounts, but about degrees or extents.8 These
relative clauses also have counterparts with wh-pronouns that are semantically equivalent.
(41) a. Jose
Jose
admiró
admired
cuán
how
alto
tall.♫♱.♱♥
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building.♫♱.♱♥
b. Jose
Jose
no
not
entendió
understood
cuán
how
hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
era
was
la
the
novela
novel.♤♫.♱♥
In Chapter 5 I argue that Degree Neuter Relatives are in fact a subtype of AR.
1.4.3 The analytical puzzle
Identifying the locus of the difference between English-like and Spanish-like languages
is only the beginning. If we concede, following previous accounts of English ARs, that the
embedded CP is interpreted as a property of degrees, the question arises as to how to continue
from the CP level on. If the CP is degree-denoting, the CP and the head-noun cannot be
analyzed in terms of intersective properties: the denotations of the CPs (type ⟨dt⟩) and the
head noun (type ⟨et⟩) are sortally mismatched, and so their intersection should be empty. The
more pressing issue we face is whether the corresponding DP (e.g. the books that Tolstoy
wrote) should be taken to denote an individual (of type e) or a degree (of type d). Both routes
have been explored in the literature, and so I briefly comment on each of them below.9
8Sometimes I will refer to sentences like (40) as having ♢♣♥♰♣♣ interpretations rather than ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpre-
tations. This is done for clarity alone; after all, in the degree semantics assumed in this dissertation, amounts
are but one of many degree expressions.
9To be sure, these problems have been discussed in the literature in the context of English ARs. In my view,
however, this puzzle only arises in Spanish; see §1.3.3.
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1.4.3.1 ARs denote individuals
The first option involves developing a structure where the head of the relative clause is
interpreted twice, inside and outside the relative clause. Take (24) again.
(24) Pedro
Pedro
ha
♟♳♶
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
wrote
escribió.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the amount of books that Tolstoy wrote.’
In order to express the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation of (24), we cannot simply appeal to a single
instance of the noun books in the logical form, because the books that Pedro wrote and the
books that Tolstoy wrote are not the same. One way around this is to adopt a matching struc-
ture for the relative clause (see Bhatt 2002, Sauerland 2004, Hulsey and Sauerland 2006).10
For instance:
(42) Logical Form of e-denoting ARs
[♢♮ the [♬♮1 d-♫♟♬♷ books [♡♮ [♬♮2 d-♫♟♬♷ books ]j [♡♮ that Tolstoy wrote tj ]]]]
match
Consider now the interpretation of NP1:
(43) Interpretation of NP1 in (42)
λy : books(y) ∧ ∣y∣ = ♫♟♶(λd : ∃x[books(x) ∧ Tolstoy-wrote(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])
The biggest issue, from a semantic standpoint, is that the definite determiner cannot be inter-
preted. Were we to close the lambda abstract in (43) with an iota or epsilon operator–common
denotations assumed for the definite determiner in Spanish–the resulting expression would
denote a definite description entailing the existence of the books x, such that x is equal in
cardinality to the number of books y that Tolstoy wrote. That this is problematic is easier to
see with a slight variant of (24) above:
10The presentation here is an amalgam of ideas present in Carlson (1977a), Heim (1987) and von Fintel
(1999).
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(24) Pedro
Pedro
escribirá
write.♤♳♲
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
wrote
escribió.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro will write the amount of books that Tolstoy wrote’
Here the books x equal in number to the books y that Tolstoy wrote need not exist; in fact,
they should not exist, since this is not what ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are about. Moreover, there
is no one single definite plurality of books x that Pedro will write: for the sentence to be true
all it is required is that he writes any books in an amount equal to those written by Tolstoy,
not just the particular books x. Different variants of this approach all lead to the same issue:
if the final denotation of the AR is to be an individual and not a degree, the definite article
cannot be interpreted. But, of course, this is quite mysterious given the fact that ARs require
the definite article (see (7) above).
1.4.3.2 ARs denote degrees
The second option involves a derivation on which the full DP denotes a degree (Grosu and
Landman 1998, Scontras 2017). Consider the syntactic structure below, in this case involving
a raising analysis of relative clauses (e.g. Kayne 1994; Bianchi 1999 a.o.).
(44) Logical Form of d-denoting ARs[♢♮ the [♬♮ books ]j [♡♮ [♬♮ d-♫♟♬♷ tj ]i that Tolstoy wrote ti ]]]
In this case, we can interpret the definite determiner: it simply returns the greatest degree d
such that Tolstoy wrote d-many books.
(45) Interpretation of the DP in (44)⟦♢♮⟧ = ♫♟♶(λd : ∃x[books(x) ∧ Tolstoy-wrote(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])
The issue now is that we have to resolve the sortal mismatch between the resulting d-type
object and verbs taking e-type arguments. As an illustration, I will describe the solution
provided Grosu and Landman (1998) (for a different solution, see Scontras 2017). In essence,
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the authors propose to reevaluate our conception of degrees. They suggest that degrees should
not consist of particulars, but as bundles of information keeping track of what degrees are
degrees of. They suggest that degrees are functions that take a plural individual X and map
X to a tuple consisting of (i) a cardinality corresponding to X, (ii) a sortal predicate P that
corresponds to what the degree is a degree of, and (iii) the plural individual X.
(46) Structured degrees in Grosu and Landman (1998)
For all plural individuals X: ♢♣♥♰♣♣P(X) = ⟨∣X∣;P;X⟩
Thus, under this conception, degrees are used to store information about the entity they are
measuring. This allows the authors to define a function that “extracts” individuals from a
degree denoting expression whenever necessary.
(47) ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣(♫♟♶(CP)) = {x ∶ ⟨∣x∣;P; x⟩ ∈ ♫♟♶(CP)}
The operator ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣ is defined so that given a degree triple, it returns its third coordinate,
the maximal individual. Applying ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣ to the meaning obtained in (45), we obtain
a type e element, thus resolving the sortal mismatch and making it possible for the AR to
combine with regular verbal predicates. Grosu and Landman (1998) develop this analysis as
a general theory of relativization in natural languages. Thus, ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣ is designed so that it
derives the ordinary ♭♠♨♣♡♲ (intersective) interpretation of relative clauses.
The issue in this case is that we cannot have our cake and eat it too: the desired ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretation rests on not applying ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣, but if so the semantic sortal mismatch is left
unresolved. If, instead, we apply ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣, we solve the sortal mismatch by providing an
e-type denotation to the relative clause, but at the expense of losing the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation
for an ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation. The conundrum is that we need to apply ♱♳♠♱♲♟♬♡♣ (for solving
the sortal mismatch) but at the same time we cannot apply it (for thus we would loose the
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation).
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In sum, the analytical puzzles that we face have to do with the division of labor among
the different pieces that participate in ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses. The for-
mal difficulties in accounting for the three main properties of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in (14)
above–definiteness of a degree, indefiniteness of the nominal in head position and identity–are
reflective of a more general question: do relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations denote
individuals or degrees? The answer in this dissertation is that the underlying semantic nature
of these ARs is language–or construction–dependent. Thus, two solutions are offered: the
first, which accounts for the English ARs discussed here, is the object of Chapter 2. The
second solution, based off of (certain) Spanish ARs, is offered in Chapters 4, 3 and 5.
1.5 Overview of the dissertation
1.5.1 Main claims
The main contribution of this dissertation is to demonstrate that natural language allows
for at least two different means of conveying ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations with relative clauses.
Languages like Spanish make use of dedicated Amount Constructions, whereas those like
English, lacking such constructions, arrive at ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings via a more general ♩♧♬♢ read-
ing. A secondary goal is to address non-uniformity within a single language. I will argue that
all three Spanish constructions in §1.4.2 are related and constitute minimal variations over
a natural class of relative clauses. Specifically, all are genuine degree constructions, which
involve syntactic and interpretive means ear-marked for constructing degree or amount ex-
pressions.
As it was pointed out earlier, previous research considered ARs only through the lens of
degree semantics. In this respect, this dissertation makes two new contributions. First, it
provides a new solution to the analytical puzzle described in (1.4.3). Second, it shows that
taking ARs to be degree expressions is a language and construction dependent consideration,
and it does not apply to all ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations we may encounter across the board. That
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is to say that, although previous research was right in pointing to degree-based analyses of
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, these should apply to languages like Spanish, but not English.
1.5.2 Summary of chapters
• Chapter 2 In this chapter I offer a new perspective on ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of rel-
ative clauses in English that does not appeal to degree semantics. I defend the idea
that in English ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are in fact a sub-case of a more general ♩♧♬♢
interpretation. I show that such an analysis is desirable for two reasons: (i) to account
for the fact that whenever an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading is available, so is a ♩♧♬♢ reading, and(ii) to account for the fact that these constructions do not show any of the hallmarks of
ordinary degree constructions.
• Chapter 3 This chapter and subsequent ones discuss Spanish. In this chapter, the goal
is to show that Spanish truly possesses a mechanism to deliver amounts that is absent
in English. The source of the difference between the two languages lies in the ability
of Spanish to construct relative clauses that denote definite descriptions of degrees (or
maximimalized sets of degrees), that can in turn be used to build Measure Phrases.
• Chapter 4 This chapter turns to propositional ARs. It is argued that these construc-
tions have the external distribution and show syntactic properties of wh-constructions,
like subordinate questions and exclamatives. I defend a syntactic analysis that accounts
for the “hybrid” nature of these propositional relatives by treating them as involving an
interrogative core and a nominal functional layer above this interrogative CP. This syn-
tactic proposal is supplemented by a compositional semantic analysis of the structure.
The structure of these propositional ARs differs only minimally from those of nominal
ARs, making the two constructions related in ways reminiscent of the more familiar
parallels between interrogatives and free relatives.
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• Chapter 5 The last chapter provides an analysis of Degree Neuter Relatives as a kind
of ARs, and show that they, too, come in two varieties. The analyses proposed for
propositional and nominal ARs in the previous chapters is shown to extend straightfor-
wardly to account for Degree Neuter Relatives in the two environments in which we
find them.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROAD TO AMOUNTS THROUGH KINDS
Previous analyses of ARs, in some way or other, have looked at this construction through
the lens of degree semantics. The goal of this chapter is to present an analysis of these con-
structions that does not appeal to degree semantics. Instead, I will defend an analysis of
so-called ARs in English where they are understood as a sub-case of a more general ♩♧♬♢
interpretation. I show that such an analysis is desirable for two reasons: (i) to account for the
fact that whenever an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading is available, so is a ♩♧♬♢ reading, and (ii) to account
for the fact that these constructions do not show any of the hallmarks of bona fide degree
constructions. Thus, the defended analysis is not only more parsimonious, but it is also em-
pirically more adequate.
2.1 A new perspective
Though the theoretical discussion of ARs began with an exploration of English ARs, En-
glish relative clauses are much more restricted in when they allow ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings. As it
was pointed out in the introduction (see §1.4.2), besides disallowing ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
in embedded positions altogether, English speakers do not readily access ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings
in many unembedded environments, either. But, in any case, we are tasked with providing
an explanation for the fact that English relatives can give rise to ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in
at least some cases. How do these come about? This chapter offers a novel perspective on
this problem and on ARs generally, where they are not “ARs” in the technical sense at all
(i.e. they do not appeal to degree semantics; Heim 1987, von Fintel 1999, etc.). Rather, they
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involve a kind-referring head noun and a relative clause that identifies some relevant property
possessed by the kind, which may very well be “being of a certain amount or quantity”.
Though the author did not discuss it in much detail, Carlson (1977a) had already observed
that relative clauses that have ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in English also have ♩♧♬♢ readings. My
goal is to pursue a unification of these two readings. While there have been attempts to
unify the semantics of kinds and degrees/amounts (Anderson and Morzycki 2015, Scontras
2017), the hypothesis that I am exploring takes this reductionist agenda further: ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations of ARs are a form of kind interpretation. Consequently, whenever a relative
clause admits an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation it also necessarily allows a ♩♧♬♢ interpretation. This
hypothesis is spelled by the following generalization.1
(1) The ♟♫♭♳♬♲ ⊆ ♩♧♬♢ generalization:
Amount interpretations of relative clauses are parasitic on kind readings.
The general intuition is, in a nutshell, that ♩♧♬♢ readings of relative clauses highlight some
relevant property that holds of the referent of the relative clause, which may well be about an
amount.
(2) a. It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled last night.↝ It would take us years to drink champagne with some relevant property of the
champagne we spilled last night
b. the champagne that we spilled last night↭ champagne with property P
[where “the champagne that we spilled last night” is a realization of P]
For the moment, interpret the squiggly double arrow “↭” in (2b) as “somehow conveys”.
The absence of the definite article in the paraphrase is intentional: ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
of ARs have existential import, as we will see shortly (see Scontras 2017). For the moment
1It is important not interpret this relation as a biconditional; it may very well be that sometimes only kind
readings are be possible. Why this should be the case is a question that I leave open for future research.
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what counts as the relevant property P is left unspecified, it can be any property, including
both gradable properties like be d-dry as well as non-gradable properties, like be produced in
Alsace.
To show that in English ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses are in fact ♩♧♬♢ inter-
pretations I build the argument in three steps. First I show that ♩♧♬♢ readings and ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations share a number of properties. Then I show that these commonalities extend to
the behavior of the nouns kind and amount as well. Finally I show that so-called ARs are not
subject to the same constraints that affect other run-of-the-mill degree constructions.
2.2 The ࿸࿶࿻࿱-࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ connection
Carlson (1977a,b) originally observed that there seems to be a connection between ♩♧♬♢
and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. In short, he noted that relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpreta-
tions in English may also have ♩♧♬♢ interpretations. The preference in the literature to use
degree semantics to analyze ARs has somewhat hidden this connection, however.2 Thus, in
what follows I provide a number of observations supporting the similarities between ♟♫♭♳♬♲
and ♩♧♬♢ interpretations.
2.2.1 Context dependency
Generally, a sentence that gives rise to an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation can also have a ♩♧♬♢
reading. Contextual and lexical factors can favor one reading or other, either by manipulating
the context or by small changes in the sentence (e.g. picking lexical verbs that favor one
reading for independent world-knowledge related reasons). Consider:
(3) Context manipulation
a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers that the Imperial Army had.
2In recent work, Anderson and Morzycki (2015) and Scontras (2017) have provided new conceptions of
degrees that bring them closer to kinds. While this may be a good thing at the end of the day, my goal here is
simply to show that we can reduce ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations to ♩♧♬♢s without having to worry about the ontology
of degrees.
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b. A♫♭♳♬♲:
We are fighting against the Imperial Army, who have a massive army, and they always
bring many more soldiers than we do to the battlefield.
c. K♧♬♢:
The Imperial Army has some soldiers that are {good/big/well trained} and although
we have more soldiers, they always win.
The context in (3b) facilitates the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation of (3a). But (3a) is felicitous and
true if it were uttered in a context like (3c). In this case, what the sentence conveys is not that
the Imperial Army possessed more soldiers than us, but that they did possess soldiers with
some other relevant quality.
Herdan (2008), a defender of the degree abstraction approach, explicitly argues against
this extreme context dependency. She points out that adjusting the context is not always
sufficient to switch from an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ to a ♩♧♬♢ reading. The evidence she presents is reported
below.
(4) Last night I was in my cellar deciding which of the many fine wines to drink. In the end,
I drank in one hour the wine that Marv can drink in one day.↝̸ I drank in one hour as fine a wine as Marv can drink in one day.
The underlined sentence contains a relative clause that cannot be true of different degrees of
wine quality. This much is true. The context provided by the author, however, is not very
conductive to a non-♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation. Notice that the combination of a verb like drink
with temporal PPs suggests quite strongly a how much you can drink in x time type of read-
ing. Thus, by “context” we cannot mean simply “linguistic context”, for merely mentioning a
possible property that the champagne may have had does not suffice to arrive at the relevant
interpretation. Instead, the role of the contextual manipulation must be to add plausibility
to the intended interpretation. Moreover, since it is context-dependency that is a stake, what
we have to show is that the relevant reading is present in those contexts that do facilitate it.
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Showing that there are contexts where the relevant interpretation is absent teaches us little
about the distribution of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations with relative clauses. With these consider-
ations in mind, let us give another try to examples similar to (4). Below are two examples
where the ♩♧♬♢, quality-oriented reading of the relative clause is possible even with temporal
modifiers. Take a chess problem solving contest, where what matters is the difficulty of the
problems and the time it takes to solve them. In this situation, (5a) reports that I could not
solve in one hour problems as difficult as the one that Marv solved in just 30 minutes. Similar
observations hold of (5b) as well.
(5) a. I didn’t solve in one hour the chess problems that Marv solved in 30’.
b. I couldn’t run in one hour the trails that Marv runs in 30’.
In addition to simple contextual manipulations, lexical changes can also flip the bias to-
wards one or other interpretation. Thus, from Heim’s (1987) classical example, Anderson
and Morzycki (2015) give us (6a), where the ♩♧♬♢ interpretation is much more salient.
(6) Lexical manipulation
a. K♧♬♢:
It will take us the rest of our lives to find the champagne that they had that evening
b. A♫♭♳♬♲:
It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they had that evening.
Here again the source of the difference in accessibility of the two readings also comes down
to plausibility. Whereas drinking a particular kind of champagne is not obviously a task of
considerable difficulty, finding a particular kind–if it were rare enough–may be.
2.2.2 A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations without relative clauses
A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, just like ♩♧♬♢ interpretations, do not necessarily rely on the pres-
ence of a relative clause. That is, provided that we have enough contextual support, the relative
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clause might be dropped altogether. The examples in (7) show that both ♟♫♭♳♬♲ and ♩♧♬♢
interpretations are possible with nouns modified by PPs.
(7) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ/K࿶࿻࿱ interpretations with PPs
a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers of the Imperial Army.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but we don’t have the students in the department
anymore.
For instance, the sentence (7b) might refer to the fact that in the department we do not have
enough students to set up a team anymore, or it could be that the students we have are not
willing to participate. Similar interpretations are available for (8b) as well, with bare DPs.
(8) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ/K࿶࿻࿱ interpretations with bare DPs
a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but don’t have the students anymore.
While the availability of ♩♧♬♢ interpretations might not come as a surprise in these cases, the
presence of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations is puzzling from a perspective where they require a degree
variable originating in a subordinate position.
2.2.3 The role of the definite article
K♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are also related by the fact that they involve definite
articles that fail to do their usual job. Notice that neither sentence in (9) is about some definite
object-level champagne. That is, when we are talking about kinds of champagne or about
amounts of champagne, we are not referring to any particular instance of champagne.
(9) a. K♧♬♢: …to find (*the) [champagne of the kind that we spilled last night]
b. A♫♭♳♬♲: …to drink (*the) [champagne in the amount that we spilled last night]
What these sentences convey is an existential statement, namely, that there is some cham-
pagne of some kind or in some amount such that we spilled that kind/amount of champagne.
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The definiteness is therefore not about the champagne, but about a kind or an amount. The
following paraphrases are more explicit about this.
(10) a. K♧♬♢: …to find the kind of champagne of that we spilled.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲: …to drink the amount of champagne that we spilled.
(11) a. K♧♬♢: …to find that kind.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲: …to drink that amount of champagne.
This type of interpretation seems to be a particularity of the definite article. In fact, as Carlson
(1977a) and Grosu and Landman (1998) noted, the definite article seems to be necessary in
all these examples.
(12) a. K♧♬♢:
It will take us the rest of our lives to find {the / *a / *some / *few / *two} champagne
that there was at the party that evening.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲:
It will take us the rest of our lives to drink {the / *a / *some / *few / *two} cham-
pagne that there was at the party that evening.
In addition, these readings are generally incompatible with the complementizer which, as
demonstrated by (13).
(13) a. K♧♬♢:
It will take us the rest of our lives to find the champagne {that / ∅ / *which} there
was at the party.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲:
It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne {that / ∅ / *which} there
was at the party.
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2.2.4 A connection with exclamatives
Relative clauses are not the only construction where it is possible to get both ♩♧♬♢ and
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations: it is also present in nominal exclamatives, which are superficially
identical to restrictive relative clauses. This is true of matrix as well as subordinate exclama-
tives.
(14) a. It’s amazing the cars he owns.
b. The cars he owns!
(15) a. K♧♬♢: what’s remarkable/surprising is the kinds of cars he owns.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲: what’s remarkable/surprising is how many cars he owns.
For completeness, notice that the same syntactic constraints we saw above with relative clauses
apply to these exclamatives.
(16) a. *It’s amazing {some / few / many} cars he owns!
b. *{Some / Few / Many} cars he owns!
(17) a. *It’s amazing the cars {that / ∅ / #which} he owns!
b. *The cars {that / ∅ / #which} he owns!
2.2.5 Wrap-up
The similarities between ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses suggest that
a satisfactory analysis should be able to account for the observed correspondence between the
availability of the two types of interpretation. It is a more parsimonious perspective and we
would otherwise lose a robust generalization.3 The next step is to explore some corollaries of
3Bear in mind that one could still maintain that only the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading requires a special treatment, and the
rest of the readings are just interpretations allowed by the definite article. The fact that ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
require the definite article makes this claim hard to disprove, and I will not consider it.
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the generalization in (1). First, if ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings are really parasitic on ♩♧♬♢ interpretations,
no relative clause that permits ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings should do so to the exclusion of a ♩♧♬♢ reading.
Second, if ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are reducible to ♩♧♬♢ interpretations in some capacity, we
should not be surprised to observe similarities in the behavior of the nouns kind and amount.
And third, since ♩♧♬♢ readings do not involve degree abstraction and are not subject to the same
syntactic and semantic restrictions that degree constructions are, it is predicted that relative
clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations do not show any of the hallmarks of degree abstraction.
I examine these questions in turn.
2.3 Distribution of the nouns amount and kind
If ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings of relative clauses are related in any way, we should not be
surprised to find similarities between the semantic behavior of the nouns kind and amount
when they appear in constructions like the kind/amount of. Below I provide six arguments in
favor of this connection.
Argument 1 Both nouns only allow existential readings when they appear with demonstra-
tive pronouns like this and that. The examples below show that both nouns are unable to refer
to particular objects (but see Scontras 2017 for a contrary opinion about amount and footnote
5 for discussion).
(18) I want [that amount of apples].
a. 8O♠♨♣♡♲: I want [those apples there (pointing at them)]
b. 3A♫♭♳♬♲: I want [apples in the indicated amount]
(19) I want [that kind of apples].
a. 8O♠♨♣♡♲: I want [those apples there (pointing at them)]
b. 3K♧♬♢: I want [apples of the indicated kind]
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Argument 2 Both nouns impose constraints on how they refer to kinds (Carlson 1977a,
p.212). For example, the noun kind can be used to talk about different subkinds, as in two
kinds of dogs, which refers to two different subkinds of dogs, like bull-dogs and beagles.
However, when used this way (typically as the restrictor of some quantifier), kind can only
refer to subkinds whose realizations are disjoint. As an example, consider (20) below. Fido
is a border collie (a kind of dog) and a watch-dog (another kind of dog). And yet (20) cannot
be used to describe a situation as in (20b) where only Fido is sitting in the next room, despite
the fact that Fido instantiates both subkinds in the real world. From this Carlson concludes
that using the noun kind to quantify or count subkinds requires that the objects that instantiate
these subkinds be disjoint.
(20) Two kinds of dogs are sitting in the next room.
a. 3There are three bull-dogs and two beagles.
b. 8There is only Fido, who is a border collie and a watch-dog.
Similar observations hold of nouns like amount and quantity (see Scontras 2017 as well).
Some speakers accept expressions like amounts of apples–or perhaps quantities of apples–in
(21) to mean that there are two different quantities of apples on the table, e.g., one weighing
two kilos and another one weighing four. However, take a situation now where there is a single
pile of apples whose amount has been determined by weight (three kilos of apples) and by
numbering the apples (twelve apples). Just like in (20) above, (21) cannot be used to refer
to these two these two amounts (three kilos and twelve in number), even though the pile of
apples on the table is both an amount of three kilos of apples and an amount of twelve apples.
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(21) There are two { ?amounts / quantities } of apples on the table.
a. 3There are two piles of apples. [only for some speakers]
b. 8There is one pile of 12 apples weighting 3 kilos.
We can attribute the infelicity of this sentence in a situation like (21b) to the same reason
that Carlson proposed for (20) above: when we reference to amounts, each object can only be
counted/measured once.
Argument 3 Carlson (1977b) noted that pseudo-partitive constructions with measure nouns
have the ability to relativize, be questioned and pronominalize. The following are his exam-
ples:
(22) Pseudo-partitives
a. Those are the beans that Bob ate three {pounds / bags} of.
b. What did Bill see two {pounds / bags} of?
c. Bob saw three {pounds / bags} of {them / it} yesterday.
The nouns kind and amount can also be used to form kind- and amount-referring expres-
sions in a similar syntactic frame as pseudo-partitives. However, as Carlson (1977b, p.341)
showed, kind of constructions differ from examples like (22) in their ability to allow these
three syntactic operations.
(23) Kind nouns
a. ??Those are the beans that Bob ate three kinds of.
b. ??What did Bill see two kinds of?
c. ??Bob saw three kinds of {them / it} yesterday.
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Amount of constructions show the same patterns as kind of constructions in disallowing these
operations (Scontras 2017).4
(24) Amount nouns
a. ??Those are the beans that Bob ate three {amounts/quantities} of.
b. ??What did Bill see two {amounts/quantities} of?
c. ??Bob saw three {amounts/quantities} of {them / it} yesterday.
Argument 4 The two nouns behave alike in contexts that typically induce Definiteness
Effects. As originally pointed out by Milsark (1974), there-be existential constructions in
English seem to be reserved for indefinites, bare plurals and other weak DPs. But unlike
ordinary definite DPs, definites with the nouns kind and amount are allowed in this position.
(25) a. *There are those {books / apples} in the library.
b. There are {books / apples} in the library.
(26) a. There are those kinds of books in the library.
b. There is that amount of apples in the kitchen.
Argument 5 Both nouns are possible in superficially transitive and intransitive forms, with
no apparent shift in meaning (Wilkinson 1995); compare to other pseudo-partitives in (29).
4Barbara Partee (pc.) notes that the implausibility of (23) and (24), at least with respect to their ability to
relativize and be questioned, might not be a formal anomaly. For instance, the following are much improved:
(i) a. Which beverages does that place have the most kind of?
b. What did he order small quantities of?
(ii) a. That’s the beverage that the store has three kinds of.
b. That’s the whiskey that she ordered small quantities of.
(iii) He ordered small quantities/amounts of it/them every week.
It could be, then, that the apparent ungrammaticality of these constructions is simply a reflection of the difficulty
to find appropriate contexts for them.
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(27) a. That kind of animal is sitting on my lawn.
b. An animal of that kind is sitting on my lawn.
(28) a. That amount of water is too much.
b. Water in that amount is too much.
(29) a. Those { bags / ?pounds } of potatoes are too much.
b. *Potatoes in those { bags / pounds } are too much.
Argument 6 Another aspect where amount and kind nouns behave like indefinites is re-
vealed by adverbs of quantification. Below both sentences in (30) are interpreted as involving
quantification over times/situations.
(30) a. Equations of that kind rarely have two different solutions.
b. An equation of that kind rarely has two different solutions.
Wilkinson (1995) observes that the same is true of the intransitive variant of the noun kind.
Despite being headed by a definite determiner, a demonstrative, (31) below has an identical
interpretation to (30a) and (30b).
(31) That kind of equation rarely has two different solutions.
As we have observed throughout this section, amount patterns once again like kind (Scontras
2014, 133), and both sentences below are interpreted alike.
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(32) a. That amount of apples rarely busts the bags.
b. Apples in that amount rarely bust the bags.
Summing up, there is an undeniable similarity between the syntactic and semantic be-
havior of the nouns kind and amount.5 These similarities along with the fact that ♩♧♬♢ and
♟♫♭♳♬♲ relatives show parallel behavior even in the absence of the relevant nouns, speaks in
favor of an analysis of the two constructions where one is derived from the other.
2.4 Degree abstraction or lack of thereof
The evidence we have seen so far indicates a tight connection between the behavior of
the nouns kind and amount and the availability of the corresponding interpretations with re-
strictive relative clauses. In this section I present arguments against a degree based approach
for relative clauses with an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading, which makes an alternative, non-degree based
analysis necessary. The alternative analysis presented below will capitalize on the similarities
between kind and amount reference seen in the previous sections.
5There is one place where a potential difference between the two words may arise. According to Scontras
(2017), amount (also quantity but neither number nor kind) is able to refer to definite objects.
(i) a. I want that {amount / quantity} of apples over there ↝ those particular apples
b. #I want that number of apples over there ↝̸ those particular apples
c. #I want that kind of apple over there ↝̸ those particular apples
I have some reservations about the availability of this interpretation for amount. Many of speakers I have con-
sulted disagree with the judgment. Maybe the relevant reading requires an interpretation of amount more in
the line with pile or perhaps quantity, which seem to allow definite readings more easily. I can think of two
reasons why we might prefer not to allow definite readings of the noun amount. First, if amount can refer to
definite objects, we lose an explanation for the ungrammaticality of examples like (24c) above, since nothing
would preclude pronominals to refer back to that entity (but see footnote 4). Second, if amount were able to
refer to definite objects rather than amounts, the following dialog would be predicted to be felicitous, contrary
to intuitions.
(ii) In the fruit store they have different containers as samples to illustrate how much fruit they can fit. I
point at one of those sampling containers that is full of strawberries and I say: “I want that amount of
strawberries”. The seller then proceeds to fill in an identical empty container with fresh strawberries and I
complain: “Why are you doing that? I said I wanted THAT amount of strawberries.”
In this dialog, given my first utterance, I am not entitled to any complaint because the vendor could not possibly
interpret that amount of strawberries as referring to any particular strawberries.
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2.4.1 Contextual support
The first, perhaps on-the-surface fact that makes us question the presence of a degree
operator is the observation that ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are accessible even in the absence of
a relative clause (e.g., replaced by a PP or dropped altogether). This suggests that we need
not depend on the presence of a degree operator in a subordinate CP position in order to get
at the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation. The following examples are repeated from above.
(7a) We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers of the Imperial Army.
(8a) We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers.
2.4.2 Sub-deletion
The process known as sub-deletion is considered a hallmark of degree abstraction (Kennedy
1997, 2002). For instance, comparatives and equatives all allow sub-deletion.
(33) a. I brought more bananas than you brought apples.
b. I brought as many bananas as you brought apples.
Classifier Relatives too differ from other pseudo-partitives and from kind of relatives in that
they allow sub-deletion.
(34) a. I brought the { amount / quantity } of bananas that you brought of apples.
b. *I brought the pounds of bananas that you brought of apples.
c. *I brought the kind of water that you brought of stones.
In contrast, relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations never allow sub-deletion.
(35) *It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they spilled wine that
evening.
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The lack of sub-deletion properties of (35) points towards a fundamental difference in how
the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations arise in (33) and (34a) on the one hand and ARs on the other.6
2.4.3 Islands
The last argument, the one that I find more compelling, is the lack of island effects with
relative clauses that permit an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation. There is a subset of syntactic islands, the
so-called weak or sensitive islands, which only allow extraction of certain kind of grammatical
expressions. It is more or less agreed that words and expressions that range over individual
entities are good extractees, as opposed to words that range over other domains, like degrees,
times, manners, etc., which often incur so-called island violations.
The form of the argument that I present here is the following. If relative clauses require
degree abstraction to obtain ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, they should pattern together with other
constructions that involve the same operation in showing weak-island sensitivity, much like
comparatives, equatives and how many questions. By the same token, relative clauses with
an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation should contrast with individual who questions, which involve ab-
straction over individuals, and are able to be extracted from weak islands. Below, I examine
the behavior of e-denoting vs. d-denoting wh-words in weak-island contexts as our baseline,
and compare this with the behavior of comparatives, equatives and relative clauses. Note,
of course, that the arguments can only go through if the relative clauses retain the ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretation.
6The contrasts above are damaging for degree based accounts in a variety of ways, depending on the particular
implementation of each analysis. For instance, Scontras (2017) assumes a raising syntax for Classifier Relatives
which, taking (34a) at face value, seems like a non-starter. But adopting a matching-style analysis without further
ado would still not do, since then the impossibility of sub-deletion in (35) would remain unaccounted for. Grosu
and Landman (2017), on the other hand, equate Classifier Relatives to pseudo-partitive constructions and only
by adding some stipulations can they account for the contrast between (34a) and (34b).
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2.4.3.1 Negative islands
The interaction between degree operators and negative and other downward entailing op-
erators was noted early on the works that pioneered degree semantics for the study of com-
parative constructions (see von Stechow 1984). An influential view popularized by Rullmann
(1995) attributes the ill-formedness of the (36) examples below to the impossibility of max-
imalizing a set of degrees that contain a negative operator in its scope.
(36) a. *How many soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
b. *We have more soldiers than the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
c. *We have as many soldiers as the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
In short, the issue is that the maximality operator, as commonly defined, presupposes a max-
imal degree among all the degrees in the set that it ranges over (see definitions of ♫♟♶ in
§4.3.2.1 and §5.3.1). In the absence of such maximal degree, the expression is undefined,
yielding ungrammaticality (in the sense of Gajewski 2002; see Abrusán 2014 and Rett 2015
for discussion). Thus, in the examples above, there is no maximal number of soldiers that the
Imperial Army did not have, since presumably that number is infinite, and thus the result of
the maximalizatization operation is undefined.
The ungrammaticality of the previous examples contrasts with the grammaticality of cases
where the extractee lives in the domain of individuals, such as which and what.
(37) Which soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
Now, if we look at relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, we observe that they pattern
like (37) and unlike the examples in (36) above. Many speakers admit an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading of
(38) without further ado: it amounts to saying that our soldiers exceeded in number those of
the Imperial Army. (Out of the blue, the ♩♧♬♢ interpretation of (38) is also available.)
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(38) We won the battle because we had the soldiers that the Imperial Army didn’t have.
Some speakers may need some more contextual support. Suppose that our school is com-
peting against other neighboring schools to get some fellowship. Crucially, in order to get
the fellowship there are certain stringent constraints on how many students schools may have,
such that having a certain number of students may maximize your chances of obtaining the
fellowship. In this case, (39) expresses that we had an amount of students such that your
school did not have as many students.
(39) Our school got the fellowship because we had the students that yours didn’t have.
2.4.3.2 Tenseless wh-islands
The case of tenseless wh-islands presents a similar contrast in English. First we observe
that there is indeed a difference in acceptability between extracting an entity denoting element
and a degree denoting element from a position embedded within a tenseless verbal phrase.
(Some speakers might feel less of a contrast in this case because, while infinitival wh-islands
are only weak islands in English, tensed wh-islands are strong islands.)
(40) a. *How many soldiers are you wondering whether to hire to fight the Imperial Army?
b. Which soldiers are you wondering whether to hire to fight the Imperial Army?
As before, other degree constructions pattern with (40a) as well.
(41) a. *We hired more soldiers than you wondered whether to hire to fight Imperial Army.
b. *We hired as many soldiers as you wondered whether to hire to fight Imperial Army.
In contrast with (40a) and (41), the relative clause in (42) is grammatical and felicitous under
an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, even though the head of the relative clause is extracted from a
tenseless verb phrase. Consider, for instance, a situation where two generals are discussing
how many soldiers they should hire to fight against the Imperial Army. While one of them
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is indecisive about hiring a certain number, the second one goes ahead and hires that many
soldiers. In this case, (42) is true and felicitous.
(42) We won the battle because we had the soldiers that you wondered whether to hire to
fight the Imperial Army.
2.4.3.3 Presuppositional islands
Presuppositional islands are induced by extracting material out of linguistic contexts that
carry some kind of presupposition. There are various types of presuppositional islands, and
we will review three here. Generally speaking, it is assumed that movement of a wh-operator
from under a factive predicate is bad if the gapped embedded clause denotes a unique element
(see Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993, Schwarz and Simonenko 2016 a.o.). This accounts for the
observed difference between the following two questions:
(43) a. To whom do you regret having shown this letter?
b. *From whom do you regret having gotten this letter?
Different accounts offer different perspectives as to why and how this should be the case,
but for our purposes we can assume the following simplified picture. The culprit of the ill-
formedness of (43b) is the presupposition of the verb regret, where x regrets that p presupposes
that x believes that p. Following the characterization in Abrusán (2014), a question like (43a)
presupposes that you have shown the letter to the relevant number of people in the domain.
That is, the presupposition of regret is argued to project universally: for every x in the given
domain, the speaker believes you have shown the letter to x. This presupposition is unprob-
lematic. However, (43b) will likewise presuppose that you have gotten this letter from a
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number of people, and this presupposition cannot ever be met by one-time-only predicates.7
With this general schema in mind, we can now look into particular cases.
2.4.3.3.1 Factive verbs Factive islands are created by factive (negative) predicates like
regret, as in (43) above (Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993). Under a classical approach to degree
questions (e.g. von Stechow 1984), a question like (44a) in interpreted as For what degree d
did John regret that he spilled d-much wine at the party? If regret projects its presupposition
universally, (44a) should presuppose that John believes that he spilled an infinite amount of
wine: for every degree d, John believes that the amount of wine that he spilled is at least d.
This corresponds to the maximal degree in the scale, which in this case is undefined.
In general, degree questions of the form ?d[φp(d)] where φp(d) is an expression presup-
posing p(d) are predicted to presuppose that p(d) holds to the maximal degree on the scale
required by the gradable predicate, which is undefined in the case of quantity predicates and
open scale adjetives.8 However, in the case of identity questions like (44b), no such infelicity
arises: the presupposition of (44b) simply states that John has spilled a number of things at
the party (and that he believes so).
(44) a. *How much wine has John regretted that he spilled at the party?
b. What does John regret that he spilled at the party?
That the infelicity of (44a) is related to the presence of degrees is confirmed by the ill-
formedness of (45), with a comparative and an equative construction.
7This is, in a nutshell, Abrusán’s (2014) theory of presuppositional islands created by degree extraction as
well: the resulting expressions carry a presupposition that is contradictory, and so no context will be able to
satisfy it.
8This is in fact one of themain criticisms by Fox andHackl (2007) andAbrusán (2014) to classical approaches
to degree questions, since the prediction is that degree questions should be felicitous with closed scale adjectives,
contrary to fact: *How empty did John discover that his account was? Solutions to the puzzle include the proposal
that all scales that natural grammar employs are dense (Fox and Hackl 2007) or some version of the interval
theory of degrees (Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002, Heim 2006).
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(45) a. *We drank more wine than John regretted that he spilled at the party.
b. *We drank as much wine as John regretted that he spilled at the party.
As before, we observe that the same is not true of relative clauses: ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings of sen-
tences like (46) survive extraction of the head of the relative clause from a position inside the
factive islands. As discussed by Grosu and Landman (1998) and Meier (2015) modal verbs
can sometimes facilitate the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, so readers having difficulty to get at the
relevant interpretation with (46a) can try (46b) instead.
(46) a. We drank the wine that John regretted that he spilled at the party.
b. We can easily drink the wine that John regretted that he spilled at the party.
2.4.3.3.2 Other factives Honcoop (1998) observed that certain factive nouns and adjec-
tives that take propositional complements also induce weak islands. For instance, while the
noun suprise in a construction like it was a surprise that p presupposes that (the speaker believes
that p, adjectives like possible do not. Correspondingly, only surprise-type nouns induce weak
islands. Below the contrast is illustrated with the adjective scandalous and the noun possible.
(47) a. *How much whiskey was it scandalous that John drank at the age of 16?
b. How much whiskey is it possible that John drank at the age of 16?
As expected, weak islands can be obviated by extracting entity denoting wh-words instead of
wh-words ranging over degrees, as witnessed by the contrast between (47a) and (48) below.
(48) What was it scandalous that John drank at the age of 16?
Looking at the comparative and equative counterparts of (47a), we observe that the same kind
of contrast is reproduced here as well. Extraction out of comparatives and equatives is also
banned with surprise-type nouns, but no so with possible-type ones.
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(49) a. ??We drank more whiskey than it was scandalous that John drank at the age of 16.
b. ??We drank as much whiskey as it was scandalous that John drank at the age of 16.
(50) a. We drank more whiskey than it is possible that John drank at the age of 16.
b. We drank as much whiskey as it is possible that John drank at the age of 16.
In contrast, (51) demonstrates that the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading of a relative clause is retained in those
environments where genuine degree constructions are ill-formed. The sentences below may
be used to express that what we drank is the amount of whiskey such that it was scandalous
that John would drink that amount of whiskey at the age of 16.
(51) a. We drank the whiskey that it was scandalous that John drank at the age of 16.
b. We can easily drink the whiskey that it was scandalous that John drank at the age
of 16.
2.4.3.3.3 Response stance verbs Response stance verbs like deny, verify, admit, etc. are
presuppositional in the sense that they “presuppose that their complements express assump-
tions or claims held by someone possibly other than the speaker which are part of the common
ground” (Honcoop 1998, 167). In the case of deny, x denied that p presupposes that it is as-
sumed by someone that p. The presuppositional status of this family of verbs is not as clear
cut as that of factives, and in fact for many speakers there is little–if any–contrast between
the two examples in (52) below.
(52) a. *How much wine has John denied that he spilled at the party?
b. What does John deny that he spilled at the party?
For those speakers that are not so willing to accept island violations like (52a) with deny,
however, the same contrasts can be reproduced by looking a comparatives/equatives on the
one hand and relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations on the other.
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(53) a. *We drank more wine than John denied that he spilled at the party.
b. *We drank as much wine as John denied that he spilled at the party.
(54) We drank the wine that John denied that he spilled at the party.
2.4.4 Interim summary and conclusion
We have shown that the connection between ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations is quite per-
vasive. Moreover, we have seen that there are reasons to cast doubt on the presence of degree
abstraction in relative clauses, even when they permit an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation. Coupled
together, these two facts suggest that subsuming ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations under ♩♧♬♢ interpre-
tations is not only defensible, but desirable.
The rest of the chapter is devoted to spell out this intuition in concrete terms. First, I
show that amount and (sub)kinds share sufficient structural properties so as to understood
the former in terms of the latter. Then, I show what it means to be a subkind and why the
relative clause is critical. Finally, I provide a compositional analysis of subkind predication
that taken in tandem with the previous conclusions, accounts for ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of
English relative clauses.
2.5 Getting from kinds to amounts
We started off the chapter by providing an intuitive paraphrase of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings of rel-
ative clauses that reflected the fact, extensively discussed in the previous sections, that relative
clauses that allow ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations also allow ♩♧♬♢ interpretations. Here it is repeated
again:
(2) a. It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled last night.↝ It would take us years to drink champagne with some relevant property of the
champagne we spilled last night
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b. the champagne that we spilled last night↭ champagne with property P
[where “the champagne that we spilled last night” is a realization of P]
This way of paraphrasing the relevant interpretation of the relative clause aims at reflecting
both the nature of the head noun as well as the role of the relative clause. In a nutshell, I
would like to argue that these relative clauses make reference to subkinds. More specifically,
in (2), the head noun champagne provides the name of a kind that we can then reference and
attribute properties to. The role of the relative clause is to determine a relevant subkind from
the kind-level object provided by the head noun, by highlighting some property that holds of
its referent. This property P may be underspecified and context-dependent. For instance, for
the sentence above, we could any have any of the following:
(55) a. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be x kind⟧ b. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be d-dry⟧
c. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be d-much⟧ d. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be d-expensive⟧
This way of looking at sentences like (2a) captures their overall vagueness–the champagne
that was spilled could have any number of properties bearing on the time it would take us
to drink an equivalent champagne. The key unifying factor, however, is that the property
contributes a way of narrowing down the space of possibilities for the subkind in question.
In what follows, I will first provide some background on subkinds before discussing how
♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings may be thought of as a species of subkind reference.
2.5.1 On subkinds
2.5.1.1 The definite article and ad hoc subkinds
As is well known, kind-referring terms in English generally have to be bare plurals. Def-
inite DPs in generic statements, as in (56), lead to ungrammaticality or oddness.9
9The restriction is not absolute, however. In certain contexts, sentences like (56) become better.
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(56) a. (#The) lions are widespread.
b. (#The) whales are extinct.
However, there are specific environments where the definite article can be used to make ref-
erence to a kind. Consider (57), where a kind-referring term is further restricted by the use
of an anaphoric demonstrative or a relative clause.
(57) Basic paradigm with kind [based on Zamparelli (1998)]
a. Anaphoric demonstratives
i. This kind of lion is widespread.
ii. This kind of whale is extinct.
b. Relative clauses
i. The kind of lion that eats people is widespread.
ii. The kind of whale that had horns is extinct.
The pattern is the same even when the head noun kind is dropped, suggesting that the definite
article is not altogether ruled out in bare kind-referring terms.
(58) Reduced paradigm without kind
a. Plural anaphoric demonstratives
i. These lions are widespread.
ii. These whales are extinct.
b. Relative clauses
i. The lions that eat people are widespread.
ii. The whales that had horns are extinct.
(i) a. Unlike other types of big cats, (the) lions come in several varieties. [Barbara Partee, pc.]
b. (The) dinosaurs became extinct at various points in time. [Dayal 2004]
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Crucially, (57) and (58) refer to subkinds of lions and whales, as opposed to the natural kinds
on the whole.10 Moreover, subkind-referring expressions like those in (57) and (58) need not
be natural or well-established; they can be ad-hoc. This is easily seen in (58b): the lions that
eat people, for instance, do not form a natural class; in fact, they may comprise of individual
lions in several subspecies of lion and exclude others in the same subspecies.
Chierchia (1998b, 348) thought of kinds as regularities that occur in nature, whose only
property is that “we can impute to them a sufficiently regular behavior”. Ad hoc subkinds al-
low us to do something similar in real time, that is, impute a regular behavior to some subset of
a kind without prior agreement as to whether the behavior in question actually qualifies as suf-
ficiently regular. This is a very useful mechanism if, with Chierchia (1998b), we believe that
what counts as kind is not set by the grammar, but amounts instead to conventional (shared)
knowledge of a community of speakers. It allows us to talk and ask questions about very
specific kinds. As an illustration, the following examples were retrieved from the internet.
(59) a. Are you the kind of student who relishes an academic challenge, is intellectually
curious, seeks out opportunities to help others, and wants to lead others to impact
change in your local community, our environment and the world?
b. He’s the kind of man who can work two jobs in his sleep, always has a side-hustle
in mind to earn more money, and guards his savings with his life.
To summarize, we saw that while simple definite descriptions (without the noun kind) do
not generally make good kind-referring terms in English, they can be used to pick out salient
subkinds in certain restricted contexts. Moreover, these subkinds may be ad hoc. Thus, we
need two things to form an ad hoc subkind: (i) a semantic sortal–something to be a kind
of–, and (ii) some means to identify what the relevant subkind is. (i) is provided by a kind-
10I am assuming no ontological difference between kinds and subkinds. Others do make a difference be-
tween “well established” kinds and “non-well established” kinds, which Pelletier and Schubert (1989) refer to
as “formal” kinds and Krifka (1995) calls “concepts”. Given the difficulties to define the notion of being “well
established”, I will not assume such distinction. (Simply saying that it amounts to a taxonomic distinction won’t
do; for discussion, see Chierchia (1998b).)
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referring noun. Anaphoric demonstratives, relative clauses (and sometimes PPs and other
modifiers like adjectives) can accomplish (ii).
The analysis I defend here capitalizes on the possibility of constructing ad hoc subkinds
and the grammaticality of the definite article when making reference to such subkinds. Before
turning to this analysis, however, we must discuss a restriction on forming subkinds.
2.5.1.2 The disjointness condition
Forming subkinds, ad hoc or not, is not completely free. Carlson (1977a) noted that when
referring to different subkinds, the subkinds must be disjoint, they cannot share realizations.
We saw this before: a sentence like (20), repeated below, cannot be verified by a situation
where only Fido is sitting in the next room, even though Fido in fact belongs to more than
one kind of dog (assume that he is a watch dog and a border collie in the real world, thus
effectively belonging to these two different subkinds of dogs).
(20) Two kinds of dogs are sitting in the next room.
Carlson (1977b) spelled out the constraint as follows (adapted from Carlson 1977b, 213):
(60) D♧♱♨♭♧♬♲♬♣♱♱ C♭♬♢♧♲♧♭♬
A kind-referring expression can only refer to a contextually defined subset of all the
possible subkinds that the noun is true of, such that:
i. the subkinds in this subset are disjoint and share no realizations,
ii. the subkinds collectively cover all the space of realizations of the kind.
This condition is fundamental in understanding how ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations can arise qua ad
hoc subkinds, and will be discussed in further detail below.
2.5.2 What amounts and kinds have in common
In order to make the connection between ad hoc subkinds and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
maximally salient, I will recast Carlson’s (1977b) disjointness condition in terms of partitions.
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More specifically, reference to subkinds must be mediated by an equivalence relation that
induces a partition on the denotation of its relevant superkind. How this equivalence relation
is determined is context dependent; as a consequence, part of the task when interpreting an ad
hoc subkind referring expression involves retrieving this equivalence relation from the context.
Following Cresswell (1976), Klein (1980) and many others, degrees can be understood as
equivalence classes of ordinary objects. That is, the degree of my height can be defined by
the set of all people who are the same height as me, an amount of champagne as the set of all
portions of liquid of equal volume, etc. Because interpreting ad hoc subkinds involves figuring
out what the equivalence relations is, and because some equivalence relations can serve to
define degrees, there is no reason why ad hoc subkinds should not make reference to portions
of equal amounts, just like the refer to sets of entities. Coming back to the example in (2)
above, we could say that the equivalence relation be the same kind as would give us a partition
of champagne individuals according to their kind (e.g. blanc de noirs, blanc de blancs, rosé
champagne…). The equivalence relation be as sweet as would partition the different types of
champagne in terms of their sweetness (extra brut, brut, extra dry…), whereas an equivalence
relation be as much as would partition the denotation of champagne in different amounts (1L,
2L, 3L…or perhaps 1 bottle, 2 bottles, 3 bottles…).
In what follows I elaborate on the details of this account.
2.5.2.1 Partitions
We first introduce the notions of equivalence relation and equivalence class. An equiva-
lence relation is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation that determines whether any two
subsets are sufficiently equal with respect to some measure.
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(61) Relations: Let A be a non-empty set and R a relation in A. Then:
a. R is reflexive iff ∀a ∈ A[R(a;a)]
b. R is symmetric iff ∀a;b ∈ A[R(a;b)→ R(b;a)]
c. R is transitive iff ∀a;b; c ∈ A[R(a;b) ∧ R(b; c)→ R(a; c)]
For instance, the equivalence relation be as old as holds of all twins, but it does not hold of
any parent–child pairs.
(62) Equivalence Relation: Let R be an equivalence relation. Then:
a ≃R b iff ∀x[(R(a; x)↔ R(b; x)) ∧ (R(x;a)↔ R(x;b))]
An equivalence class collects in a set all the elements that are equal with respect to some
equivalence relation. In our previous example, it would return the set of all things that have
the same age.
(63) Equivalence Class: Let [ ]R be a function from a domain D to POW(D) such that:∀x ∈ D[[x]R = {y ∶ y ∈ D ∧ x ≃R y}]
If R is an equivalence relation, [x]R represents the equivalence class containing x. Thus, if y
is also a member of [x]R, then [x]R = [y]R. Equivalence relations are useful for us because
they can induce a partition.
(64) Partition: Let A be a non-empty set. A partition is a collection of subsets of A iff (i)
for any two subsets X and Y, X ∩ Y = ∅ and (ii) the union of all subsets of A equals A.
Each subset that is a member of some partition is called a cell. An equivalence relation R is
able to induce a partition on a set A, because any two members x and y can only be in the
same cell if (and only if) they are related by R. Similarly, the collection of all the equivalence
classes on A with respect to R forms a partition: every member of each equivalence class [x]
is related to every other member of [x] via R and not related to any member of any other set.
Thus, a partition is simply a collection of all equivalence classes arising from some equivalence
relation.
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(65) Collection of Equivalence Classes on D: {X ⊆ D ∶ ∃x ∈ DR[X = [x]R]}
As an illustration, let us return to Fido in (20). Given the equivalence relation be the same
breed as, Fido is a member of the cell containing border collies, the equivalence class [F]breed.
By the same token, if the equivalence relation were have the same role as, Fido would be in
the cell containing watch dogs, [F]role. Given the properties of partitions, Fido cannot live
in two cells at the same time, and so we have to chose one or the other equivalence relation.
Hence the ill-formedness of (20).
2.5.2.2 Degrees as equivalence classes
2.5.2.2.1 Foundations The agenda of reducing degrees to existing objects that are better
understood and less abstract goes back to Cresswell (1976), but see also Klein (1980, 1991),
Hoeksema (1983), Rullmann (1995) and more recently Bale (2006, 2008). The basic tenet
in Cresswell (1976) is to view degrees as equivalence classes of individuals.11
I illustrate the main idea with an adjective A. Associated with any gradable predicate (an
adjective, adverb, verb, etc.) there is a two-place relation ⪰A, and a set DA. The set DA is a
subset of the universe of discourse containing all and only those objects of which the adjective
can be sensibly predicated. This is just a lexical requirement to make sure that a set like Dtall
contains people, mountains, etc., but not ideas or colors, since the latter cannot be sensibly
attributed a height.
The relation ⪰A is reflective of our conceptual ability to determine, from any two individ-
uals, which has more of a certain quality than another. From this intuition, Cresswell (1976)
suggested to define ⪰A as follows:
(66) ⟨Dtall; {⟨x; y⟩ ∶ x; y ∈ Dtall and x is as tall as y}⟩
11In the rest of the chapter I make use of this notion, but in a slightly different way from Cresswell’s (1976):
rather than taking degrees to be equivalence classes, it suffices to assume that it is possible, for any one degree
d, to determine the set A of things of which d holds. Similarly, any plural individual x will have a natural
corresponding degree d stating its cardinality. This is reminiscent of the mappings existing between kinds and
properties (e.g. Chierchia 1998b). Thus, this should not be understood as radically switching conceptions of
degrees; there is still room for simplex degrees in the ontology.
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The relation ⪰A has certain properties. First, it is reflexive. Given any one individual x, x is as
tall as x. Second, it is transitive. For any three individuals x; y and z, if x is as tall as y and y
is as tall as z, then x as tall as z (i.e. if ⟨x; y⟩ and ⟨y; z⟩ are members of the relation, then so is⟨x; z⟩). And third, the relation is connected. If any individuals x and y are in Dtall, then either⟨x; y⟩ or ⟨y; x⟩ is in the relation. The resulting relation is weaker than a partition, it only fits
the criteria for being a pre-order (or connected quasi-order).
One of Cresswell’s (1976) main contributions was to show that it is possible to build a
scale from an underlying pre-order. The process requires two basic steps–although only the
first one concerns us here. First, one must partition the domain of individuals in the pre-order.
Then, the resulting equivalence classes are ordered with respect to each other by a relation that
is congruent with the underlying pre-order.12 In this case, we can easily define an equivalence
relation from ⪰A as follows.
(67) x ≃A y ↔ x ⪰A y ∧ y ⪰A x
Now we can partition a domain according to ≃A as we did before. The degree of A-ness of an
object x, say degA(x) can be defined as the set of all objects that stand in the ≃A relation to x:
(68) degA(x) = {y ∈ DA ∶ x ≃A y}
As a consequence, the degree to which Liz is tall, degtall(Liz) can now be identified with the
set of all objects that are exactly as tall as Liz. Proceeding alike for all the individuals in DA
we can get the set DEGA, the set of all equivalence classes into which DA is partitioned by ≃A.
DEGA is now a partition, since ≃A is reflexive, transitive and symmetric (and non-connected,
by virtue of equivalence classes being disjoint sets).
12There a number of ways we can order equivalence classes. Rullmann (1995), following Klein (1991),
provides a simple one. The relation ⪰A may induce a relation ≥A on the members of DEGA such that degA(x) ≥A
degA(y) iff x ⪰A y∧y ⪰̸A x. It can be shown that ≥A takes the equivalence classes in DEGA (i.e. the degrees) and
induces a linear (total) order–a relation that is reflexive, transitive, connected, and antisymmetric. For discussion
and proofs, see Cresswell (1976), Klein (1991) and Bale (2006).
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(69) a. Reflexivity: ∀d;d′ ∈ DEGA[d ≃A d′]
b. Transitivity: ∀d;d′;d′′ ∈ DEGA[[d ≃A d′ ∧ d′ ≃A d′′]→ d ≃A d′′]
c. Symmetry: ∀d;d′ ∈ DEGA[d ≃A d′ → d′ ≃A d]
In this view, each degree d corresponds to one of the cells in the partition DEGA induced on
the set DA. For instance, in the case of DEGtall (and a very reduced domain) we may have:13
(70) Representation of DEGtall as a partition
d:f : John, Sue Liz
d:f : Mary, Al
df : Mike, Helen
d:f : Hilary
2.5.2.2.2 Cardinalities The details of how to establish partitions from pluralities require
some discussion of what individuals we consider with respect to the partition. Suppose we
induce a partition over a set A via the equivalence relation “be the same cardinality as”. Now
take a plurality of two people a ⊕ b. Claiming without further ado that both a and b live in
the cell corresponding to those pluralities of cardinality might get us in trouble, because the
same individuals a and bmight team up with a third individual c to be part of a second cell in
the partition, the one corresponding to pluralities of cardinality . Intuitively this seems to go
against the disjointness condition.
The solution is to adopt a Link (1983) style approach to pluralities (see §4.3.1.1 and foot-
note 11 in Chapter 4 as well). According to Link, plural entities are just sums of individuals
(and not sets), as concrete as the individuals that serve to define them and of the same logical
type. Plural morphology signals the presence of a pluralization operation ∗ which generates
13Notice that the thresholds of the degrees should be overtly determined, so that there is no vagueness what-
soever as to where exactly every individual belongs in the partition. In the example above the cut-off point was
the nearest inch, so the actual equivalence relation should read be as tall as, to the nearest inch.
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all the individual sums of members of the extension of any 1-place predicate. This oper-
ation forms a complete join-subsemilattice in the domain D of individuals that ∗ generates
by operating over atoms. That is, D is closed under the join operation, and a ⊕ b is the
“individual-sum” of a and b. This gives us the following structure on D:
(71) Denotation of ∗D where D = {a;b; c}:
.
a⊕ b⊕ c
a⊕ b a⊕ c b⊕ c
a b c
If a mapping exists between degrees and sets of individuals, as discussed above, each level in
the Linkian structure above can be seen as an equivalence class. Assuming that cardinalities
are simply degrees, as it is common practice, we can create a partition DEGcard on D by the
equivalence relation ≃card.
(72) a. x ≃card y ↔ x ⪰card y ∧ y ⪰card x [where ⪰card = a cardinality as big as]
b. degcard(x) = {y ∈ ∗D ∶ x ≃A y}
The result is a partition of the domain of plural individuals according to their cardinality.
(73) Partition DEGcard on ∗D:
a⊕ b⊕ c
a⊕ b, a⊕ c, b⊕ c
a, b, c
The equivalence class [a ⊕ b]card corresponds to all plural individuals of cardinality  in the
domain, such that [a⊕ b]card = [a⊕ c]card = [b⊕ c]card. Because plural individuals are individ-
uals with full rights, we need not look into their composing parts. That is, a and b only belong
to the bottom cell in (73); the fact that a⊕ b is a member of a different cell is inconsequential
in this respect.
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2.5.2.2.3 And back to ad hoc subkinds Let us turn back now to ad hoc subkinds. We
started by asking about the connection between ad hoc subkinds and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
of relative clauses. My answer here is that we can arrive at both interpretations by appealing to
partitions. Concretely, both constructions require a suitable equivalence relation that projects
the partition. In the case of ad hoc subkinds, we saw evidence for this in Carlson’s (1977b)
disjointness condition, which I have reproduced in the language of partitions. In the case of
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, we have seen that amounts, and degrees at large, can also be defined
as equivalence classes, as sets of individuals, which in turn can induce a relevant partition.
In order to make the connection between ad hoc subkinds and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of
relative clauses explicit, we have to look a bit further into ad hoc subkinds. Ad hoc subkinds
are inherently vague referring expressions. Although they refer to subkinds, they do not do so
in a direct way. Compare:
(74) a. The blue whale is becoming extinct.
b. The whales that you like so much are becoming extinct.
One can refer to a subkind by directly mentioning its name. In this case, blue whale stands for
a (taxonomic) subkind of whale. But not all subkinds have names; in fact, very few do. For
all we know, the kind of whales that you like so much could be blue whales, but it could as
well be almost any collection of whales that you fancy. That is, the subkind whales that you
like so much are a subkind just by virtue of your liking them so much. In this case, then, the
only “sufficiently regular behavior” that we may impute them is precisely that you like them
so much.
I suggest that the sole role of the relative clause in ad hoc subkind reference constructions
is to provide information that helps determine what the relevant sufficiently regular behavior
is. How exactly does the relative clause fulfill this role? It does so by restricting, in more or
less the usual way, the denotation of the kind-denoting NP, e.g. whale in (74b), to a subset of
whales. Crucially, this subset must be a member of one cell in a partition of whale subkinds.
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Given the nature of partitions, information about one cell can help us form at least a bipartition,
for instance, lumping together in one cell the individual whales that you like, and all the ones
that do not belong in this cell occupying the sole other cell of the partition. Of course, the
more information we might have about your preferences, the richer the partition could be.
Under this view, a critical part of resolving ad hoc subkind reference is being able to
determine an equivalence relation that puts all the whales that you like in a single cell. This is
not always as straightforward as it may seem and, sometimes, vagueness is rampant. Consider
again:
(2a) It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled last night.
In this example, the champagne that we spilled last night is referring to an ad hoc subkind
of champagne. If we go with the taxonomic interpretation of the sentence, we partition the
domain of champagne into its different subkinds, andwe assume that the particular champagne
that the spilled last night lives in one of the cells. For instance, if we spilled a very rare kind
of prestige cuvée:
(75) Champagne partitioned by taxonomic kinds
Prestige cuvée ↝ the champagne that we spilled last night was a prestige cuvée.
Blanc de noirs
Blanc de blancs
Rosé Champagne
Each one of the cells above contains the individual instances of champagne that correspond
to each kind. (In this respect, the table above is just a shortcut to the actual partition, whose
members are always individuals, not kinds.) Carlson’s (1977b) disjointness condition is met
by resorting to an equivalence relation like be the same type as. Now, it could be that the
reason why it would take us so long to find the champagne that we spilled last night is because
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it was much sweater than usual. In that case, we can generate the relevant partition from an
equivalence relation like be as sweet as.14
(76) Champagne partitioned by sweetness in gr. of sugar per litre
d < gr
: < d < 
: < d < 
: < d < 
: < d < 
d ≥  ↝ the champagne that we spilled last night was d-sweet.
To reiterate: subkind reference must be mediated by a partition to ensure that the domain
is covered by non-overlapping sets. This partitioning is carried out by an equivalence relation
that is only contextually determined. In the case of ad hoc subkind reference, the only condi-
tion that the equivalence relation must meet is that it assigns the denotation of the full modified
NP (together with the relative clause or PP modifier) to a single cell in the partition. As long
as this is observed, any equivalence relation might do. Thus, the only difference between (75)
and (76) above is that different equivalence relations are picked in different contexts.
At this point, it is straightforward to extend the same reasoning to the classical AR exam-
ples and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. Since we know that cardinalities can be defined in terms of
equivalence classes, there is no reason why the required equivalence relation cannot be of the
form be as much as. For instance, for the classical champagne example (2a), we could envi-
sion a partition like (77) (although partitions with different levels of granularity are possible,
including partitions where champagne is measured by numbers of bottles).
14These are not arbitrary, see http://www.nytimes.com////dining/iht-wine.html.
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(77) Champagne partitioned by volume
0L ≤ d < 1L
1.1L < d < 2L
2.1L < d < 3L
3.1L < d < 4L
4.1L < d < 5L ↝ the champagne that we spilled last night was d-much.
…
If this rationale is correct, ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses are simply a case of ad
hoc subkind reference. Thus, the only analysis we need is one that derives ad hoc subkind
reference, and no appeal to degree semantics is necessary.
2.5.3 Interim conclusion
Making reference to subkinds requires structuring the domain in a certain way. I have
argued that one way of capturing this requirement is by partitioning the relevant domain.
Once this step is taken, a parsimonious account of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of ordinary rel-
ative clauses is made available. Assuming degrees to be definable in terms of equivalence
classes, we can exploit the idiosyncracies of ad hoc subkind reference to induce a partition
of the domain introduced by the relevant kind term established via an equivalence relation
that is in turn based on quantities or amounts. Given the evidence reported in sections §2.2
through §2.4 above, this account offers a number of advantages: (i) it accounts for the per-
vasive similarities between expressions that can refer to kinds and amounts in terms of their
the syntactic/semantic properties, (ii) it accounts for the lack of evidence for degree abstrac-
tion, and (iii) it relies on mechanisms that are independently needed for the interpretation of
subkind-referring expressions as well as mappings between degrees and equivalence relations
independently argued for in the literature about degrees.
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2.6 Compositional implementation
The final task of this chapter is to provide a compositional analysis of ad hoc subkinds.
In the reductionist approach advocated here there is no need for degree-specific machinery
to account for ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of ARs, since these do not involve degrees in the usual
sense. They only involve degrees insofar degrees are one way of many to attribute the suf-
ficiently regular behavior required to refer to subkinds. The compositional derivation that I
present below, therefore, is a derivation of ad hoc subkind interpretations.
2.6.1 Basic semantics of kinds
In laying out my assumptions about kind reference I am following Chierchia (1998b) for
the most part. The topic of kind reference is much richer than I can do justice here, and
nothing of consequence for the derivation of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations bears on the particular
implementation that I offer below. There is one novelty in the analysis that I will spell out:
the use of a particular kind of mapping between kinds and subkinds, but this may be easily
adapted to any other theory of kind reference (e.g., Carlson 1977b, Wilkinson 1995, Krifka
1995, Borer 2005, etc.).15
What is a kind? Kinds are individuals whose spatiotemporal manifestations are discon-
tinuous. In this sense, they are like plural individuals, which do not form a whole. Kinds can
be regarded as the totality of individuals that belong to it; the kind dog can be identified as the
sum of all individual dogs, which can then be modelled as the largest member of the plural
individual comprising all dogs.
15The discussion that follows is simplified at least in two respects: First, I will gloss over the fact that kinds are
intensional objects, and thus they require the use of world/situation variables; otherwise we could not distinguish
kinds whose extensions are identical in the actual world (as with the tyrannousaurus and the brontosaurus).
Second, the ontology assumed by Chierchia (1984, 1998b) requires particular versions of set theory that I will
not discuss here. In short, in Chierchia’s (1984) system, the domain U is assumed to be a join semilattice, and
kinds K are assumed to be both a subset of the atomic individuals in U as well as a subset of the intension of
U, Us. The issue is that the cardinality of Us is greater than U and so we have to make sure that K is not so big
that it does not fit into U. See Chierchia and Turner (1988) for discussion and a solution in terms of Property
Theory.
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For any property, like the property of being a dog, there is a corresponding kind, the dog-
kind. Conversely, natural kinds have a corresponding property (the property of belonging to
that kind). This correspondence suggests that there must be mappings from one to another.
In Chierchia’s (1984) system, properties may be systematically mapped to their individual
correlates via a nominalization function, the “down” operator ∩. Likewise, individuals may be
mapped to their corresponding properties via the inverse of ∩, the “up” operator ∪. That is,
while the down operator is a “nominalizer”, the up operator is a “predicativizer”.
(78) Property–kind mappings
a. Predicativization
Let d be a kind. Then for any world/situation s, ∪d = λx:x ≤ ds, if d is defined,
false otherwise (where ds is the plural individual that comprises all of the atomic
members of the kind).
b. Nominalization
For any property P and world/situation s, ∩P = λs:ιPs if λs:ιPs is in K; else undefined
(where Ps is the extension of P in s and K is the set of kinds).
The mappings in (78) are useful because they permit us to go back and forth between prop-
erties and their corresponding kinds. The system now provides two different ways to look at
properties. Kinds qua predicable entities are essentially incomplete or “unsaturated” (pretty
much like run-of-the-mill properties). However, just like properties (e.g. run), kinds can
be nominalized and so turned from predicative into argumental objects (e.g the running). In
effect, this means that kinds have a second live as individuals. This individual objects are usu-
ally referred to as the individual counterparts of kinds. In Chierchia’s (1984, 54–55) words,
“properties have two modes of being: one as ‘intrinsically functional’ entities, the other as
individuals systematically correlated to those entities”.
At this point it helps to lay out the two relevant subsets of the domain D, along with
the variables I will use for each type. Kinds are individuals with their own rights, and so they
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belong to their own domain Dk, a subset of D. In order to represent kinds and object variables,
I follow the convention, after Carlson (1977b), of using the subscripts k for kind level and o
for object level variables. Thus, we can talk about the domain of object-individuals Do, to the
exclusion of the domain of kind individuals, Dk.
Given that we have mappings between properties and kinds, it is useful to look at some
correspondences. Following the usual convention, I use small caps to name a kind, such
that ♢♭♥ is the dog-kind. Then, the dog-kind ♢♭♥ is equivalent to the nominalization of the
property of being a dog, (79a). In turn, the property of being a dog is equivalent to the
predicativization of ♢♭♥.
(79) a. ♢♭♥ = ∩λx:∗dog(x)
b. ∪♢♭♥ = λx:∗dog(x) = ∪∩λx : ∗dog(x)
Let us now look at how kinds enter into the semantic computation. Kinds have the possibility
to combine both with kind-level and with object-level predicates. In the first case, kinds are
attributed some property directly by the main predicate. In the second case, most commonly
with episodic sentences, we encounter a mismatch between a kind denoting argument and an
predicate that lexically selects for non-kind predicates.
(80) a. Dogs are {widespread/extinct/common}.
b. Dogs are barking outside my window.
In (80a) we encounter a case of direct-kind reference: the dog-kind, the individual correlate
of the property of being a dog, is taken directly as an argument by a verb that selects for
kinds.16 To derive this interpretation, we simply take the plural property denoting the totality
of dogs (λx: ∗dog(x)) and apply the down operator to retrieve its individual correlate.
(81) ⟦(80a)⟧ = extinct(∩λx:∗dog(x))
16If, instead, we try to combine a kind level predicate with an individual-denoting object, the result is seman-
tically ill-formed. For instance, Fido cannot be extinct.
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The example in (80b) is different in that now the dog-kind serves as an argument to an
individual-selecting predicate. In this case, the predicate does not attribute properties to the
dog-kind, but to object-level instances of the dog-kind; (80b) asserts the existence of some
individual dog that is barking. In other words, the sentences existentially quantifies over indi-
viduals that belong to the dog-kind and attributes them the property of being barking outside
my window. To achieve this result, Chierchia (1998b) proposes a new rule of composition:
(82) Derived Kind Predication (DKP):
If P applies to objects and k denotes a property, then P(k) = ∃x[∪k(x) ∧ P(x)]
The rule DKP solves two problems: it provides a means to solve the sortal mismatch and
introduces existential quantification over instances of a kind.
(83) ⟦barking-outside-my-window⟧(⟦dogs⟧) =∃x[∪∩λx:∗dog(x) ∧ barking-outside-my-window(x)]
Notice that, given the definitions in (78) above, we can further unpack (83) in (84), which
may be more transparent:
(84) ⟦barking-outside-my-window⟧(⟦dogs⟧) =∃x[x ≤ ♢♭♥ ∧ barking-outside-my-window(x)]
In prose, there is some individual specimen of ♢♭♥ (some particular dog) that is barking
outside my window.
2.6.2 From kinds to subkinds
The next and final step to arrive at the desired ad hoc subkind interpretations involves a
mapping from kinds to subkinds. There are a number of mappings in the literature between
kinds and subkinds (e.g. Krifka et al. 1995, Wilkinson 1995, Zamparelli 1998), usually car-
ried out by an operator, which is very similar in meaning to the noun kind in expressions like
kind of dog. In accordance to the discussion above, however, we need a mapping that will
partition kinds, not just any subkind extracting operation.
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From the discussion in §2.5.2.1 we know what those conditions are. A partition of a kind
K is a set G of subsets of ∪K that covers ∪K and where members of G do not share any
instantiating individuals.
(85) Cover: A set of subkinds G is a cover of a kind K iff:
a. G is a set of non-empty subsets of ∪K.
b. ∀xo[xo ≤ K→ ∃yk ∈ G[xo ≤ yk]]
In prose: for every object-level individual xo that realizes the kind K, there is a kind-individual
yk in G that xo is a realization of. This is only a necessary condition, but not sufficient, for no
individual can instantiate two distinct subkinds of G. We need to add a ban on overlapping
subkinds:
(86) No overlap:∀xo[∃yk ∈ G[xo ≤ yk]→ ¬∃zk ∈ G[yk ≠ zk ∧ xo ≤ zk]]
We can now simply define a partition function that meets these two criteria.17
(87) Kind partition funcion
A partition∏ is a ⟨kt; kt⟩ function such that for any kind K,∏(K)meets two conditions:
a. ∀xo[∃yk ∈∏(K)[xo ≤ yk]→ ¬∃zk ∈∏(K)[yk ≠ zk ∧ xo ≤ zk]]
b. ∀xo[xo ≤ K→ ∃yk ∈∏(K)[xo ≤ yk]]
As an illustration, consider the case ofK = ♢♭♥ andG = {♡♭♪♪♧♣; ♮♳♥; ♥♰♣♷♦♭♳♬♢; ♠♣♟♥♪♣; : : :}.
Then condition (a) states that if xo is an instance of the kind ♢♭♥, there is some subkind yk
in the set of subkinds G that xo is also an instance of. This conditions make sure that all par-
ticular dogs belong to some subkind, to some breed in this case. In turn, condition (b) states
that if xo is an instance of the subkind yk, there will be no additional subkind zk in G that xo
17Here the partition function is defined over kinds, but it can also be defined over sums once a the relevant
part-whole properties of sum-individuals are made explicit; see Gillon (1987) and Schwarzschild (1996) for
discussion.
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also realizes. This is reflective of the fact that, if Fido is a beagle, he cannot be any other
breed. More generally, the function ensures that if we partition the dog-kinds by breed, all
border-collies will be in the same cell of the partition, and, say watch-dog border-collies will
not be able to occupy their own–despite being a subkind of dogs as well in the actual world.
2.6.2.1 Basic cases
Now we can move on and talk about how to derive subkinds. We first induce a partition
of a kind into the set of the individual correlates of its subkinds. We can do this by defining
a kind-to-subkind operator that makes use of the partition function:
(88) ⟦KSK⟧ = λxk:λyk:∏(xk)(yk)
That is: KSK targets a kind, xk, and returns a set of kind-individuals that partition it. The
function returns the set of (individual correlates of) subkinds that are in the partition.
(89) ⟦KSK⟧(⟦♢♭♥⟧) = λyk:∏(♢♭♥)(yk) = λyk:∏(λx:∗dog(x))(yk)= {∩λx:∗greyhound(x); ∩λx:∗collie(x); ∩λx:∗beagle(x); : : :}= {♥♰♣♷♦♭♳♬♢; ♡♭♪♪♧♣; ♠♣♟♥♪♣; : : :}
If we want to account for its use with demonstratives (e.g., that dog), we may adopt the se-
mantics of the anaphoric demonstrative provided by Scontras (2017):
(90) a. ⟦that⟧ = λP:ιxk[P(xk) ∧ ∪xk(thati)] [where thati = ♠♣♟♥♪♣]
b. ⟦that dog⟧ = ιxk[λyk:∏(♢♭♥)(yk)(xk) ∧ ∪xk(♠♣♟♥♪♣)]= ιxk[xk ∈ {∩λ:∗greyhound(x); ∩λ:∗collie(x); ∩λ:∗beagle(x);…} ∧ ∪xk(♠♣♟♥♪♣)]= ιxk[xk ∈ {♥♰♣♷♦♭♳♬♢, ♡♭♪♪♧♣, ♠♣♟♥♪♣,…} ∧ ∪xk(♠♣♟♥♪♣)]= ∩λx:∗beagle(x) = ♠♣♟♥♪♣
Here the kind interpretation of that dog simply returns whatever subkind of dog is retrieved
by the anaphor, in this case the individual-correlate of the ♠♣♟♥♪♣ subkind. Unless we provide
more criteria, however, the partition function does not have a way to determine what the
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subkinds need to be. In this sense, these results echo Krifka et al.’s (1995) taxonomic function,
which picks as its default a collection of natural or well-established subkinds.
2.6.2.2 Ad hoc subkinds
The final step is to manipulate the criteria that determine how we partition a kind. Put
differently, in order to build ad hoc subkinds, we have to override the taxonomic default we
saw earlier. I suggest to enforce this in the following way. The kind is partitioned just like we
did above, but now the property contributed by the relative clause is used to further constraint
what the relevant subkinds might be.
(91) ⟦KSKah⟧ = λxk:λP⟨et⟩:λyk:∀zo[(∪xk⋂P)(zo)→ zo ≤∏(xy)(yk)]
Let us unpack (91). KSKah is a function that takes a kind-individual xk and a property P and
returns a set of kind-individuals yk. This is a set of subkinds of xk. What is special about
this set of subkinds is that all lions that eat people must instantiate some subkind yk. That
is, all individuals zo that live in the intersection of (i) the property denoted by the relative
clause–expressed as P–, and (ii) the property correlate of the kind xk, must in turn realize
some subkind yk. Moreover, because yk is a subkind of xk in a partition of yk, all zo must
belong to the same subkind.
Let us work out an example. Consider:
(92) The lions that eat people
Lions that eat people do not conform to a natural class, so this is a task for KSKah and ad hoc
subkinds. Syntactically, assume a structure like the following.
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(93) DP
D
the
NP1
NP2 CP
that ti eat peopleKSKah NP3i
♪♧♭♬
By the time KSK gets to enter into the derivation, the NP already denotes a kind.18
(94) a. ⟦NP2⟧ = ⟦KSKah⟧(⟦♪♧♭♬⟧)= λP⟨et⟩:λyk:∀zo[(∪♪♧♭♬ ⋂ P)(zo)→ zo ≤∏(♪♧♭♬)(yk)]
b. ⟦NP1⟧ = λyk:∀zo[(∪♪♧♭♬ ⋂ ⟦CP⟧)(zo)→ zo ≤∏(♪♧♭♬)(yk)]= λyk:∀zo[lion(zo) ∧ eat-people(zo)→ zo ≤∏(♪♧♭♬)(yk)]
The first conjunct in the last line above returns a set of kind-individuals that forms a partition
of lions and where (iii) one of the cells of the partition contains lions that eat people. As a
consequence, non-people-eating lions will have to be in other cells in the partition. It follows,
then, that the cells in the partition cannot contain taxonomic subkinds anymore, since no
partition of lions in terms of their subspecies will contain the ad hoc subkind of lions that eat
people in one its cells. Thus, as desired, this method of referencing ad hoc subkinds overrides
the (taxonomic) default we alluded to above.
But how is then the rest of the partition completed? The most likely way is to find a suit-
able equivalence relation that groups all people-eating lions in the same cell. An equivalence
relation eat the same asmight do. With this equivalence relation we obtain a partition of lions
like the following.
18There a number of ways of doing this within; for discussion see Carlson (1977b), Zamparelli (1998), Dayal
(2004), Kratzer (2005), Borer (2005) a.o. Bear in mind however that different options entail different views of
how nouns come to denote kinds.
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(95) {∩λ:∗lions that eat people; ∩λ:∗lions that eat carrion; ∩λ:∗lions that eat grass…}= {♪♧♭♬♱ ♲♦♟♲ ♣♟♲ ♮♣♭♮♪♣, ♪♧♭♬♱ ♲♦♟♲ ♣♟♲ ♡♟♰♰♧♭♬, ♪♧♭♬♱ ♲♦♟♲ ♣♟♲ ♥♰♟♱♱…}
What matters most is that the modifier, the relative clause in these case, is telling us what
one of the subkinds must be.19 Now the definite article can simply contribute an ι-operator:⟦the P⟧ = the largest member of P, if there is one. It applies to the set of subkinds of lions that
eat people and returns its maximal element, lumping them together in the individual correlate
of the property be a people-eating lion.
(96) = ιyk:∀zo[lion(zo) ∧ eat-people(zo)→ zo ≤∏(♪♧♭♬)(yk)]= ∩λz:∗lion(z) ∧ eat people(z)
We are almost done. The resulting DP can serve as an argument to non-kind-selecting pred-
icates via Derived Kind Predication (see (82) above). The kind interpretation of a sentence
like (97a) is in (97b).
(97) a. You like the lions that eat people.
b. ∃y[∪(∩λz:∗lion(z) ∧ eat people(z))(y) ∧ like(y)(you)]
That is, a sentence like (97a) asserts the existence of an instantiation of the ad hoc lion subkind
that eats people, and that you like those instantiations.
With this, we are done. A sentence like (98a) receives a single interpretation (under its
♩♧♬♢ reading), stated in (98b).
(98) a. In thirty minutes Mary saw the birds that John saw in a day.
b. ∃y[∪(∩λx:∗bird(x)∧ saw-in-a-day(x)(John))(y)∧ saw-in-thirty-minutes(y)(you)]
Notice that, practically speaking, (98b) may be interpreted in any number of ways. This is
because all the semantics of KSKah forces us to do is find a partition of birds where the birds
19Bear in mind that in order to avoid overlapping cells in the partition we have to be careful about the language
we use to express the relevant subkinds. Thus, if we want to consider lions that eat people and carrion as an
available subkind, we should differentiate between them and lions that only eat people.
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that John saw in a day live in one cell. What characterizes those birds is determined by the
context. For instance, it could be that John saw very strange birds, and that Mary saw birds
of comparable strangeness in a shorter span of time. This is a possible interpretation of (98a)
and is captured by (98b). Alternatively, it could be that John saw n-many birds in one day
and Mary saw as many in a shorter span of time. What particular criteria we adopt is set by
its plausibility in the context, provided that the partition requirement is satisfied.
2.7 Assessment and conclusion
The merits of looking at English so-called ARs this way are various. All the properties of
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of ARs discussed in sections §2.2 through §2.4 follow without further
ado, namely, (i) it accounts for the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ ⊆ ♩♧♬♢ generalization in 1 above, which states that
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses are parasitic on kind interpretations; (ii) it provides
a newway to look into the connection between the words amount and kind (coincidentally with
recent results by Scontras 2017); (iii) it explains why ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are not subject
to the typical restrictions that we observe with constructions that involve degree-abstraction
and degree-operators. Thus, if the results reported here are on the right track, ARs in English
may not exist as we knew them. This conclusion, however, only extends to the type of ARs
discussed in this dissertation, and not to other potential candidates (e.g. ACD ARs, etc.).
Before concluding, I must point out two issues on which the view that ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpre-
tations are parasitic on ♩♧♬♢ readings does not shed light on. The analysis presented here
does not make predictions about when or why ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are not available. In
some contexts where ♩♧♬♢ interpretations are quite natural, ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations seem to
be unavailable, and no tinkering with the context will improve the situation. Complex demon-
stratives provide the clearest example. Take the two questions in (99) and the answer in (100).
Only the question in (99a) may receive an answer like (100).
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(99) a. How long have you been drinking Pinot Noir?
b. How long have you been drinking three bottles of wine every day?
(100) I’ve been drinking that wine for ten years now. 3(99a); 8(99b)
This means that although (100) is a good answer to a question asking about a taxonomic kind,
it is not a good answer to a question inquiring about amounts. Intuitively, the answer that
works for (99b) is the minimally different (101).
(101) I’ve been drinking that much wine for ten years now. 8(99a); 3(99b)
A further potential issue of this account has to do with noun kind itself.20 If ♟♫♭♳♬♲ inter-
pretations are really ad hoc subkind interpretations, then why is the noun kind incompatible
with the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation? Consider:
(102) a. We didn’t have the soldiers that they had. 3♟♫♭♳♬♲; 3♩♧♬♢
b. We didn’t have the kind of soldiers that they had. 8♟♫♭♳♬♲; 3♩♧♬♢
Given the analysis provided here, the noun kind in (102b) is doing what the kind-to-subkind
operator KSKah is doing covertly in (102a). And yet the an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation is out in
(102b). Perhaps, then, the operator KSKah does not fully parallel the English word kind, but
I do not have an answer yet as to why or how that should be.
Nothing of what we have said so far hints a solution for these two issues, and so I will
leave them open here.
20I thank Seth Cable for pointing this out to me.
77
CHAPTER 3
NOMINAL AMOUNT RELATIVES IN SPANISH
3.1 Initial considerations
The goal of this chapter is to analyze Spanish Amount Relatives when they appear as
complements to predicates that take nominal arguments. I will refer to these constructions
as nominal Amount Relatives, nominal ARs for short. From a semantic standpoint, nominal
ARs in Spanish seem to be no different from their English counterparts. Thus, the classic
examples that we find in the literature on ARs in English work with nominal ARs in Spanish
as well.
(1) a. Nos
us.♢♟♲
llevaría
take
años
years
beber
drink
el
the
champán
champagne
que
that
derramamos
spilled
en
in
la
the
fiesta.
party
‘It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled at the party’
b. Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
tenía
have
nuestro
our
enemigo.
enemy
‘We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers that our enemy had’
The distinguishing property of Spanish is that it shows a greater degree of freedom in the
construction of nominal ARs, and allows them in environments where they seem to be im-
possible in English. Of the examples below, only the Spanish variants are reported to have
the relevant ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations out of the blue.
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(2) a. He
aux
visto
seen
los
the
pájaros
birds
que
that
tú
you
has
aux.
visto.
seen
‘I have seen the birds that you have seen.’
b. Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
c. Juan
Juan
ha
aux
traído
brought
las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
year
pasado.
past
‘Pedro has brought the apples that brought Pedro last year.’
In contrast, English speakers seem to require considerable more contextual support to accept
sentences like (2). For instance, take (2b) above: out of the blue, the English translation is
odd, presumably because nobody can write the same books that Tolstoy wrote. This oddness
is indicative of the lack of an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation. But now consider the same example in
the following dialog.
(3) Emil Sinclair is an incredible young writer. I was reading about him today and, you won’t
believe it, he is only 30 and he has already written the books that Tolstoy wrote.
There is a contrast–at least for some speakers–between (2b) and (3): in (3) the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ inter-
pretation is now easier to access. But the fact that Spanish allows ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in
(2) quite effortlessly raises the possibility that the source of the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation in the
two languages is underlyingly different.
The goal of this chapter is to argue that Spanish truly possesses a mechanism to deliver
amounts that is absent in English. In a nutshell, I locate the source of the difference between
the two languages in the ability of Spanish to construct relative clauses that denote definite
descriptions of degrees (maximimalized sets of degrees, to be precise), that can in turn be
used asMeasure Phrases. Moreover, the syntactic structure that permits us to do so in Spanish
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differs minimally from the analysis of propositional ARs that I will present in Chapter 4. The
resulting picture is one where propositional ARs and nominal ARs are related to each other
in the same exact way in which interrogatives clauses and free relative clauses relate to each
other.
From a semantic point of view, the analysis captures the three main properties of ARs at
large, as discussed in §1.3.1 and summarized below.
(4) Desiderata for ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations
a. Definiteness: A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations refer to a definite amount.
b. Indefiniteness: The head of the relative clause in interpreted as an indefinite.
c. Identity: A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations require a comparison of two amounts of same stuff.
The chapter takes off by first discussing the syntactic aspects of nominal ARs in Spanish,
which will be crucial to understanding the differences between English and Spanish. Then, I
propose a semantic analysis of Spanish nominal ARs and conclude with a general assessment.
3.2 Quantity free relatives in Spanish
3.2.1 Finding the pieces to build nominal ARs
Spanish has an independent ability to generate relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpreta-
tions in simple contexts similar to (2). Moreover, it can do so through either one of two
constructions: cuanto and lo que free relatives. Though these constructions do not superfi-
cially match nominal ARs, we can identify in them all the pieces that are required to derive
the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation for nominal ARs. In a nutshell, the way that I propose to look at
nominal ARs is the following. We start off with the observation that Spanish allows ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations where English does not (at least not readily). The burden of explaining this
contrast is placed on a particular syntactic structure which is available in Spanish but absent
from English. Evidence for this syntactic construal comes from relative constructions other
than nominal ARs, the already mentioned cuanto and lo que free relatives. It follows then
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that Spanish nominal ARs cannot be mere ordinary headed relative clauses, but something
else. Thus, I propose an analysis of Spanish nominal ARs where they are in fact very closely
related to propositional ARs, on the one hand, and free relatives, on the other, but crucially
different from restrictive relative clauses.
Following this narrative, the syntactic make-up of nominal ARs depends on certain prop-
erties of Spanish free relatives that are absent from English. The first such property is the
ability to form quantity free relatives. Quantity free relatives are free relatives formed with
the quantity relative pronoun cuanto, and are somewhat of a rarity even among Romance
languages. The examples in (2) all have variants with cuanto that have the relevant ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretation.
(5) a. He
aux
visto
seen
cuantos
how many.♫♱.♮♪
pájaros
birds
has
you
visto
aux
tú.
seen
‘I have seen as many birds as you have seen.’
b. Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
cuantos
how many.♫♱.♮♪
libros
books
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy wrote.’
c. Juan
Juan
ha
aux
traído
brought
cuantas
how many.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
year
pasado.
past
‘Juan has brought as many apples as Pedro brought last year.’
Free relatives formed with cuanto have the ability to pied-pipe an NP to the front of the
relative clause. Excluding -ever free relatives, this is not generally possible in English (see
also Caponigro 2002 and Cecchetto and Donati 2015 for a cross-linguistic assessment of this
generalization), nor in lo que free relatives in Spanish.1
1At this point, I do not have an answer as to why English only allows how many free relatives with ever. There
are a number of semantic properties that distinguish the two types of free relatives, most notably that ever free
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(6) a. *I read what book you read.
b. *He
aux
leído
read
lo
the.♬♲
libro
book
que
that
tu
you
has
aux
leído.
read
Thus, the ability to form quantity free relatives with cuanto constitutes the first piece of ev-
idence that Spanish has nominal wh-constructions that specifically deliver ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpre-
tations. Moreover, the lack of analogous constructions in English give us a first point of
divergence between both languages.
The second piece of evidence comes from lo que free relatives. Spanish is a language that
cannot form free relatives with the relative pronoun que (“what”). Instead, a CP headed by
the complementizer que appears directly as the complement of the definite article.2
(7) Juan
Juan
comió
ate
lo
the
que
that
Pedro
Pedro
cocinó
cooked
‘Juan ate what Pedro cooked’
The derivation of a lo que free relative involves a null wh-operator that raises from a CP
internal position to [Spec,CP], very much like in ordinary free relatives, as is clear from the
comparison of the two structures in (8) below (e.g. Gutiérrez-Rexach 2014).
(8) a. English free relative
[♢♮ D∅ [♡♮ whati [ C○[+♰♣♪] ∅ [♲♮ Pedro cooked ti ]]]]
b. Spanish lo que free relative
[♢♮ lo [♡♮ Opi [ C○[+♰♣♪] que [♲♮ Pedro cocinó ti ]]]]
relatives have a modal flavor (Dayal 1997, von Fintel 2000 a.o.). However, it is not clear how the cross-linguistic
morphological generalizations observed by Caponigro (2004) bear on these semantic differences.
2The consensus is that in lo que free relatives que is not a pronoun, just a complementizer. For discussion
see Brucart (1992a) and Arregi (1998) a.o.
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The structures are formally identical, differing only in the pieces that each language realizes
overtly vs. covertly: Spanish shows overtly what English does covertly, and vice-versa.
Summing up, Spanish has both the ability to form free relatives with overt definite articles
and the ability to form free relatives with nominal heads that have quantity-oriented meanings.
These are the two pieces that I will use to build nominal ARs in Spanish.3
3.2.2 Semantic considerations
Now that we have laid out the syntactic considerations regarding cuanto and lo que free
relatives in Spanish, we ask how their structures are interpreted to give rise to ♟♫♭♳♬♲ inter-
pretations. From a semantic point of view, it is obvious why cuanto free relatives are able to
deliver ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, since it is part of the lexical content of cuanto (“how many”).
But lo que free relatives are ambiguous. The sentence in (9) has both an ♭♠♨♣♡♲ and an ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretation.
(9) Es
is
imposible
impossible
comer
eat
lo
the
que
that
Juan
Juan
come.
eats
i. ‘It is impossible to eat what Juan eats’
ii. ‘It is impossible to eat as much as Juan eats’
This suggests that the null wh-operator Op in lo que free relatives like (8b) may optionally be
a variant of cuanto (“how many”) as well.
Now that we have seen the range of interpretations available for free relatives, we can
ask: what are the available interpretations of nominal ARs? As a testing ground, let us try
the verb escribir (“write”), which may take both interrogative and nominal complements (see
discussion in Chapter 4). This flexibility allows us to tease apart the meanings that come
about with propositional ARs on the one hand, and nominal ARs, on the other. The relevant
sentence is (2b), repeated below.
3It is important to notice that there are important differences in terms of word order restrictions between
nominal ARs and the propositional ARs discussed in the next Chapter (see §4.1.3).
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(2b) Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
In §4.1.3.1 of the next chapter I discuss the relevance of Subject-Verb inversion in Spanish
propositional ARs. For themoment, it suffices to know that propositional ARs, unlike nominal
ARs, require SV inversion.4 In the case of (2b), the sentence contains a relative clause with
SV inversion (escribió precedes the subject Tolstoy). As a consequence, a propositional AR
parse is available: a parse where (2b) is interpreted as a subordinate question. In this particular
case, (2b) is ambiguous between two different propositional ARs parses: one corresponding
to a subordinate identity of ♭♠♨♣♡♲ question, the other corresponding to an identity of ♟♫♭♳♬♲
question.
(10) a. Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
qué
what
libros
books
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written what books Tolstoy wrote.’
b. Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
cuántos
how many
libros
books
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written how many books Tolstoy wrote.’
That is (2b) is true under a parse equivalent to (10a) if Pedro took a piece of paper and wrote
down a list with all of Tolstoy’s works (War & Peace, Anna Karenina, The death of Ivan
4This is an old observation (e.g. Plann 1984 a.o.). As an illustration, consider the contrast between the two
variants below. Propositional ARs, which appear as complements to wh-embedding predicates like preguntarse
(“wonder”) below, are only grammatical with SV inversion.
(i) Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
{ comió
ate
Pedro
Pedro
/ *Pedro comió }.
‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro ate’
The full discussion of these facts is provided in §4.1.3.1. For the moment, it suffices to take the requirement of
SV inversion with propositional ARs to tease them apart from nominal ARs, which are compatible with it, but
do not require it.
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Ilyich, etc.). Under a parse equivalent to (10b), the sentence is true if what Pedro wrote down
was the number of books that Tolstoy wrote (in this case, 12, counting novels and novellas).
Now let us take a look at what happens in the absence of SV inversion. Recall that, SV
inversion being a necessary requirement of propositional ARs, its absence guarantees that
the relative clause is not interpreted as a propositional AR (again the full discussion of this
restriction is discussed in §4.1.3.1). That is, (11) cannot have the same structure as the AR
in (2b).
(11) Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
wrote
escribió.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
This example has a number of available interpretations as well. The ordinary restrictive rela-
tive clause interpretation is available, but is of course false, for Pedro could not have possible
written War & Peace, Anna Karenina, etc. The identity of ♭♠♨♣♡♲ question interpretation in
(10a) is still available, however. How so? In this case, because nothing precludes the rela-
tive clause in (11) to be interpreted as concealed question.5 Finally, the sentence also has an
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, but one that is different from (10b):
(12) Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
cuantos
how many
libros
books
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
escribió.
wrote
‘Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy wrote.’
The difference between the two ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in (10b) and (12) revolves around
what exactly Pedro wrote. In (10b), Pedro wrote a number, but in (12) he wrote books. The
following paraphrases may help in teasing the two interpretations apart.
5This meaning can be derived as discussed in §4.5.
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(13) a. Paraphrase of (10b)
Pedro has written down the number corresponding to the number of books that
Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote down the number 12]
b. Paraphrase of (12)
Pedro has written the same number of books that Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote any 12 books]
Because SV inversion is optional for nominal ARs, the interpretation in (12) is also possible
for (2b). Interestingly, however, the identity of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation in (10b) is absent from
(11). In §3.5.1, after I have spelled out the analysis, I explain why identity of ♭♠♨♣♡♲ inter-
pretations are available in (11), and what precludes identity of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ readings from arising
in this construction.
3.3 The syntax of nominal ARs
The upshot of the previous section is that unlike English, Spanish makes use of two dif-
ferent free relatives that denote amounts. How does this bear on nominal ARs? I argue that
nominal ARs in spanish are in fact free relatives, of a sort that is a cross between cuanto and
lo que free relatives. Like lo que relatives, nominal ARs have an overt definite article, and
like cuanto free relatives, they involve a quantity-denoting wh-operator that pied-pipes an NP.
Moreover, I suggest that this particular strain of free relatives are related to the propositional
ARs discussed in the next chapter much in the same way as free relatives andwh-constructions
are often taken to be related.
Given the surface similarity (and often string-identity) of free relatives and interrogatives
in languages like English, the two constructions are often taken to have a common core. How-
ever, given their radically different external distribution, the two must also be fundamentally
different in some way. One way to characterize this key difference is to think of free relatives
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as requiring an argumental type meaning, unlike questions. Following the influential ideas
in Jacobson (1995) and Caponigro (2004) a.o., the difference can be captured analytically
by dissociating the C○ head in free relative clauses from whatever will give rise to question-
semantics.
(14) English wh-constructions
a. Interrogative
[♡♮ whati [ C○[+♵♦] [♲♮ Mary bought ti ]]]
b. Free relative
[♢♮ D∅ [♡♮ whati [ C○[+♰♣♪] [♲♮ Mary bought ti ]]]]
On this view, then, free relatives are a hybrid between questions and ordinary restrictive rel-
ative clauses. Like questions, they involve movement of a wh-operator, but like nominals
restricted by relative clauses, the resulting object is a DP denoting an individual.
I argue that the difference between nominal and propositional ARs in Spanish also comes
down to a difference in the presence/absence of an interrogative core with question semantics.
Building on the proposed structure for lo que free relatives, I suggest the following syntactic
structure for Spanish nominal ARs.
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(15) Syntactic structure of nominal ARs in Spanish [with optional T-to-C movement]
DP
D
las
CP
DPi
Opwh manzanas
C’
C○
que[+♰♣♪]
TP
DP
Juanj
T’
T○
trajo
vP
tj ti
Variation in just a few key pieces is able to capture the similarities and differences between
nominal ARs and the more transparent free relatives. The parallel external distribution of
nominal ARs and lo que and cuanto free relatives follows from the fact that nominal ARs are
a subtype of free relatives. If correct, then Spanish allows structures like (15) for clauses that,
on the surface, look like ordinary restrictive relative clauses. Moreover, this particularity of
Spanish is not shared by other languages like English, for it depends on idiosyncrasies related
to how free relatives may be constructed in the language.6
Let us recap. The desiderata we started this section with involved finding a syntactic
construction particular to Spanish and crucially absent from English, that would help us un-
derstand why Spanish allows nominal ARs so freely. I argued that nominal ARs are, despite
appearances, free relatives, sharing properties with other two existing free relative construc-
tions in the language, lo que and cuanto free relatives. The next step is to explain how and why
6For discussion on the full gamut of Spanish wh-constructions, see §4.2.4.
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attributing this syntax to nominal ARs can explain the contrasts in the availability of ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations between English and Spanish.
3.4 Nominal ARs as degree expressions
In Chapter §1 we saw that virtually all semantic analyses of ARs in the literature (e.g.
Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman 1998, etc.) entertain analyses where the
CP in the embedded positions denotes a degree property. In this section I provide my own
analysis of Spanish nominal ARs on the basis of the same premises.
The semantic analysis that I propose for Spanish nominal ARs is built in two steps. First,
nominal ARs are argued to denote to a maximal degree (a definite description of a degree).
Then, the resulting degree description may take up the role of aMeasure Phrase in an ordinary
pseudo-partitive construction (e.g. three kilos of tomatoes), where the head noun has under-
gone elision under identity. The resulting construction amounts to the property of individuals
denoted by the elided NP as measured by the maximal degree denoted by the nominal AR.
3.4.1 Step 1: Deriving a maximal degree
The first step is to provide a semantics for the nominal AR itself. As mentioned above, I
assume that nominal ARs in Spanish–and cuanto free relatives, for that matter–denote maxi-
mal degrees. This is in accordance with traditional approaches to ARs, as well as Grosu and
Landman’s (1998). The derivation proceeds very similarly to what we saw with propositional
ARs. The relevant LF structure we start off is repeated below:
(16) [♢♮1 las
the
[♡♮1 [♢♮2 ♫♟♬♷ manzanas
apples
]i [♡♮2 que
that
Juan
Juan
trajo
brought
ti ]]]
‘The apples that Juan brought’
As is common practice, we employ a silent ♫♟♬♷ quantifier, familiar from the literature on
comparative constructions.
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(17) ⟦♫♟♬♷⟧ = λP⟨et⟩:λQ⟨et⟩:λd:∃x [P(x) ∧Q(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
The final technical adjustment involves the definite determiner. In this case, I assume that
when the definite article in Spanish applies to a set of degrees, it returns its maximal element
(Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996, 1999, 2014). The operator ♫♟♶ is defined following Russell’s ι-
operator, and so it requires the existence of a unique maximal element. Thus, although I will
often use (18a) as a shorthand, bear in mind that the full definition of ♫♟♶ is that of (18a).
(18) a. ⟦♫♟♶⟧ = λN⟨dt⟩ : ιn[N(n)] [i.e. ιn[N(n)]↔ ♫♟♶(N)]
b. ⟦♫♟♶⟧ = λN⟨dt⟩:ιd[d ∈ N ∧ ∀d′[d′ ∈ N ∧ d ≠ d′ → d′ < d]]
From here, I follow Jacobson’s (1995) and Caponigro’s (2004) syntax-semantics mapping of
free relatives.
(19) a. ⟦DP⟧ = λQ⟨et⟩:λd:∃x [manzanas(x) ∧Q(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
b. ⟦CP⟧ = λx: [trajo(Juan; x)]
c. ⟦CP⟧ = λd:∃x [manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
d. ⟦DP⟧ = ♫♟♶(λd: ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])= ιd[ ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]
Semantically, the nominal AR denotes the maximal degree that holds of the individuals that
are in the extension of the two properties (being an apple and being brought by Juan). Intu-
itively, this is what we want: maximalization restricts the set of degrees to its maximal degree,
if there is one. So far, these results replicate Grosu and Landman’s (1998).
3.4.2 Step 2: Enter the Measure Phrase
The next step in the derivation is to fix the sortal mismatch with verbs that take e-type
arguments. In §1.4.3 we described how this is one of the biggest challenges of ARs at large.
The solution that I suggest to solve the problem relies on thinking of nominal ARs as Mea-
sure Phrases. Given that nominal ARs only operate in the dimension of ♯♳♟♬♲♧♲♷, i.e. they
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only provide cardinalities, I will take them to be part of a NP where they attribute a certain
cardinality to the property denoted by the NP (although see Chapter 5 for an application to
Degree Neuter Relatives).
3.4.2.1 The syntax and semantics of cardinal numbers
The basic assumption about the syntax and semantics of cardinal numbers follows ideas
from Hurford (1975), Ionin and Matushansky (2006), Kayne (2005) and Solt (2015). As an
illustration, take the NP three apples; the basic structure that we are concerned with looks as
follows.
(20) Basic syntax of cardinal numbers
MeasP
DegP: d
three
Meas’
M♣♟♱ NP: ⟨et⟩
apples
As the tree makes explicit, I assume a degree semantics for cardinal numbers, following a
similar treatment as Solt’s (2009) for quantity denoting words like many and few. On my
view, numerals are just names of degrees, syntactically occupying the specifier of a Number
Phrase projection, whose task is that of measuring the cardinality of an individual. To do so,
it requires the mediation of a measuring function, represented as M♣♟♱ above. This M♣♟♱
function has been proven to be well motivated both on syntactic (Kayne 2005, Zweig 2005,
a.o.) as well as semantic grounds (e.g. Rett 2008, Wellwood 2015, Solt 2015 a.o.).7 There
are a number of ways M♣♟♱ can be defined so that the composition of (20) succeeds. Here
7Different authors give different names to the M♣♟♱ head. Ultimately, this way of mapping individuals to
cardinalities is a way of recasting old ideas by Cartwright (1975) and Cresswell (1976), who brought attention to
the necessity for a mechanism that would allow us to go back and forth between individual denoting expressions
and their cardinalities.
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I adopt a simple one: M♣♟♱ simply takes a degree d and returns the property of individuals
whose cardinality equals d.
(21) ⟦M♣♟♱⟧ = λnd:λxe:∣x∣ ≥ n
The obvious issue with this simple definition of M♣♟♱ is that it cannot yet combine with the
NP. Moreover, the motivation for introducing M♣♟♱ is to create a gradable predicate–of type⟨d; et⟩–that may later take a simplex degree of type d. That is, the resulting phrase [♫♣♟♱
NP] must be of type ⟨d; et⟩, and so other alternatives like existentially closing the denota-
tion of the NP will not do. To solve the mismatch I appeal to a variant of Kratzer’s (1996)
Event Identification rule (cf. Degree Argument Introduction in Solt 2015), call it Degree
Identification:8
(22) D♣♥♰♣♣ I♢♣♬♲♧♤♧♡♟♲♧♭♬ (DI):
If α is a branching node, {β; γ} are the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ = λxe:P(x),⟦γ⟧ = λnd:λxe:Q(n)(x), then ⟦α⟧ = λnd:λxe:P(x) ∧Q(n)(x).
That is, Degree Identification is a mode of composition that makes it possible to identify any
two individuals with respect to a single degree description. It takes two functions g ∈ D⟨d;et⟩
and f ∈ D⟨et⟩ and returns a function h ∈ D⟨d;et⟩. The parallelism with Event Identification is
absolute. The semantic computation of an ordinary NP like three apples goes now as follows:
8Notice that a second option is to provide two different definitions of M♣♟♱, a predicative and an attributive
version.
(i) a. ⟦♫♣♟♱attributive⟧ = λP⟨et⟩:λnd:λxe[P(x) ∧ ∣x∣ ≥ n]
b. ⟦♫♣♟♱predicative⟧ = λnd:λxe[∣x∣ ≥ n]
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(23) MeasP: ⟨et⟩
λxe: ∗apple(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = 
DegP: d
three
Meas’: ⟨d; et⟩
λnd:λxe: ∗apple(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = n
M♣♟♱: ⟨d; et⟩ NP: ⟨et⟩
λx: ∗apple(x)
apples
3.4.2.2 Application to nominal ARs
We are now ready to calculate the meaning of a nominal AR. Given that nominal ARs
denote definite degrees, we can simply use them as inputs to Meas’ in structures like (20). An
AR like (16) above has now the meaning in (24b):
(24) a. [ las
the
[♡♮1 [ ♫♟♬♷ manzanas
apples
]i [♡♮2 que
that
Pedro
Pedro
trajo
brough
ti ]]]
‘The apples that Pedro brought’
b. ιd[ ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]= ♫♟♶(λd: ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Pedro; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])
The uniquemaximal degree denoted by (24b) can nowmeasure the cardinality of the NP in the
head position just like the numeral three did in the previous case. Critical for the calculation
to go through is the assumption that there is in fact a head identical to the head internal to the
nominal AR.
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(25) MeasP: ⟨et⟩
λxe: ∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = ♫♟♶(λd: ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ trajo(x;Pedro) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])
DegP: d
⟦(24b)⟧
Meas’: ⟨d; et⟩
λnd:λxe: ∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = n
M♣♟♱: ⟨d; et⟩ NP: ⟨et⟩
λx: ∗manzana(x)
manzanas
While a full assessment of the full analysis will have to wait for later, we can already notice
some desirable features of (25): (i) maximalization happens at the degree level only, (ii) the
resulting object is not a degree and so no sortal mismatch arises when combining with other
verbal predicates, and (iii) no ad hoc elision of the definite article is required.
The property of this proposal that requires more discussion is the syntactic procedure that
elides the head NP. Schematically:
(26) NP elision in nominal ARs
MeasP
DegP Meas’
M♣♟♱ NP
⟨manzanas⟩
D
las
CP
DP
Op manzanas
C’
que[+♰♣♪] trajo Pedro
Identity & Deletion
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This deletion operation is reminiscent of Comparative Deletion. Comparative Deletion is a
hallmark feature of comparative constructions like (27), which compare two quantities of the
same sort of stuff (number of books, degrees of height, degrees of carefulness; Kennedy 1999,
Kennedy and Merchant 2000).
(27) a. Jill wrote more books than Sue read ⟨books⟩.
b. The table is wider than chair is ⟨wide⟩.
c. My sister drives as carefully as I drive ⟨carefully⟩.
What makes Comparative Deletion interesting is that it is obligatory if and only if there is
identity between the two objects of the comparison. That is, when it comes to Comparative
Deletion, you can only delete under identity, and if you can delete, you must.
(28) a. Jill wrote more books than Sue read {*books / magazines}.
b. The table is wider than chair is {*wide / tall}.
c. My sister drives as carefully as I drive {*carefully / recklessly}.
The parallel between (28) and (26) above is clear: in (26) elision is obligatory and it must
happen under identity. But there is also an obvious difference: in comparatives, comparison
is possible when the objects that are being compared are different; in such cases, deletion
simply does not take place. However, this is not a possibility for nominal ARs, as illustrated
in (29).
(29) a. *las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
manzanas
apples
b. *las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
plátanos
bananas
In nominal ARs, then, there are both (i) obligatory deletion under identity and (ii) obligatory
identity of the objects of comparison.
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3.4.2.2.1 More deletion under identity There is another corner of the Spanish grammar
where a similar elision process as in nominal ARs seems to take place. This is in compara-
tive constructions that are formed with the standard marker de (see Brucart 1992b, Sáez and
Sánchez López 2013, Mendia 2017). The following is an example:
(30) Compré
bought
más
more
libros
book.♫♱.♮♪
de
of
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
compraste
bought
tú.
you
‘I bought more books than (the books) you bought’
Typically, comparatives with de take a relative clause as their standard, as in (30), but it must
be a relative clause with a “missing head”. This makes it a rather remarkable comparative
construction, since it not only must there be elision, but the construction is ungrammatical
if the head of the relative clause does not match the restriction of the comparative quantifier
más (“more”).
(31) a. *Compré
bought
más
more
libros
book.♫♱.♮♪
de
of
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
cómics
comic.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
compraste
bought
tú
you
b. *Compré
bought
más
more
libros
books
de
of
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
libros
book.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
compraste
bought
tú
you
There is, to my knowledge, no satisfactory explanation for why this should be so. But, what-
ever elision process drives the restrictions on de comparatives in Spanish, it seems to be exactly
the same we observe in (26). I will take it then, that the elision of (26) is part of a general
process that is visible in other constructions.
3.4.2.2.2 Pronouncing different copies The fact that we have two copies in the con-
struction in (26) raises the question as to whether there is optionality about which one of the
copies may be pronounced. In the case of nominal ARs, this optionality is not available in
modern Spanish, as shown in (32).
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(32) *las
the
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
manzanas
apples
But there are indications that this was not always so. The following is an example from the
th century by Teresa of Ávila.9
(33) Mas no le da licencia que reparta la fruta, hasta que él esté tan fuerte con
lo que ha comido de ella…
‘But He doesn’t give (her) permission to distribute fruit until she is strong from what
(fruit) she has eaten.’
The interest of the previous passage lies in the free relative lo que ha comido de ella (lit. “what
has eaten of it.♤♫”), where ella (“she”) is a nominal referring to fruta (“fruit”). That is, this is a
nominal AR–it refers to an amount of fruits, not to any particular fruits–where the higher copy
of the Measure Phrase is realized. This is still quite not parallel to (26), since the presence of
the neuter variant of the definite article suggests that there never was a nominal head inside
the relative clause in the first clause. Nevertheless, the fact that it was possible to build an
♟♫♭♳♬♲ denoting lo que free relative that is modifying a subsequent nominal fits well with the
syntactic account of nominal ARs suggested here. A tentative structural analysis of (33) may
go as follows.
(34) [♫♮ [♢♮ lo [♡♮ [♢♮ Op ♫♟♬♷ ]i [ que …ti ]]] [ M♣♟♱ fruta ]]
A second case suggesting that the head of the Measure Phrase may be overt involves Degree
Neuter Relatives. Degree Neuter Relatives are constructions similar to nominal ARs where
the head of the relative clause is not nominal, but some gradable predicate.
9Passage from Libro de la vida, by Santa Teresa de Jesús, in García López (ed.), 2015, Penguin Clásicos.
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(35) Juan
Juan
no
not
es
is
lo
the.♬♲
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
Pedro
Pedro
‘Juan is not as tall as Pedro’
Foreshadowing the extension of the analysis proposed here to Degree Neuter Relatives, which
will be the object of Chapter 5, notice that Degree Neuter Relatives also allow a word order
where the gradable predicate is final.
(36) Juan
Juan
no
not
es
is
lo
the.♬♲
que
that
es
is
Pedro
Pedro
de
of
alto
tall
At this point, one may wonder whether alto in (36) is really sitting in a higher Measure Phrase
(or Adjective Phrase in this case), or whether it is simply a lower copy of the CP internal
adjective that has been fronted. One argument in favor of the first option comes from the
need to use the preposition de in (36). This preposition is obligatory in Spanish Measure
Phrases:10
(37) a. dos
two
metros
meters
*(de)
of
{ cable
wire
/ largo
long
}
b. dos
two
kilos
kilos
*(de)
of
{ patatas
potatoes
/ peso
weight
}
Like in (37), dropping the preposition from (36) results in ungrammaticality, as does fronting
it together with the adjective.
10This raises the question of why the preposition de cannot be overt in nominal ARs, as opposed to Degree
Neuter Relatives and other Measure Phrases.
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(38) a. *Juan
Juan
no
not
es
is
lo
the.♬♲
que
that
es
is
Pedro
Pedro
alto
tall
b. *Juan
Juan
no
not
es
is
lo
the.♬♲
de
of
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
Pedro
Pedro
The ungrammaticality above suggests that there is no place for a preposition inside the CP. As
a consequence, the adjective alto in (36) must be outside the CP. This suggests that sentences
like (35) must be taken to be genuinely ambiguous between two different syntactic parses,
(39a) and (39b), but (39c) is not one of them.
(39) a. 3 Pronounce CP internal higher copy[♫♮ [♢♮ lo [♡♮ [♢♮ Op alto ]i [ que …ti ]]] [ ⟨alto⟩ ]
b. 3 Pronounce external copy[♫♮ [♢♮ lo [♡♮ [♢♮ Op ⟨alto⟩ ]i [ que …ti ]]] [ de alto ]
c. 8 Pronounce CP internal lower copy[♫♮ [♢♮ lo [♡♮ [♢♮ Op ]i [ que …alto ]]] [ ⟨alto⟩ ]
Altogether, I take the outcome of this discussion to be that the elision pattern proposed in
(26) for Measure Phrases containing nominal ARs is both not only possible, but also attested
elsewhere in the language.
3.4.3 Step 3: The final touch
We are not quite done yet. We have a semantics for nominal ARs that intuitively give us
the desired result, but which, being of type ⟨et⟩, cannot directly combine with predicates that
take e-type arguments. For concreteness, consider (2c), repeated below.
(40) [♲♮
Juan
Juan
brought
[♴♮
the
trajo
apples
[♫♮
that
las
brought
manzanas
Pedro
que trajo Pedro ]]].
‘Juan brought the (amount of) apples that Pedro brought.’
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In (2c), thematrix predicate is seeking for a type of argument that does not fit with the nominal
AR. Luckily, this kind of mismatch is well studied, and there are a number of possibilities
available.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, I favor the view where, rather than providing an
argument to the main predicate, nominal ARs in Spanish semantically restrict its denotation.
That is, instead of the predicate taking the object as its argument via Functional Application,
they combine via Restrict (Chung and Ladusaw 2004).
(41) R♣♱♲♰♧♡♲:
If α is a branching node, {β; γ} are the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ = λxσ:λyσ:P(y; x),⟦γ⟧ = λzσ:Q(z), then ⟦α⟧ = λyσ:λxσ:[P(y; x) ∧Q(x)].
This mode of composition has two main properties: (i) it does not saturate the argument slot
of the verb and (ii) and it demotes the lambda term corresponding to the modified argument
to the last position. That is, restricting a function f ∈ D⟨e;et⟩ by a function g ∈ D⟨et⟩ does not
reduce the valency of f, and the resulting object is a function h ∈ D⟨e;et⟩. By adopting this
mode of composition, we allow the semantic computation to proceed as if the object slot of
the predicate were saturated, when in fact it is not. Existential closure at the TP level binds
the remaining free variable, bringing its valency to zero. I represent this closure in the tree by
means of the operator [∃].
(42) ⟦∃⟧ = λP⟨σ;t⟩:∃σ[P(σ)]
The final steps in the derivation of (40) are represented below.
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(43) TP: t∃x[trajo(x; Juan) ∧ ⟦(25)⟧(x)]
[∃]
λP⟨σ;t⟩:∃σ[P(σ)]
TP: ⟨et⟩
λx:trajo(x; Juan) ∧ ⟦(25)⟧(x)
DP: e
Juan
VP: ⟨e; et⟩
λy:λx:trajo(x; y) ∧ ⟦(25)⟧(x)
V: ⟨e; et⟩
λx:λy:trajo(x; y)
trajo
MeasP: ⟨et⟩
⟦(25)⟧
Let us examine the resulting interpretation: the full denotation of (40)–in (44) below–states
that Juan brought apples in an amount d, where d is equal to the maximal amount of apples
that Pedro brought.
(44) ⟦(40)⟧ = ∃x[trajo(x; Juan) ∧ manzanas(x) ∧∣x∣ = ♫♟♶(λd: ∃z[manzanas(z) ∧ trajo(z;Pedro) ∧ ∣z∣ = d])]
This is precisely the interpretation we are seeking.11 Recall the three points in the desiderata
of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses we discussed earlier (see §1.3.1 for discussion).
11The tree in (43) is somewhat of a simplification: nominal ARs take low scope with respect to negation:
(i) ¬ > ∃; ∃ ≯ ¬Juan
Juan
no
not
trajo
bring
las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘Juan didn’t bring the (amount of) apples that Pedro brought.’
This means that, in accordance with Restrict, nominal ARs must take low scope with respect to negation. In turn,
this means that, in some cases at least, we will need to accordingly adjust the tree in (43), and either interpret
existential closure lower or negation higher than TP.
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(4) Desiderata for ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations
a. Definiteness: A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations refer to a definite amount.
b. Indefiniteness: The head of the relative clause in interpreted as an indefinite.
c. Identity: A♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations require a comparison of two amounts of same stuff.
The analysis presented here achieves all three points above. First, maximalization at the de-
gree level is obtained by virtue of constructing a free relative headed by the definite article
that denotes a maximal degree of something. The indefiniteness nominal ARs is guaranteed
by taking them to be simple NPs modified by a Measure Phrase. Finally, the two distinct
copies of the nominal head that are required to establish the equation between the two rel-
evant degrees is granted by assuming a particular kind of deletion under identity process,
independently existent in the language.
In practice, the semantics in (44) provides nominal ARs an interpretation identical to the
paraphrases below, which is in line with speakers’ intuitions.12
12The LF in (44) has the meaning of an equative, so one might wonder if it shares other interpretive parallels
with genuine equatives (like as many as). For instance, equatives are notorious for receiving both “at least” and
“exactly” interpretations.
(i) Liz is as tall a Bill is…
a. …so you were wrong to say that she is taller. [“exactly”]
b. …in fact, she’s taller. [“at least”]
We see that in this respect, nominal ARs are the same.
(ii) Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy…
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote…’
a. …so you were wrong to say that he wrote more. [“exactly”]
b. …in fact, he wrote more. [“at least”]
The precise mechanisms by which we arrive at the weak readings for equatives is debated. For Horn (1972),
Soames (1982) and Russell (2006) a.o. they should be understood as scalar implicatures, whereas Cresswell
(1976), von Stechow (1984) and Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) a.o. locate the source of the ambiguity at
the lexical level. The takeaway is that, whatever theory we pick about equatives, one can apply it to ARs as well.
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(45) a. Juan brought apples in the amount that Pedro brought apples.
b. Juan brought apples in that amount.
[where that amount refers to the amount of apples that Pedro brought]
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Impossible meanings
Recall the discussion in §3.2.2 about the impossibility of identity of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpreta-
tions in the following contexts:
(2b) SV inversion
Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
(11) No SV inversion
Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
wrote
escribió.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
The contrast between the two sentences is that, although both allow nominal AR interpreta-
tions (as in (46b)), only (2b) accepts (46a)).
(46) a. Pedro has written down the number corresponding to the number of books that
Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote down the number 12]
b. Pedro has written the same number of books that Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote any 12 books]
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The naive answer to why (11) lacks a meaning like (46b) is that it is simply not a subordinate
question, i.e. it is not a propositional AR. And yet, it is possible to interpret (11) as a concealed
question, which would result in an identity of ♭♠♨♣♡♲ question interpretation. The puzzle, then,
is: why is it not possible to have ♟♫♭♳♬♲ concealed questions? After all, these are identity
questions as well, only about a number or amount, rather than an individual.13 This possibility
is further discussed in detail in §4.5 of Chapter §4: by defining a type shifter that takes as an
input a definite description of a degree (or an “amount concept”, of type ⟨sd⟩), we can extract
a set of propositions equivalent to the denotation of a question like what is the cardinality
of books that Tolstoy wrote?. This would result in the identity of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, a
question not about individual books, but about amounts of books.
The absence of this interpretation for (11) receives a straightforward explanation under
the analysis presented in this chapter: although nominal ARs denote definite descriptions, the
full Measure Phrase does not, it denotes a property of individuals. Given the semantics of the
pair of type-shifters discussed in §4.5, the indefinite meaning of the Measure Phrase is of the
wrong type. The difficulties to define type-shifters of the required type is discussed in Nathan
(2006) and Frana (2017). But even if we defined a suitable type-shifter that allowed indefinite
concealed question, we would face an overgeneration issue, for ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations can
only arise in the presence of the definite article. My analysis provides one way of ruling out
this option, as is desired.
3.5.2 Why Restrict?
In the previous section I suggested that the Measure Phrase and the verbal predicate com-
bined via Restrict. There are, I believe, good reasons for doing so instead of any of the other
type-shifting or valency-reducing operations in the market. For instance, resolving the type
mismatch using the ι-operator would not work, since we need nominal ARs to be indefinites.
13Recall that concealed questions can only be identity questions (Nathan 2006).
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Introducing an ι-operator in the structure would furthermore lead to a presupposition failure
(see §1.4.3).
One of the signatures of nominals combining via Restrict is that they must always take
lowest scope with respect to other sentential operators (e.g. Chung and Ladusaw 2004, Mc-
Nally 2004 a.o.). Usually, indefinites may combine via Restrict, but not just any indefinite
may. This is visible when we look at the scopal properties of different indefinites: in (47)
below, only (47a) may scope above the matrix predicate want.
(47) a. Lisa wants to bring an apple. [3want > ∃; 3∃ > want]
b. Lisa wants to bring apples. [3want > ∃; 8∃ > want]
c. Lisa wants to bring that amount of apples. [3want > ∃; 8∃ > want]
The same is true of nominal AR in Spanish: the nominal AR rendition of (47) is also scopeless
(under its ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, of course).
(48) [3want > ∃; 8∃ > want]Lisa
Lisa
quiere
wants
traer
bring
las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
This property eliminates the possibility of introducing other type-shifters. For instance, an-
other independently motivated way to deal with attributive DPs such as nominal ARs is to
assume a null existential determiner, which effectively lifts the type of the nominal ARs to a
generalized quantifier type (⟨et; t⟩).14 This option is perfectly plausible for bare plurals and
mass nouns in general, which are very close to the final denotation of nominal ARs (cf. Chier-
chia 1998a, Dayal 2004). But this strategy requires the nominal AR to QR at LF, thereby
predicting scope interactions like the one in (47a).
A second argument in favor of Restrict in Spanish nominal ARs comes from existential
sentences. Nominals combining via Restrict are compatible with existential constructions
14For example: ⟦∅D⟧ = λP⟨et⟩:λQ⟨et⟩:∃x[P(x) ∧Q(x)].
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with the copulative verb haber. As López (2012) extensively argues, these objects must be
(semantically) incorporated to haber. This is shown in (49), where only the bare plural variant
in (49a) is grammatical.
(49) a. Hay
be
hombres
man.♫♱.♮♪
‘There are men’
b. * [ungrammatical without a locative coda]Hay
be
un
a.♫♱.♱♥
hombre
man.♫♱.♱♥
‘There is a man’
c. *Hay
be
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
hombres
man.♫♱.♮♪
‘There is a man’
In general, definite DPs incur Definitiness Effects in this position (Milsark 1974, Carlson
1977a, a.o.), and Spanish is no different. What we find, however, is that definite DPs are
indeed compatible with haber predicates, but only with ♩♧♬♢ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations.
(50) Hay
be
los
the
libros
boook
que
that
había
were
en
on
la
the
mesa
table
‘There are the (kind/amount of) books that there were on the table’
This suggests that the definite DP headed by los libros is in fact an indefinite in disguise, which
aligns with our expectations.
A remaining contender to Restrict is the type-shifter nom (or “∩”) from Chierchia 1984.
In Chierchia’s (1984) system nom is the operation involved in transforming common nouns
like dog into their bare plural form dogs. The type-shifter maps properties onto their entity-
correlates only if these exist. Recently, Scontras (2017) has argued precisely for this type of
106
interpretation for the classifier noun amount; see §2.3. The data we have seen so far does not
adjudicate between Restrict or nom.
One argument that speaks in favor of Restrict over nom is the inability of Spanish nominal
ARs to be in subject position, something that follows from Restrict but is unexpected under
nom. The relatives in (51) only admit an ♧♬♢♧♴♧♢♳♟♪ restrictive interpretation, where the claim
is about what individual friends came to the party, and not about how many friends came.
(51) Los
the
amigos
friends
que
that
vinieron
came
a
to
mi
my
fiesta
party
vinieron
came
a
to
tu
your
fiesta.
party
‘The friends that came to may party came to your party’
The lack of amount interpretation in (51) is not so surprising if the interpretation of nominal
ARs relies on Restrict: it is well known that Restrict only very rarely affects subjects (see
discussion in Werle 2000 on Lillooet, Chung and Ladusaw 2004 on Maori and Stvan 2009
on bare singular count nouns in English). There may be a number of explanations for such
behavior. In Spanish, the reason could be simply that the parse with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations
is unavailable by virtue of the high position in the structure were subjects have been argued to
sit (Ordóñez 1997, Zagona 2002, a.o.). This position, usually a Topic Phrase, is higher than
the locus of Existential Closure on TP.
We can reverse this situation, however. Example (52) below is just a variant of (51)
with locative inversion, a construction where a locative PP is preposed and the logical subject
appears postponed after the verb. There is good evidence suggesting that the locative PP is in
[Spec,TP], or the usual position of subjects in the language (see Diercks 2014 for an overview
and discussion of the arguments). Thus, the subject of (52) occupies a syntactic position
analogous to direct objects in ordinary transitive sentences. The main difference between the
two variants in (51) and (52) is that in the latter the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation is available.
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(52) A
to
mi
my
fiesta
party
vinieron
came
los
the
amigos
friends
que
that
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
tuya.
yours
‘To my party came the friends that came to your party’
It would be hard to account for the contrast between (51) and (52) by means of nom. It has
been argued that Spanish is a language where nom is available both in subject and in object
position (in fact, it has been proposed that Spanish lexicalizes nom as the definite article; see
discussion in Chierchia 1998b and Dayal 2004), and so without further ado nom should be
expected to resolve the type mismatch in (51) and yield an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation all the same.
That this is not so argues in favor of Restrict instead.
3.5.3 Nominal ARs are not numerals
I have provided a semantics of nominal ARs that echoes the interpretation of numerals in
Measure Phrases. Under this account, then, one could expect to find nominal ARs in places
where numerals typically appear. This is not the case, however. Certain environments that
accept numerals are incompatible with nominal ARs. Numerals in predicative positions are
one such environment.
(53) a. El
The
número
number
de
of
planetas
planets
es
is
ocho.
eight
b.*El
The
número
number
de
of
planetas
planets
es
is
los
the
planetas
planets
que
that
dibujó
painted
Juan.
Juan
Suppose that Juan painted eight planets. Since nominal ARs in Spanish are degree expressions
similar to numerals, why is (53b) ungrammatical? I can only offer a speculative note here,
leaving a deeper exploration of the issue for a further occasion. In the literature on the syntax
of numeral expressions number words are commonly considered syntactic heads, not phrases,
at least in some syntactic environments. On the contrary, nominal ARs can only be phrasal,
they are full DPs. Thus, even if we concede that both objects, numerals and nominal ARs,
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have denotations of the same type, this need not make them syntactically equivalent. My
hope, then, is that whatever lies at the source of the contrast above can be attributed to the
different syntactic make-up of the two expressions.
3.5.4 A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခs with vs. without degrees
The main conclusion of this dissertation so far is that there are two formally distinct strate-
gies in order to generate ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses, and that the availability of
each strategy is language dependent. Thus, while in English relative clauses can only express
♟♫♭♳♬♲s via ♩♧♬♢ interpretations, as argued in Chapter §2, this chapters shows that Spanish
does possess a dedicated Amount Construction whose exclusive role is to provide ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations. This is summarized below.
(54) Available strategies to generate ࿮࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretations by language
♟♫♭♳♬♲♱ via ♩♧♬♢♱ ♟♫♭♳♬♲ via degrees
Spanish 3 3
English 3 8
One prediction of (54) is that in Spanish it should be easier to find ARs in environments where
English does not allow them, namely whenever the ♟♫♭♳♬♲s as ♩♧♬♢s strategy is not available.
This is something we have already seen above: in the example below, only the Spanish variant
allows an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, rendering the English translation false (see also §3.1).
(2b) Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
que
that
escribió
wrote
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
A further prediction of (54) is that we should see Spanish ARs showing opposed properties
depending on whether they are derived by the degree-less or the degree-based strategy. More
concretely, if a relative clause with an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation in Spanish allows a ♩♧♬♢ inter-
pretation, then it should also show the properties observed for English ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations.
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On the other hand, if a relative clause with an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation does not allow for a ♩♧♬♢
interpretation, only the degree-based derivation is available. As a baseline, consider (2b) and
(55) below.
(55) Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
tenía
had
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We lost the fight because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers that the Imperial
Army had.’
As I show below, (2b)’s ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation rests solely on the degree-based derivation,
whereas (55) parallels its English counterpart and gets its ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation via ♩♧♬♢s.
The first indication in favor of this contrast, is that only (55) allows a ♩♧♬♢ interpretation.
That is, while (55) can be true if the reason for losing the battle was not having soldiers as
well trained/motivated/strong as the Imperial Army had, (2b) is not be true even if Pedro
wrote the same kind of books as Tolstoy (it only allows a false ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation and an
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation).
The next step is to ascertain what happens if we drop the relative clause. In §2.2 we saw
that English ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations do not necessarily require a relative clause, and so they
are available also with PP modifiers and with bare DPs. Thus, we expect that only variants
of (55) in Spanish will allow ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations in these cases. That this is the case is
shown below.
(56) PP modifier
a. 8♟♫♭♳♬♲
Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros
books
de
of
Tolstoy.
Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books of Tolstoy.’
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b. 3♟♫♭♳♬♲
Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
de
of
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We lost the fight because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers of the Imperial
Army.’
(57) Bare DP
a. 8♟♫♭♳♬♲
Pedro
Pedro
ha
aux
escrito
written
los
the
libros.
books
‘Pedro has written the books.’
b. 3♟♫♭♳♬♲
Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados.
soldiers.
‘We lost the fight because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers.’
Finally, we look at island-sensitivity. In §2.4.3 of Chapter 2 we saw that the English variants
of examples like (55) do not seem to display the same type of island-sensitivity that other
degree constructions do. The prediction, then, is that only Spanish examples like (2b) but not
(55) will show the this restriction. Below I show that this is the case with negative islands and
factive islands (the baseline examples were provided in §1.4.1 of Chapter 1, here I only show
the relevant contrasts).
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(58) Negative islands
a. 8♟♫♭♳♬♲
Pedro
Pedro
escribió
wrote
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
no
not
escribió.
write
‘Pedro wrote some particular books that Tolstoy didn’t write.’
b. 3♟♫♭♳♬♲
Ganamos
won
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
no
not
tenía
had
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We won the battle because we had the (amount of) soldiers that the Imperial Army
didn’t have.’
(59) Factives: response stance verbs
a. 8♟♫♭♳♬♲
Pedro
Pedro
escribió
wrote
los
the
libros
books
que
that
Juan
Juan
admitió
admitted
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
escribió.
written
‘Pedro wrote the books that Tolstoy didn’t write.’
b. 3♟♫♭♳♬♲
Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
Juan
Juan
admitió
admitted
que
that
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial
Imperial
tenía.
had.
‘We lost the battle because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers that Juan admit-
ted that the Imperial Army had.’
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(60) Factives: surprise
a. 8♟♫♭♳♬♲
Pedro
Pedro
escribió
wrote
los
the
libros
books
que
that
es
is
sorprendente
surprising
que
that
Tolstoy
Tolstoy
escribiera.
write.♱♳♠♨
‘Pedro wrote the books that it was surprising that Tolstoy wrote.’
b. 3♟♫♭♳♬♲
Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
que
that
es
is
sorprendente
surprising
que
that
la
the
Armada
Army
Imperial
Imperial
tuviera.
have.♱♳♠♨.
‘We lost the battle because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers that it is surpris-
ing that the Imperial Army had.’
Altogether, these contrasts show that the predicted availability of the two different ways of
getting at ♟♫♭♳♬♲s is present in Spanish. In contrast, English only has access to the degree-less
strategy described in Chapter 2.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that Spanish possesses a mechanism to deliver amounts that
is absent in English. The main source of the difference between the two languages rests
on the availability in Spanish of relative clauses that denote definite descriptions of degrees
(understood as maximimalized sets of degrees), that can in turn be used as Measure Phrases.
The resulting state of affairs is one where natural languages allow two different strategies
for deriving ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses: a degree-based strategy and a degree-
less strategy, where degree semantics does not come into play at all. While some languages
like Spanish employ both strategies, languages like English only have the degree-less strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
PROPOSITIONAL AMOUNT RELATIVES
This chapter looks at Amount Relatives in Spanish when they appear as complements to
wh-embedding predicates, predicates that typically select for either interrogative or excla-
mative complements. I will refer to this type of Amount Relatives as Propositional Amount
Relatives (propositional ARs henceforth). These constructions are puzzling as they seem to
be DPs that are selected for by predicates that usually do not select nominal complements.
The task of this chapter is to understand why these ARs have the distribution that they do,
how sentences involving them receive their interpretation, and why analogous constructions
do not exist in languages like English.
The chapter begins by looking into the general properties of propositional ARs in Span-
ish. In §4.1 it will be shown that propositional ARs have the external distribution and show
other syntactic properties of wh-constructions like subordinate questions and exclamatives.
Section 4.2 presents a syntactic analysis that tries to account for the “hybrid” nature of these
propositional relatives by treating them as involving an interrogative core and a nominal func-
tional layer above this interrogative CP. In §4.3 I present a compositional semantic analysis of
this structure. Finally, an appendix is included where I discuss how, despite their superficial
resemblance, propositional ARs should not be understood as concealed questions.
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4.1 Properties of propositional ARs
4.1.1 Basic distribution
4.1.1.1 Question embedding predicates
Spanish, unlike languages like English, allows ARs to be embedded under a great variety
of wh-embedding predicates, like wonder, ask, know, say. etc. For ease of exposition, I will
refer to the ARs that appear under such predicates as “propositional ARs”, as they appear
where propositional expressions otherwise appear. These will be contrasted in §3 with “nom-
inal ARs”, which serve as arguments to verbs requiring nominal complements. The following
examples provide the basic paradigm, illustrating how two types of question embedding pred-
icates, rogatives and responsives (Lahiri 2002), embed ARs. In (1) and (2), we see the typical
distribution of subordinate questions, headed by a relative pronoun qué (“what”) and cuánto
(“how many”).
(1) Rogative predicates
a. Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how-many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
preguntó
ask
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how-many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘He asked me {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
(2) Responsive predicates
a. Yo
I
sé
know
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how-many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
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b. Yo
I
te
you
dije
said
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how-many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I told you {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
Example (3) shows the distribution of propositional ARs, which parallels that of the subordi-
nate questions in (1) and (2).
(3) Amount Relatives with question embedding predicates
a. Rogative predicates
Me
I.♢♟♲
{ pregunto
wonder
/ preguntó
ask.3.♱♥
} las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
i. ‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
ii. ‘He asked me {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. Responsive predicates
Yo
I
{ sé
know
/ dije
said
} las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I {know / said} {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
In addition to the target ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, the sentences can also be interpreted as in-
volving an identity question–equivalent to what we called an ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation in §1.2.2 of
the introduction. The two meanings are precisely the ones we see in the ordinary subordinate
questions in (1) and (2).
Moreover, as shown in (4), neither subordinate questions nor propositional ARs may be
embedded under anti-rogative verbs, i.e. verbs that take only declarative complements.
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(4) Anti-rogative predicates
a. Subordinate Questions
*Yo
I
{ creo
believe
/ pienso
think
/ afirmo
claim
} { qué
what
/ cuántas
how many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
‘I {believe/think/claim} {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. Amount Relatives
*Yo
I
{ creo
believe
/ pienso
think
/ afirmo
claim
} las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Juan
‘I {believe / think / claim} that Juan brought d-many apples’
Thus, propositional ARs seem to behave like embedded questions (i) in having the same range
of interpretations, (ii) in being able to appear under the same types of verbs and (iii) in being
unable to appear under the same types of verbs.
4.1.1.2 Exclamation embedding predicates
In addition to rogative and responsive verbs, propositional ARs can also occur with pred-
icates that take exclamative complements. These include emotive predicates such as surprise,
be amazing and other emotive locutions like tienes que ver (“you should see”). These predi-
cates come in two syntactic frames: the post-verbal subject frame and the impersonal frame.
In the first case, the subject of the emotive predicate must follow the predicate, yielding a VS
word order, rather than the canonical SV. The exclamative and propositional AR variants in
this frame are given in (5a) and (5b) respectively.
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(5) Post-verbal subjects
a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘It surprised me {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro.
‘It surprised me the apples that Pedro brought’
A couple of notes are required about (5b). First, observe that there is an agreement mismatch
between the matrix predicate and the DP; usually, Spanish requires subject arguments to agree
with the verb in ♮♣♰♱♭♬ and ♬♳♫♠♣♰, but this is not observed in (5b). This agreementmismatch
is studied in detail in §4.1.3.2. For the moment, it suffices to note that this is a property of
propositional ARs that comes in handy to tease them apart from ordinary DPs (see §4.1.3.2
and theminimal pair (31) below). Second, just like in its English translation, the interpretation
of (5b) is vague, and what surprised the speaker about the apples could be almost anything:
that there were many apples, that they were big, that they were Fuji apples, etc. This is also
true of the qué variant of (5a). (The cuánto variant is straightforward and uniformly refers to
the amount of apples.)
Both subordinate exclamations (6a) and propositional ARs (6b) may appear in the imper-
sonal frame as well. As in the post-verbal case, the qué variant of (6a) and the propositional
AR in (6b) are vague with respect to the object of the emotive attitude.
(6) Impersonal
a. Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Juan.
Juan
‘It is surprising how many apples Juan brought’
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b. Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Juan.
Juan
‘It is surprising the apples that Juan brought’
4.1.1.3 Ambiguities between questions and exclamations
There are environments that allow for both interrogative and exclamative complements,
sometimes leading to ambiguity as to the interpretation of the sentence as a whole. Consider,
for instance, the following sentence (from Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996).
(7) Bill found out how rich my parents are.
a. Bill found out exactly how much money my parents have.
b. Bill found out that my parents are much richer than (he) expected.
Sentence (7) may be interpreted as a subordinate question, where the speaker asserts that Bill
knows the (true) answer to the relevant question, (7a). But interpreted as an exclamative, (7)
describes an emotive attitude that holds between Bill and a proposition of the formmy parents
are d-rich, (7b).
Propositional ARs may be embedded in similar environments as well, and give rise to the
same sort of ambiguities.
(8) No
not
sabes
know.2.♱♥
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
last
pasado.
year
Lit.: ‘You don’t know the apples that Pedro brought last year.’
The sentence in (8) may be interpreted as a subordinate ♭♠♨♣♡♲ or ♟♫♭♳♬♲ question, as in
(9a)/(9b). The same sentences, however, can be used exclamatively as well, expressing that
the apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the speaker’s expectations, either with respect
to some property of the particular apples, (9c) or with respect to the amount of apples that
were brought (9d).
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(9) a. Subordinate ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interrogative
You don’t know what are the apples that Pedro brought last year.
b. Subordinate ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interrogative
You don’t know what is the amount of apples that Pedro brought last year.
c. Subordinate ♭♠♨♣♡♲ exclamative
The amount of apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the
speaker with respect to some property of apples.
d. Subordinate ♟♫♭♳♬♲ exclamative
The amount of apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the
speaker.
Furthermore, as first discussed by Elliot (1971), exclamatives are factive and therefore in-
compatible with speaker ignorance regarding the content of the expression. In keeping with
this observation, the exclamative use of propositional ARs is not allowed when the speaker
must be taken to be ignorant, as in (10).
(10) No
not
sé
know.1.♱♥
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
last
pasado.
year
‘I don’t know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought last year’
For good measure, it is worth observing that the pattern is identical for sentences with overt
wh-pronouns:
(11) No
not
sé
know.1.♱♥
{ qué
what
/ cuántas
how-many.♤♫.♮♪
} manzanas
apples
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I don’t know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
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So, as the last two sections have shown, the wide range of interpretations allowed by propo-
sitional ARs follows closely the interpretation of bona fide subordinate questions and excla-
matives. Similarly, both types of construction are confined to be the syntactic environments.
4.1.2 Constraints on propositional ARs
4.1.2.1 Restrictions on the determiner
Recall from the introductory that ARs obligatorily co-occur with the definite article (Carl-
son 1977a). Spanish propositional ARs are subject to the same restriction. In general, any
attempt to construct a propositional AR with a determiner other than the definite article re-
sults in ungrammaticality.
(12) a. *Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
{ algunas
some
/ muchas
many
/ dos
two
} manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I wonder {some / many / two} apples that Pedro brought’
b. *Sé
know
{ algunas
some
/ muchas
many
/ dos
two
} manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I wonder {some / many / two} apples that Pedro brought’
c. *Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
{ algunas
some
/ muchas
many
/ dos
two
} manzanas
applesm
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘It is surprising {some / many / two} apples that Pedro brought’
This is true even of cases like (13), where the definite article is present, but further modified
by the universal quantifier all. The attempts below are ungrammatical.1
(13) a. *Yo
I
me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
todas
all.♤♫.♮♪
las
D.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
Lit.: ‘I wonder all the apples that Juan brought’
1The sentence in (13b) can be marginally acceptable under an acquaintance interpretation of the verb know.
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b. *Yo
I
sé
know
todas
all.♤♫.♮♪
las
D.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
Lit.: ‘I know all the apples that Pedro brought’
4.1.2.2 Obligatoriness of the relative clause
A second constraint on propositional ARs is that the relative clause is obligatory. Unmod-
ified definite DPs are not usually grammatical as complements of rogative predicates–with
the exception of some “functional” nouns like price, time, etc. (Nathan 2006). Under respon-
sive predicates some speakers may allow a concealed question interpretation, but the ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretation is absent.2
(14) a. *Yo
I
me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas.
apples
b. ?Yo
I
sé
know
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas.
apples
‘I know which ones are the (relevant) apples’
Recall from (5b) that propositional ARs allow an agreement mismatch when they appear as
post-verbal subjects of emotive predicates. Even if we keep these properties the same, with
the goal that the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading is facilitated and the ♭♠♨♣♡♲ reading disallowed, dropping
the relative clause results in ungrammaticality all the same.
2The same is true of other, such as reduced relatives clauses, participial phrases, etc.:
(i) a. *Yo
I
me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
traídas
brought
por
by
Juan.
Juan
b. *Yo
I
me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
personas
people
jugando
playing
a
poker
poker.
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(15) *Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
On the variant where the subject nominal and matrix verb agree, the resulting sentence is
grammatical but lacks an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation. The sentences in (16) simply states that the
apples themselves, not the quantity of them, were the source of surprise.
(16) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♱♥
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas.
apples
‘The apples surprised me.’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♱♥
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
de
of
Juan.
Juan
‘Juan’s apples surprised me.’
This property of propositional ARs is in stark contrast with the ARs usually discussed in the
literature, where the role otherwise played by the relative clause can be supplied by a rich
enough context (see §2.2.2 in Chapter 2). In both English and Spanish, sentences like (17)
may convey an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading.
(17) a. We lost because we didn’t have the soldiers {(of the enemy) / (that the enemy had).}
b. Perdimos
lost
la
the
batalla
battle
porque
because
no
not
teníamos
have
los
the
soldados
soldiers
(que
that
nuestro
our
enemigo
enemy
tenía).
had
I leave the discussion of further differences between Spanish propositional ARs and nominal
ARs in Spanish as well as English for Chapters 3 and 2 respectively.
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4.1.3 Further syntactic properties of propositional ARs
A number of additional syntactic properties of propositional ARs lead us to the conclusion
that they are not ordinary nominal modified by restrictive relative clauses. In many respects,
propositional ARs fail to show properties of ordinary DPs in Spanish and instead bear the hall-
marks of wh-constructions, like subordinate interrogatives and exclamatives. In this section,
I discuss five syntactic properties of propositional ARs that differentiate them from surface
identical DPs involving relative clauses and other definite DPs like free relatives.
4.1.3.1 Subject Verb inversion
In Spanish, the canonical word order is SVO. However, Subject Verb inversion is a com-
mon, optional process, and in many environments subjects may vary freely between preverbal
and postverbal positions.
(18) Declarative sentences
a. Hoy
today
Juan
Juan
ha
aux.
traído
brought
las
the
manzanas.
apples
‘Today Juan brought the apples’
b. Hoy ha traído Juan las manzanas.
However, there are a number of constructions where SV inversion is obligatory (see Torrego
1984, Suñer 1994, Barbosa 2001 a.o.). The blueprint of such cases is that they all involve
movement of some operator–usually wh-operators, but also focus–to the left periphery of the
clause. This is illustrated by the examples in (19) through (23).
(19) Matrix wh-questions
a. { Qué
what
/
/
Cuántas
how many
manzanas
apples
} ha
aux.
traído
brought
Juan?
Juan
‘{What / How many apples} did Juan bring?’
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b.*{ Qué / Cuántas manzanas } Juan ha traído?
(20) Matrix exclamatives
a. { Lo
the.♬♲
/ Cuántas
how many
manzanas
apples
} que
that
ha
aux.
traído
brought
Juan!
Juan
‘{The things / How many apples} Juan has brought!’
b.*{ Lo / Cuántas manzanas } que Juan ha traído!
(21) Embedded wh-questions
a. Me
I
pregunto
wonder
{ qué
what
/
/
cuántas
how many
manzanas
apples
} ha
aux.
traído
brought
Juan.
Juan
‘I wonder {what / how many apples} Juan brought.’
b.*Me pregunto { qué / cuántas manzanas } Juan ha traído?
(22) Embedded exclamatives
a. Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
{ lo que
what
/
/
cuántas
how many
manzanas
apples
} ha
aux.
traído
brought
Juan.
Juan
‘It is surprising {what / how many apples} Juan has brought.’
b.*Es sorprendente { lo que / cuántas manzanas } Juan ha traído.
(23) Focus fronting
a. Manzanas
apples
ha
aux.
traído
brought
Juan,
Juan,
no
not
plátanos.
bananas
‘Apples has brought Juan, not bananas.’
b.*Manzanas Juan ha traído, no plátanos.
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Notice however, that A-bar movement to the left-periphery is not enough to trigger obligatory
inversion. As shown in (24)–(26), there are movement constructions–including headed and
free relatives as well as topicalization–where inversion is only optional.
(24) Relative clauses
a. Las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
ha
aux.
traído
brought
Juan.
Juan
‘The apples that Juan brought.’
b. Las manzanas que Juan ha traído.
(25) Topic fronting
a. El
the
Quijote
Quixote
lo
it
ha
aux.
leído
read
Juan.
Juan
‘Don Quixote Juan has read.’
b. El Quijote Juan lo ha leído.
(26) Free Relatives
a. Juan
Juan
ha
aux.
comido
eaten
lo
the
que
that
ha
aux.
preparado
cooked
Pedro.
Pedro
‘Juan has eaten what Pedro has cooked’
b. Juan ha comido lo que Pedro ha preparado.
One generalization about when inversion is required versus not is due to Rizzi (1997), who
argues that inversion must take place whenever there is an operator-variable chain.
(27) T♦♣ ♧♬♴♣♰♱♧♭♬ ♥♣♬♣♰♟♪♧♸♟♲♧♭♬
Inversion is obligatory if the clause in question contains an operator-variable chain.
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For Rizzi, wh-words and focus are quantificational, unlike relative operators (which move
and merely trigger abstraction in a Heim and Kratzer 1998-style system) and topics (where
the value of the trace or lower copy is identical to the topic phrase and thus, the same across
all evaluations).3
Regardless of the possible analyses that may account for this generalization, what is im-
portant for our purposes is that SV inversion provides a good diagnostic of operator-variable
chains, understood à la Rizzi. With respect to movement constructions at large, the data in
(19) through (26) suggest a nominal/clausal divide: SV inversion seems to be obligatory those
constructions that are clausal in nature (interrogatives and exclamatives), whereas it does not
seem to be required with relative clauses and free relatives, both of which are nominal–in
the sense that their distribution follows more closely that of ordinary nominal phrases. This
property of SV inversion makes it a good test to probe the underlying syntactic properties of
propositional ARs. If inversion is optional in propositional ARs, this would lend support to
a view on which they share a common core with ordinary relative clauses yielding an ♭♠♨♣♡♲
(intersective) interpretation. On the other hand, if inversion is obligatory, this would sug-
gest that propositional ARs have a syntactic makeup that is categorically different from such
nominals, and that they have a common underlying structure as wh-constructions.
Turning now to propositional ARs, they require inversion across different types of em-
bedding predicates, as shown below with rogative (28a), responsive (28b) and emotive factive
predicates (28c) (Plann 1984).
3The author considers quantificational those phrases that make use of not just one, but a range of values that
get assigned to a variable (the trace of the focused constituent that has been fronted), and where calculating the
meaning of such chain requires reference to evaluations at different values. This is true of both wh-operators
and focus. In turn, by claiming that topic is not quantificational, Rizzi assumes that the value which the trace
gets in the interpretation of the chain is invariable, since it receives the same value across all evaluations (i.e. it
is still assigned a value by the topic phrase, but that value remains constant). Rizzi (1997, 2004) refers to traces
of this kind as null constants.
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(28) Propositional ARs
a. Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
{ comió
ate
Pedro
Pedro
/ *Pedro comió }.
‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro ate’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
dijo
say
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
{ comió
ate
Pedro
Pedro
/ *Pedro comió }.
‘She told me {what/how many} apples Pedro ate’
c. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
las
D.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
{ comió
ate
Pedro
Pedro
/ *Pedro comió}.
‘It surprised me the (amount of) apples that Pedro ate’
For completeness, (29) shows that SV inversion is also required in nominal matrix exclama-
tives, which are also ambiguous between ♭♠♨♣♡♲ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations.
(29) Las
the
manzanas
apples
que
that
{ comió
ate
Pedro
Pedro
/ *Pedro comió }!
‘The apples that Pedro ate!’
4.1.3.2 Agreement
In Spanish, nominative subject arguments must agree with the verb in person and number,
whether pre- or post- verbal. Failure to agree results in ungrammaticality, as shown by the
contrast in (30).
(30) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♮♪
mis
I.♮♭♱♱.♮♪
amigos.
friends
‘My friends surprised me’
128
b.*Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
mis
I.♮♭♱♱.♮♪
amigos.
friends
Consider now the minimal pair in (31).
(31) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
amigos
friends
que
that
invitó
invited
Pedro.
Pedro
‘It surprised me {what/how many} friends that Pedro invited’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♮♪
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
amigos
friends
que
that
invitó
invited
Pedro.
Pedro
‘The friends that invited Pedro surprised me’
At first blush, the difference in agreement pattern between (31a) and (31b) may suggest that
agreement is optional with these emotive predicates. However, as the translations indicate,
these two sentences are not semantically equivalent. Only (31a) has an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation,
and thus is a propositional AR. Crucially, in (31a), the verb does not seem to be agreeing with
the noun amigos (“friends”). What we have, at least superficially, is an agreement mismatch
(see also Torrego 1988, Campos 1993, Brucart 2003).
Similar facts obtain in other types of propositional ARs. For instance, plurale tantum terms
in Spanish always trigger plural agreement irrespective of their number interpretation. But
when they form propositional ARs and the relative clause receives an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation,
the verb can be marked singular, against expectations (32a). When the interpretation is not
about an amount, plural agreement resurfaces, as shown in (32b).
(32) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
víveres
supplies
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘It surprised me {what/how many} supplies Pedro brought’
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b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendiéron
surprised.3.♮♪
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
víveres
supplies
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘The supplies that Pedro brought surprised me’
We find similar agreement mismatches with psychological predicates with experiencer sub-
jects, like olvidar (“forget”). The subject of such verbs are marked dative, and since dative
arguments in Spanish cannot be targeted for agreement, the verb instead agrees with the ob-
ject. The basic facts, in (33), show that the verb agrees with the object, and failure to agree
with the object, as in (33b), results in ungrammaticality.
(33) Agreement pattern with DPs
a. Se
refl
me
I.♢♟♲
han
aux.3.♮♪
olvidado
forgotten
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
libros
books
‘I forgot the books’
b. *Se
refl
me
I.♢♟♲
ha
aux.3.♱♥
olvidado
forgotten
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
libros
books
When olvidar takes a clausal complement, however, the verb bears default agreement (33),
presumably because clauses are not φ-feature bearers in Spanish (cf. Halpert 2015).
(34) Agreement pattern with clauses
a. *Se
refl
me
I.♢♟♲
han
aux.3.♮♪
olvidado
forgotten
{ qué
what
/ cuántos
how many.♫♱.♮♪
} libros
book.♫♱.♮♪
leyó
read
Juan
Juan
‘I forgot {what/how many} books Juan read’
b. Se
refl
me
I.♢♟♲
ha
aux.3.♱♥
olvidado
forgotten
{ qué
what
/ cuántos
how many
} libros
book.♫♱.♮♪
leyó
read
Juan
Juan
‘I forgot {what/how many} books Juan read’
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Let us now turn to propositional ARs when they occur as the object of such subject experiencer
verbs. As we see in (35), only the non-agreeing variant in (35b) has an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation.
(35) a. Se
refl
le
PR.♢♟♲
han
aux.3.♮♪
olvidado
forget
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
mejillones
mussel.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
ha
aux.
pedido
ordered
Juan.
Juan
‘He has forgotten the mussels that John ordered’ [restrictive RC]
#‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered [AR]
b. Se
refl
le
PR.♢♟♲
ha
aux.3.♱♥
olvidado
forget
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
mejillones
mussel.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
ha
aux.
pedido
ordered
Juan.
Juan
#‘He has forgotten the mussels that John ordered’ [restrictive RC]
‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered [AR]
A final note on these agreement facts. One could think that the presence of the relevant [♱♥]
φ-features on the matrix predicate is due to an elided classifier noun cantidad (“quantity”), as
represented in (36) below.
(36) { Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
/ sé}
know
la
the.♱♥
⟨cantidad de⟩ manzanas
amount of
que trajo
apples.♮♪
Pedro.
that
‘I {wonder / know} (what is) the amount of apples that Pedro brought’
The first issue with this idea is that cantidad de is not a constituent, and so it should not be
targeted by ellipsis (e.g. Merchant 2013 a.o.). This is shown by other cases of NP-ellipsis
where, in configurations like the one in (36), the elision never targets the preposition de.
(37) a. He
aux.
cogido
taken
[♢♮ las
the.♱♥
⟨gafas⟩
glasses
de
of
Pedro
Pedro
]
‘I have taken Pedro’s glasses’
b. *He cogido [♢♮ las ⟨gafas de⟩ Pedro ]
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Moreover, Spanish does have an elliptical construction like (36) where cantidad is elided, but
in these cases too the preposition must remain, as illustrated by the contrasts in (38).
(38) a. { Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised
/ Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
} la
the.♤♫.♱♥
⟨cantidad.♤♫.♱♥⟩ de
of
plátanos
banana.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
trajo
brought
Juan
Juan
‘It {surprised me / is surprising} the amount of bananas that Juan brought’
b.*{ Me sorprendió / Es sorprendente } la ⟨cantidad.♤♫.♱♥ de⟩ plátanos que trajo
Juan
Finally, there are important differences between (36) and its overt variant that, again, would
be difficult to account if the former were derived from the latter. For one, overt cantidad de
does not require a relative clause, as shown below.
(39) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
la
the.♤♫.♱♥
cantidad
amount
de
of
manzanas.
apples
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
la
the.♤♫.♱♥
cantidad
amount
de
of
manzanas
apples
de
of
Juan.
Juan
c. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
esa
that.♤♫.♱♥
cantidad
amount
de
of
manzanas.
apples
And second, unlike propositional ARs, the overt counterpart of (36) cannot be embedded by
question embedding predicates, suggesting that it is a different type of construction altogether.
(40) *Yo
I
{ me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
/ sé
know
} la
the.♤♫.♱♥
de
of
plátanos
banana.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
trajo
brought
Juan.
Juan
I take it, then, that the agreement patterns reported above cannot be successfully accounted
for by alluding to hidden/null material in the relative clause.
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Before I conclude the section, let us see how the two properties of propositional ARs we
have seen so far hang together. In (31), for instance, the two examples–the agreeing and the
non-agreeing variants–were introduced with SV inversion. Thus, given the distribution of
propositional ARs reviewed in this section, we would expect that the ordinary SV word order
is compatible only with the agreeing variant. This is exactly what we find:
(41) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♮♪
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
amigos
friends
que
that
Pedro
Pedro
invitó.
invited
‘The friends that invited Pedro surprised me.’
b.*Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
amigos
friends
que
that
Pedro
Pedro
invitó.
invited
The same is true of the examples in (35): the canonical SV order is compatible only with
agreeing variants of the relative clause.
(42) a. Se
refl
le
PR.♢♟♲
han
aux.3.♮♪
olvidado
forget
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
mejillones
mussel.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
Juan
aux.
ha
ordered
pedido.
Juan
‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered.’
b. *Se
refl
le
PR.♢♟♲
ha
aux.3.♱♥
olvidado
forget
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
mejillones
mussel.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
Juan
Juan
ha
aux.
pedido.
ordered
4.1.3.3 Pre- vs. post-verbal clausal subjects
Propositional ARs pattern with interrogatives/exclamatives and unlike ordinary DPs with
restrictive relative clauses in certain positional constraints they are subject to. In Spanish, only
certain types of clauses can appear in the preverbal subject position, and embedded interrog-
atives and exclamatives are not among these. Subject interrogatives/exclamatives uniformly
appear in the post-verbal position. On the other hand, DPs, including concealed questions, are
not subject to this restriction and can occur in both pre and post-verbal subject positions. As
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illustration, consider the contrast between (43a) and (43b): though the sentences are intended
to convey the same meaning, only (43b), involving a concealed question, is grammatical.
(43) a. Preverbal interrogative
*Qué
what
hora
time
era
is
me
me
sorprendió
surprised
‘What the time is surprised me’
b. Preverbal concealed question
La
the
hora
time
me
me
sorprendió
surprised
‘The time surprised me’
We can also show that nominal constructions involving overt wh-expressions, i.e. free rela-
tives, behave like DPs and not like interrogatives in being allowed in the preverbal subject
position. We can distinguish otherwise surface identical interrogatives and free relatives on
the basis of the type ofwh-pronoun they select. Spanish has two variants ofwh-pronouns, one
prosodically strong and one prosodically weak, a distinction reflected in the orthography as
well (e.g. quien for the weak variant of “who” and quién for the strong one, cuanto and cuánto
for “how many”, etc.). Crucially, depending on the construction, only one or the other variant
is permitted: strong wh-pronouns occur in propositional environments, i.e. true questions and
exclamatives, whereas the weak variant is used in nominal environments, i.e. free relatives.
Below, (44a) states that what is surprising is the fact that a certain person came to the party.
By contrast, (44b) claims that whoever came to the party, that person was surprising.
(44) a. Embedded interrogative
Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
[♡♮ quién
who.♱♲♰
vino
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta].
party
‘It is surprising who came to the party’
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b. Free relative
Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
[♢♮ quien
who.♵♩
vino
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta].
party
‘The person who came to the party is surprising’
Usingwh-pronoun selection as a diagnostic, we can show that only free relatives–which require
the weak variant–are allowed in the preverbal subject position.4
(45) Strong Relative Pronoun quién
a. 3Post-verbal
Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
quiénes
♵♦♭.♮♪
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta.
party
‘It surprised me who came to the party’
b. 8Pre-verbal
*Quiénes
♵♦♭.♮♪
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta
party
me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió.
surprised.3.♱♥
(46) Weak Relative Pronoun quien
a. 3Post-verbal
Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♱♥
quienes
♵♦♭.♮♪
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta.
party
‘Those who came to the party surprised me’
4Recall the agreement facts reported above in §4.1.3.2: subordinate questions/exclamations do not agree
with matrix predicates, whereas relative clauses and free relatives do.
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b. 3Pre-verbal
Quienes
♵♦♭.♮♪
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta
party
me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron.
surprised.3.♱♥
‘Those who came to the party surprised me’
We can now turn to propositional ARs and ask whether they pattern like interrogatives or free
relatives. As shown in (47), the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading is permitted only when the phrase in question
occurs post-verbally; the pre-verbal variant is ungrammatical.
(47) Amount Relatives
a. 3Post-verbal
Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
estudiantes
students
que
that
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta.
party
‘It surprised me how many students came to the party’
b. 8Pre-verbal
*Los
D.♫♱.♮♪
estudiantes
students
que
that
vinieron
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta
party
me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió.
surprised.3.♱♥
Again, we see that propositional ARs show pattern syntactically with interrogatives, and unlike
ordinary DPs, even those DPs that have a question interpretations.
4.1.3.4 Anaphora
DPs in Spanish require the same ♥♣♬♢♣♰ and ♬♳♫♠♣♰ features on anaphors that refer back
to them. However, it is also possible for anaphors to pick out non-nominal referents, like
clauses, measure phrases etc. In these cases, neuter pronouns like lo and ello must be used.
Here, we can use anaphora as a testing ground for the difference between propositional ARs
and nominal restricted by relative clauses. If propositional ARs are ordinary DPs modified by
relative clauses, anaphoric reference should only be available through the use of pronominal
forms that agree in φ-features with the nominal head. Once again, we will use the dual nature
136
of wh-pronouns to set a baseline against which we compare the behavior of propositional
ARs. Because strong wh-pronouns can only occur in clauses, anaphors referring back to
those clauses will only take neuter forms, like the pronouns lo and ello. Free relatives with
weak pronouns, on the other hand, will require anaphors that agree with the DPs containing
the wh-pronoun in ♥♣♬♢♣♰/♬♳♫♠♣♰. Consider first the subordinate question in (48), with the
strong wh-pronoun.
(48) Strong wh-pronoun; subordinate question
a. With ♬♳♫♠♣♰/♥♣♬♢♣♰ anaphor
Me
I.dat
sorprendió
surprised
[ cuántos
how many.♱♲♰.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
]j, uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
ellosi/∗j.
PR.♫♱.♮♪
‘It surprised me how many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for them’
b. With ♬♣♳♲♣♰ anaphor
Me
I.dat
sorprendió
surprised
[ cuántos
how many.♱♲♰.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
]j, uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
ello∗i/j.
PR.♬♲
‘It surprised me how many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for it’
In this minimal pair, (48a), with a plural anaphor, only has an interpretation where the reason
for admiring Raquel is the particular articles that she wrote. On the other hand, (48b), with
the neuter anaphor ello, conveys that the reason for admiration is the number of papers that
Raquel wrote (and so it = the amount of papers in the translation).
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(49) Weak relative pronoun; free relative
a. With ♬♳♫♠♣♰/♥♣♬♢♣♰ anaphor
Me
I.dat
sorprendieron
surprised
[ cuantos
how many.♵♢.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
], uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
ellosi.
PR.♫♱.♮♪
‘All the papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for them’
b. With ♬♣♳♲♣♰ anaphor
*Me
I.dat
sorprendieron
surprised
[ cuantos
how many.♵♢.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
], uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
elloi.
PR.♬♲
‘The papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for it’
With the weak relative pronoun, we see a different pattern. In (49), only the plural anaphor
ellos, as in (49a), is felicitous. The neuter anaphor ello in (49b) does not have a suitable an-
tecedent and the sentence is therefore illicit. Thus, unlike embedded questions/interrogatives,
which permit anaphoric referece by neuter anaphors, free relatives are DPs that require their
anaphors to match with them in φ-features.
Propositional ARs, on the other hand, pattern with the wh-constructions that make use of
strong wh-pronouns. As we see in (50a), the use of the plural anaphor ellos forces an ♭♠♨♣♡♲
interpretation of the relevant construction. The use of neuter ello, on the other hand, is both
grammatical and moreover yields an ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation.
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(50) Amount Relatives
a. With ♬♳♫♠♣♰/♥♣♬♢♣♰ anaphor
Me
I.dat
sorprendió
surprised
[ los
the.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
que
that
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
]j, uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
ellosi/∗j.
♮♰.♬♲
‘The papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for them’
b. With ♬♣♳♲♣♰ anaphor
Me
I.dat
sorprendió
surprised
[ los
the.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
que
that
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
]j, uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
ello∗i/j.
♮♰.♬♲
‘It surprised me how many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for it’
Finally, notice that in the agreeing variant of (50b), ungrammaticality ensues only with the
neuter anaphor ello, but not with the agreeing ellos.
(51) a. *Me
I.dat
sorprendieron
surprised
[ los
the.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
que
that
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
]j, uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
elloi/j.
♮♰.♬♲
‘It surprised me how many many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for it’
b. Me
I.dat
sorprendieron
surprised
[ los
the.♫♱.♮♪
artículosi
papers
que
that
escribió
wrote
Raquel
Raquel
]j, uno
one
tiene que
must
admirarse
admire-♰♣♤♪
de
of
ellosi/j.
♮♰.♬♲
‘The papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for them’
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4.1.3.5 Differential Object Marking
Spanish is a language where direct objects that are both specific and human must be pre-
ceded by the preposition a (“to”). This is an instance of Differential Object Marking (DOM;
see Torrego 1998, Leonetti 2004 a.o.).
(52) a. María
María
besó
kissed
*(a)
to
Raquel
Raquel
b. María
María
besó
kissed
(*a)
to
el
the
retrato
portrait
In certain cases, specific and non-human animate objects may trigger DOM as well, depending
on the closeness or “relative humanity” attributed to them.
(53) María
María
vió
saw
(a)
to
la
the
gata
cat
Unlike this subset of nominals, clausal arguments do not show DOM. We can again construct
minimal pairs using the by now familiar strong/weak distinction of wh-pronouns. The strong
pronoun forms subordinate interrogatives, which, being clausal, do not trigger DOM; weak
pronouns, on the other hand, form free relatives, which, if animate and specific, must trigger
DOM.
(54) a. Strong wh-pronoun
María
María
vió
saw
(*a)
to
quién
who
vino
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta
party
‘María saw who came to the party’
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b. Weak wh-pronoun
María
María
vió
saw
*(a)
to
quien
who
vino
came
a
to
la
the
fiesta
party
‘María saw the person who came to the party’
We turn now to propositional ARs. If the animacy/specificity of the superficial head noun in
propositional ARs were sufficient to trigger DOM, this would suggest that despite the vari-
ability in interpretation, propositional ARs are syntactically garden-variety DPs. However,
this is not what happens; propositional ARs do not trigger DOM, as shown in (55). Not only
is the variant without DOM in (55a) grammatical and has the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ reading, the sentence
in (55b) with DOM cannot receive such an interpretation.
(55) a. Estudian
evaluate.3.♮♪
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
delegados
representative.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
enviarán
send
‘They are evaluating {what/how many} representatives they will send.3.♮♪’
b. Estudian
evaluate.3.♮♪
a
to
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
delegados
representative.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
enviarán
send
‘They are evaluating the (individual) representatives they will send.3.♮♪’
4.1.4 Interim summary & challenges
To sum up, Spanish propositional ARs look like ordinary DPs, yet seem to have the exter-
nal distribution and bear the syntactic blueprints of wh-constructions. They can complement
verbs that otherwise do not take nominal complements, show syntactic constraints that do
not apply to ordinary DPs, and show mysterious agreement and case assignment patterns.
Yet, they look on the surface like ordinary nominals and seem to be headed by a definite
determiner, suggesting that they are categorically a DP. Thus, among our key desiderata in
the remainder of this chapter is to account for the mixed nature of propositional ARs. In
the following two sections, I propose a structure for propositional ARs that takes seriously
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their syntactic and semantic parallels with interrogatives and exclamatives. In a nutshell, I
suggest that propositional ARs start their lives out, both syntactically and semantically, as a
wh-construction. Their nominal nature is derived by merging a special variant of the definite
article, which I call D♟♬♱, which combines with a question and returns a proposition. Not only
will this account explain the puzzling syntactic behavior of propositional ARs, it also offers
insight into why other languages do not have analogous constructions.
4.2 Proposal: the syntax of propositional ARs
This section presents an analysis of propositional ARs as interrogative structures. Propo-
sitional ARs are not born as DPs, but as full clauses. The syntactic make-up of propositional
ARs is akin to interrogative clauses, which involve a [+♵♦] specified C○ head with an inter-
rogative core. The resulting construction is a DP with an embedded CP providing question
semantics that is only superficially identical to an NP modified by a relative clause.
Consider the example in (56) as a working case.
(56) … las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
The example in (56) looks like a restrictive relative clause, but, as I hope has been shown
throughout this chapter, there are reasons to believe that it cannot just be an ordinary relative
clause. The structure that I propose for DPs like (56) qua propositional ARs is represented
below.
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(57) Syntactic structure of propositional ARs
DP
D
las
CP
DP[♵♦]
Opwh manzanas
C’
C○ TP
Juanj T’
ti vP
tj ti twh
que[+♵♦]+ [T○+V○]i
trajo
The structure in (57) is reminiscent of that proposed by Borsley (1997) and Bianchi (1999)
for restrictive relative clauses. For these authors, D directly takes a CP as its complement (see
also Kayne 1994), and the constituent targeted for movement is not an NP, but a DP headed
by a null determiner.
(58) [♢♮ the [♡♮ [♢♮ e books]i [♡ that [♲♮ you read ti]]]
There are two main differences between their structures and mine: (i) the presence of a C○
head with a [+♵♦] feature in (57) and (ii) that the null determiner in (57) is a wh-operator.
With these ingredients, the derivation proceeds as follows. The [+♵♦] C○ head probes for an
element in its domain with matching [♵♦] specifications, either a question or an exclamative,
and agrees with that element. Spanish is a wh-movement language, and this Agree relation
triggers movement of the wh-goal to the specifier of CP. Moreover, finite verbs in Spanish
overtly move to T (Rizzi 1982) and when there is wh-movement, there is also accompanying
T-to-C movement, such that the verb is pronounced to the immediate right of the moved
wh-expression (Torrego 1984, Suñer 1994 and Gallego 2007 a.o.).
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Finally, the D introducing the definite article enters in the derivation with an unvalued
φ-feature, D[uφ]. In the current structure, unlike with restrictive relative clauses, the sister
of D lacks these features, but the DP in [Spec,CP], which is equidistant to CP and also in the
c-command of D[uφ] can serve as a suitable goal.
(59) DP
D[uφ]
las
CP
DP[♤♫,♮♪]
Opwh manzanas[♤♫,♮♪]
C’
…
Agree
Summing up, the proposed structure for propositional ARs in Spanish. The key aspects of
(57) amount to (i) a [+♵♦] feature on C○, (ii) the presence of a null wh-operator generated in
VP internal position, and (iii) the ability of the definite article to combine with a non-relative
CP. These three aspects of the syntax of propositional ARs demand some more elaboration,
so I will discuss them in turn.
4.2.1 The nature of the [င࿵] feature
The structure in (57) takes propositional ARs to involve a type of interrogative C○, yet
propositional ARs and ordinary interrogatives differ in a number of important ways. For one,
propositional ARs can never form matrix interrogatives.
(60) Matrix interrogative
*Las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro?
Pedro
‘What apples brought Pedro?
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Moreover, genuine embedded interrogatives are incompatible with the complementizer que,
which is obligatory in propositional ARs.
(61) a. Embedded interrogative
Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
cuántas
how many
manzanas
apples
(*que)
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
‘I wonder how many apples Pedro brought’
b. Propositional AR
Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
las
the
manzanas
apples
*(que)
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
Given these differences, we are forced to ask: what is the nature of the [+♵♦] C○ head in
propositional ARs? I would like to suggest that the C○ in propositional ARs is the same one as
in wh-exclamatives. The parallels between the two constructions are various (see §4.1.3). For
instance, propositional ARs, which, as we saw before, do not form good matrix interrogatives,
do nevertheless form grammatical and felicitous matrix exclamatives. Moreover, exclamatives
are compatible with the complementizer que.
(62) a. Matrix exclamative
Las
what
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
aux
Pedro!
brought
‘The apples that Pedro brought!
b. Exclamatives with que
Cuántas
how many
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
aux
Pedro!
brought
‘How many apples Pedro brought!
These two examples show properties of Spanish exclamatives that, although relevant for
propositional ARs, fall out of the scope of this work and I will not address them here. For
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instance, sub-sentential exclamatives like (62a) rely on some form of null wh-operators to
be interpreted whose nature varies depending on particular views of exclamatives like (62a).
These have been argued to be either sentential (e.g. Zanuttini and Portner 2003, Portner and
Zanuttini 2005, Gutiérrez-Rexach 2014) or sub-sentential (e.g. Rett 2015 and the papers
in Bosque 2017). Here I will not discuss the exact nature of the operators involved in the
interpretation of (62a).
Lastly, it may seem that the structure proposed in (57) is in violation of the doubly filled
COMP filter (Chomsky and Lasnik 1977).5 I do not dwell on this issue for two main reasons.
First, if we admit that this is an issue, there are simple technical solutions, such as adopting
multiple CP layers (see e.g. Watanabe 1993, Benincà 1996, Gutíerrez-Rexach 2001, Goria
2002, Ambar 2003, You 2013 a.o.). Second, there are other structures in Spanish that also
seem to be in violation of this filter, including certain types of relative clauses, thereby calling
into question the role of the filter in the language (Plann 1982, Suñer 1984, Arregi 1998,
Lahiri 2002, a.o.).
4.2.2 The null wh-operator
I will assume that the null operator Opwh may come in two forms, as covert variants of
the overt wh-words qué (“what” or “how”) and cuánto (“how many”). That is, the only differ-
ences between Opwh and qué and cuánto are simply overtness vs. covertness; otherwise, Opwh
is identical to the wh-words we see overtly on exclamatives. The evidence for such covert
operators comes, once again, from exclamative constructions. Consider the ordinary matrix
exclamations below.
5The Doubly Filled COMP Filter in (i) was proposed to rule out sentences like (ii).
(i) Doubly Filled COMP Filter
*[♡♭♫♮ wh-phrase φ], φ ≠ e [where e means “deleted”]
(ii) *the man [♡♮ who [♡ that met you]] is my friend
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(63) a. Qué
what
listo
intelligent
que
that
es
is
Pedro!
Pedro!
‘How intelligent Pedro is!
b. Cuántas
how many
ganas
effort.♤♫.♮♪
le
him
pone
put
el
the
tío!
dude
‘How much effort the dude is putting in!’
As Hernanz (2006) and Hernanz and Rigau (2006) show, the wh-word can be dropped from
the wh-phrases in (63), resulting in the semantically equivalent variants of (64).
(64) a. Listo
intelligent
que
that
es
is
Pedro!
Pedro!
‘How intelligent Pedro is!
b. Ganas
effort.♤♫.♮♪
le
him
pone
put
el
the
tío!
dude
‘How much effort the dude is putting in!’
4.2.3 The role of the determiner
The proposed structure in (57)–repeated here–requires the definite article to select a CP.
(57) [♢♮ las
the
[♡♮ [♢♮[♵♦] Opwh manzanas]i
apples
[♡ que[+♵♦]
that
[trajo]j
brought
[♲♮ Juan
Juan
tj ti]]]]
This is common practice under some variants of the raising analysis of relative clauses, orig-
inated in Kayne (1994) (cf. Borsley 1997 and Bianchi 1999). But there is a big difference in
terms of the featural specification of C○ in relative clauses on the one hand and propositional
ARs on the other: the former is a C○[+♰♣♪] whereas the later is C○[+♵♦]. This difference is
crucial, as we saw above, to derive the SV inversion patterns reported in §4.1.3.1. But the
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distinction is also meaningful for the semantic composition of propositional ARs (as will be
clear in the next section).
The issue is the following: if we take for granted the results presented here so far, i.e. if
we are assuming that propositional ARs are syntactically questions up to CP, what is the role
of the definite article? From a syntactic stand-point, notice that the behavior of the definite
article is quite flexible in Spanish in general. For instance, unlike in Germanic languages, it
can appear with tensed clauses.
(65) a. No
not
me
me
gusta
like
el
the
[♡♮ que
that
tu
you
actúes
behave.♱♳♠♨
así
so
].
‘I don’t like your behaving like that’
b. El
the
[♡♮ que
that
Juan
Juan
llegue
arrive.♱♳♠♨
tarde
late
] no
not
me
me
importa
care
‘I don’t care if Juan arrives late’
For the cases that occupy us, however, I want to defend the idea that the definite article we
see in propositional ARs is not the run-of-the-mill definite article. Instead, it is a variant
similar to the Answerhood operator proposed in Heim (1994) and Dayal (1996). Let us refer
to this variant of D as D♟♬♱. I will postpone the discussion of its semantic details until the next
section, and concentrate now on its syntactic properties.
Syntactically, I take D♟♬♱ to be an impoverished variant of its ordinary cousin D♬♭♫ (hence-
forth I will use D♬♭♫ to refer to the ordinary definite article). In section §4.1.3 we saw that
propositional ARs do not behave syntactically as other DPs do, including DPs with restrictive
relative clauses. A subset of that evidence, summarized below for convenience, shows that
propositional ARs establish grammatical relations, e.g. Agree, differently (see short descrip-
tion under each phenomenon, full discussion can be found in §4.1.3).
(31) SV agreement [Subject DPs must agree in ♬♳♫♠♣♰ with the matrix predicate; propo-
sitional ARs trigger neuter agreement.]
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a. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised.3.♱♥
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
amigos
friend.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
invitó
invited
Pedro.
Pedro
‘It surprised me {what/how many} friends that Pedro invited’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendieron
surprised.3.♮♪
los
the.♫♱.♮♪
amigos
friend.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
invitó
invited
Pedro.
Pedro
‘The friends that invited Pedro surprised me’
These data suggest that the φ-features that are visible on the D heading the propositional AR
(e.g., ♫♱.♮♪ in (31)) are nevertheless not visible to the agreeing V. Thus, the Agree mechanism
proposed in (59) above, where D♟♬♱ gets its φ-features valued by the wh-DP in [Spec,CP],
can only be part of the explanation. As I show below, the solution to this mismatch lies in the
particularities of D♟♬♱ and its own φ-featural composition.
It is well-known that Agreement, as a grammatical operation, is sometimes sensitive to
syntactic features and some other times to semantic features. But, as Corbett (2006) has
shown, occasionally it appears that Agreement is sensitive to both types of features simulta-
neously, within the same utterance. The consequence is that controllers of agreement must
carry two sets of φ-features. Recent examples of papers exploring and corroborating these
implications can be found in Danon (2013) and Landau (2016).
According to Corbett (2006, 155–157), “semantic agreement” is consistent with the mean-
ing of the controller, whereas “syntactic agreement” is consistent with its form. This divergent
distribution of φ-features within the DP is very well attested attested across languages. The
cases that interest us are those where a mismatch occurs between the DP internal φ-features
and the φ-features that it controls outside the DP. The following are some such examples in
English (from Danon 2013, Landau 2016 and Rullman 2010).
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(66) Syntactic agreement
a. [♢♮[♱♥] Part of the residents ] has.♱♥ opposed the plan.
b. [♢♮[♱♥] The committee ] has.♱♥ decided on the issue.
c. [♢♮[♱♥] Each of us ] thinks.♱♥ that we can win the nomination.
(67) Semantic agreement
a. [♢♮[♱♥] Part of the residents ] have.♮♪ opposed the plan.
b. [♢♮[♱♥] The committee ] have.♮♪ decided on the issue.
c. [♢♮[♱♥] Each of us ] think.♮♪ that we can win the nomination.
The agreement patterns in (67) are the flip-side of Spanish propositional ARs. In (67), a mor-
phologically singular DP controls plural agreement on the verb, whereas in Spanish proposi-
tional ARs a morphologically plural DP controls singular agreement on the verb. Of course,
this state of affairs raises questions about Agree. In the particular cases at hand, (67) and
propositional ARs in Spanish, are there multiple Agree operations, each targeting a differ-
ent set of φ-features bore by potentially different heads? Moreover, in addition to making
the relevant Agree relationship available, we need to understand as well where the difference
between D♟♬♱ and D♬♭♫ exactly lies.
The solution that I propose is couched in terms of Wechsler and Zlatić’s (2003) original
distinction between ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ and ♧♬♢♣♶ features, (partially) following Landau’s (2016) con-
figurational adaption. The gist of the idea is that morphologically-rooted features (♡♭♬♡♭♰♢
features) are hosted on the noun stem while semantically-rooted featuers (♧♬♢♣♶ features)
are hosted on higher functional heads. Following Danon (2013), I will assume that the only
φ-features that are accessible to agreement from outside of the DP are those in the highest
nominal projection, D in the case of DPs (this is accordance with phase-based conceptions
of agreement, but largely independent of it). As a consequence, D must somehow mediate
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between the DP-internal and DP-external φ-agreement. Graphically, this can be represented
as follows (cf. Landau 2016):
(68) [♲♮ T○ [♴♮V○´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
External Agree Zone
[♢♮ D [♶♮ : : : ]]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Internal Agree Zone
]]
The low boundary of the External Zone is determined byD, which in turns determines the high
boundary of the Internal Zone. Here DP-external agreement takes place after D has carried
out all the Agree operations DP-internally. In Landau’s (2016) terms, D is the “contact point”
between external probes like v and T, and any nominal φ-features there may be inside the DP.
Both Wechsler and Zlatić (2003) and Landau (2016) show convincingly that Agree in the
External Zone almost exclusively targets ♧♬♢♣♶ features.6 This means that inherently ♧♬♢♣♶
(semantic or, in this case, “interpretable”) features, such as [♮♣♰♱♭♬], will always be specified
as valued features on D, since N is not specified for [♮♣♰♱♭♬]. In turn, D must have unvalued
♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ (morphological) features that it will inherit from N. Thus, by the time that V is
merged and is probing for agreement, D has already probed into its Internal Agree Zone and
valued all the unvalued features it had.
We are now ready to look into the featural specifications of D♬♭♫ and D♟♬♱ in Spanish. I
will begin with the more familiar D♬♭♫.7
(69) Feature array of D࿻࿼࿺⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
♧♬♢♣♶
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
u♥♣♬♢♣♰:
u♬♳♫♠♣♰:
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
♡♭♬♡♭♰♢
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
u♥♣♬♢♣♰:
u♬♳♫♠♣♰:
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
6Landau (2016) comments on two possible answers for why this must be the case, giving a locality-based
answer and a type-based answer. I refer the interested reader to the original paper.
7Only the nominal ♬♳♫♠♣♰ and ♥♣♬♢♣♰ features are represented. (Un)valuation is marked with the privative
feature u, so that unvalued features are represented as [uF] and valued ones simply as [F].
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According to (69), all its features, ♧♬♢♣♶ and ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ are unvalued. This means that D will
have to value them all in the Internal Agree Zone from some goal, N in this case, which only
contains valued ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ features.
(70) Feature array of N⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
♥♣♬♢♣♰
♬♳♫♠♣♰
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
This is the most common situation, one where ♧♬♢♣♶ and ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ features on D have the
same specifications. Schematically:
(71) [♴♮ V [♢♮ ♧♬♢♣♶ [uφ]D
♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ [uφ]
[♬♮ N[♬♳♫,♥♣♬] … ]]]
The [uφ] features of D, both ♧♬♢♣♶ and ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢, are valued by the [φ] features on N. With
its valued ♧♬♢♣♶ [φ] features, D can serve as goal for a probing V. Thus, for (72) we have (73).
(72) Me
me
sorpredieron
surprised.3.♮♪
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apple.♤♫.♮♪
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
(73) [♴♮ sorprendieron3.♮♪ [♢♮ ♧♬♢♣♶ [uN♳♫;uG♣♬]las.♤♫.♮♪
♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ [uN♳♫;uG♣♬]
[♬♮ manzana[♤♫,♮♪] … ]]]
Let us look at D♟♬♱ now. I mentioned earlier the intuition that D♟♬♱ seemed to be “defective”, in
the sense that it rendered opaque the φ-features of the nominal in [Spec,CP] for DP-external
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probes. We can now formulate this intuition in a concrete way: D♟♬♱ enters in the computation
with valued φ ♧♬♢♣♶ features and unvalued ♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ φ-features. In this respect, it differs from
D♬♭♫ precisely in that, although it can Agree with the nominal in [Spec,CP], it is not able to
“pass on” its features further up in the tree. Its feature specification looks as in (74).
(74) Feature array of D࿮࿻က⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
♧♬♢♣♶
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
♥♣♬♢♣♰: nt
♬♳♫♠♣♰: sg
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
♡♭♬♡♭♰♢
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
u♥♣♬♢♣♰:
u♬♳♫♠♣♰:
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Given its feature configuration, whenever D♟♬♱ is involved, only ♬♣♳♲♣♰ and ♱♧♬♥♳♪♟♰ φ-
features will be visible from any DP-external position. In a case with SV agreement mismatch
like (75) the agreement relationships are established as in (76).
(75) Me
me
sorpredió
surprised.3.♱♥
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apple.♤♫.♮♪
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro.
Pedro
(76) [♴♮ sorprendió3.♱♥ [♢♮ ♧♬♢♣♶ [N♳♫sg;G♣♬nt]las.♤♫.♮♪
♡♭♬♡♭♰♢ [uN♳♫;uG♣♬]
[♬♮ manzana[♤♫,♮♪] … ]]]
This configuration correctly captures the behavior of propositional ARs with respect to the
three phenomena mentioned earlier: SV agreement, anaphora and DOM.8 In the ideal case,
one will be able to tie in the valued ♧♬♢♣♶ features of D♟♬♱ with the presence of a of a [+♵♦]
8I did not include case features in the exposition, but the system works all the same for case as well.
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C○ in its complement position. This would provide the first step towards an explanation for
why D♟♬♱ but not D♬♭♫ must come with valued ♧♬♢♣♶ features. I will leave this question open
for future study.9
4.2.4 Relation to nominal ARs
The structure proposed in (57) above for propositional ARs differs from that of nominal
ARs discussed in §3 only in the specification of the C○-head. In nominal ARs, the structure
for which is repeated in (77), we have an interrogative C○[+♵♦] head, whereas nominal ARs
have relative C○[+♰♣♪]; as will be demonstrated shortly, only the former will give rise to a
question meaning.
(77) Syntactic structure of nominal ARs in Spanish [with optional T-to-C movement]
DP
D
las
CP
DPi
Opwh manzanas
C’
C○
que[+♰♣♪]
TP
DP
Juanj
T’
T○
trajo
vP
tj ti
9One may also wonder whether it is a coincidence that the ♧♬♢♣♶ features on D♟♬♱ are neuter and singular,
raising the question of whether this is some form of “default” in Spanish. But notice that, since we still need the
relevant φ-features to agree inside the DP, it is not clear how D♟♬♱ could show default agreement in this sense.
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Thus, variation in just a few key pieces is able to capture the similarities and differences be-
tween propositional ARs and nominal ARs. The string-identity of propositional and nominal
ARs follows from the fact that much of their structural make-up is indeed the same. However,
because of differences in the nature of the C○-head involved, the resulting phrases differ in
meaning.
At this point it is useful to stop and look at the resulting landscape of wh-constructions in
Spanish. We can provide a comprehensive description of all the syntactic structures discussed
so far by looking at three moving pieces: (i) the pair of operators qué and cuánto, which (ii)
vary with respect to their overtness (i.e. overt in subordinate interrogatives and exclamatives
vs. covert in ARs) and (iii) with respect to the make up of the CP they come in, i.e. whether
they involve a [+♵♦] or [+♰♣♪] C○ head. The full paradigm is spelled out below.
C○ Opwh complementizer definite article nominal head
cuánto ♧♬♲/♣♶♡♪ [+♵♦] overt no no yes
qué ♧♬♲/♣♶♡♪ [+♵♦] overt no no yes
cuanto FR [+♰♣♪] overt no no yes
lo que FR [+♰♣♪] covert yes yes no
propositional AR [+♵♦] covert yes yes yes
nominal AR [+♰♣♪] covert yes yes yes
Table 4.1. Relation of features in ARs vs. overt wh-operator constructions.
As the table shows, the (c)overtness of the wh-operator, the presence of the complementizer
que and the definite article go hand in hand. As a consequence, going from a propositional
AR to a nominal AR involves just one change. Similarly, going from ordinary free relatives
to a structure like (77) simply amounts to inverting the overtness/covertness of the different
pieces involved in constructing a free relative, as described above. This gives us a typology of
at least three possible structures for a sequence of the form the NP that in Spanish–ignoring
the possibility of a matching relative structure.
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(78) a. Relative clause:[♢♮ las [♬♮ manzanasj [♢♮ Op tj ]i [C○[+♰♣♪] que [♲♮ María compró ti ]]]]
b. Nominal AR:[♢♮ las [♡♮ [♢♮ Op manzanas]i [C○[+♰♣♪] que [♲♮ María compró ti ]]]]
c. Propositional AR:[♢♮ las [♡♮ [♢♮ Op manzanas]i [C○[+♵♦] que+[compró]j [♲♮ María tj ti ]]]]
4.3 Semantic analysis
As I hope has emerged throughout the chapter, there is a lot to gain by attributing to
propositional ARs the syntactic structure of wh-constructions like questions and exclamatives.
In this section, I show how we can also capture their semantic properties by interpreting them
as questions and exclamations.
The empirical landscape that we need to capture varies along two main axes: (i) the type
of predicate to which propositional ARs are complements (rogative, responsive and emotive
factives), and (ii) the two types of interpretations that propositional ARs may have (♭♠♨♣♡♲
and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations).
4.3.1 Background: the basics of questions
In this section I lay out my assumptions about the semantics of questions. The baseline
theory of questions that I am assuming is a blend between the well-studied proposals by Ham-
blin (1973) and Karttunen (1977), with the incorporation of Dayal’s (1994, 1996) idea that
the truth requirement on question denotations is introduced by an answerhood operator.
4.3.1.1 Question as sets of answers
In Hamblin’s (1973) original proposal, questions denote sets of propositions. In particular
they denote the set of their possible answers. Thus, a question like (79a) below is interpreted
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as the set in (79b), often referred to as a Hamblin-set. The set in (79c) exemplifies one such
possible meaning.
(79) a. Which book did Liz read?
b. ⟦(79a)⟧ = λp:∃x[book(w)(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(x;Liz)]
c. {that Liz read The Hobbit, that Liz read Don Quixoje, that Liz read Crime &
Punishment…}
In questions, wh-phrases may range over singular as well as plural individuals. In order to
extend this account to plural questions, I adopt the ontology of plural individuals from Sharvy
(1980) and Link (1983): singular terms denote in the atomic domain whereas plural terms
may denote plural and singular individuals. Plural morphology (as well as the conjunction and
in one of its senses) signals the presence of a pluralization operation ‘∗’ denoting the summing
operation ⊕. This operator generates all the individual sums of members of the extension of
any 1-place predicate P.10 Thus, the denotation of ∗P is closed under the sum operation. The
consequence for the semantics of questions is that we now have different Hamblin-sets for
plural and singular individuals.
(80) a. Which books did Liz read?
b. ⟦(80a)⟧ = λp:∃x[∗book(w)(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(x;Liz)]
(81)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
that Liz read ♲♦⊕♢♯⊕♡♮, ♮♪
that Liz read ♲♦⊕♢♯, that Liz read ♲♦⊕♡♮, that Liz read ♢♯⊕♡♮, ♮♪
that Liz read ♲♦, that Liz read ♢♯, that Liz read ♡♮ ♱♥
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
10The ∗-operator denotes a function from D⟨et⟩ into D⟨et⟩ such that, for any f ∈ D⟨et⟩ and any x ∈ De, ∗f(x)↔[f(x) ∨ ∃y∃z[∗f(y) ∧ ∗f(z) ∧ x = y⊕ z]].
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The resulting set of answers is order by entailment: if Liz read The Hobbit and Don Quixote,
it must be the case that Liz read The Hobbit.11
(82) Ordering of the Hamblin-set in (128):
.
♲♦⊕ ♢♯⊕ ♡♮
♲♦⊕ ♢♯ ♲♦⊕ ♡♮ ♢♯⊕ ♡♮
♲♦ ♢♯ ♡♮
The entailment relations may cause problems in embedded contexts. Karttunen (1977) ob-
served that (83a) entails that for every book that Liz read, Bill knows that she read it. But this
does not follow from the embedded question if we assume that it denotes a Hamblin-set like
(81), since there is no reference to the propositions in (81) that are true in the actual world.
Thus, Karttunen argued that the denotation of questions must be limited to the set of their
true answers, as in (84); this is what is usually referred to as the truth requirement on question
denotations.
(83) a. Bill knows which books Liz read
b. ⟦(83a)⟧ = ⟦know(⟦(81)⟧)(Bill)⟧
(84) ⟦(83a)⟧ = λp:∃x[p(w) ∧ ∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(w′)(x;Liz)]
This reading is referred to as theweakly exhaustive interpretation of questions. At this point, it
is useful to define the maximal element, i.e. the unique element that is true and entails the rest
11A quick clarification. In Link’s (1983) system plural entities are just sums of individuals, as concrete as the
individuals that serve to define them and of the same logical type. Therefore, the question alternatives in (81)
denote distinct propositions, and are not ordered by entailment. This works when the predicate is collective (if
Sue and Liz are a good couple it does not follow that Sue is a good couple). For distributive interpretations, we
must order the propositions in the Hamblin-set by entailment. Following Link (1983), we can apply a distributive
operator ‘D’ to the predicate. The distributive operator states that, if some property P is true of a (possibly) plural
individual x, then it must be true of any individual part of x as well. That is, DP(x) ↔ P(x) ∧ ∀y[y ≤i x →
P(y)]. Now the denotation of D(∗P) forms a complete join-subsemilattice in the domain D of individuals that
P generates by operating over atoms, and the different members are ordered by entailment.
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of the true answers. The reason is that questions about singular and plural individuals differ
on the felicity of the possible answers. For instance, (85a) can felicitously answer both (79a)
and (80a). However, (85b) can only felicitously answer (80a), but not (79a). (Both answers
are possible for a question like (86).)
(85) a. Liz read The Hobbit.
b. Liz read The Hobbit and Don Quixote.
(86) What did Liz read?
This shows that the choice between a singular or a plural wh-phrase is reflective of speakers’
expectations regarding the number of entities that should be mentioned in the answer. The
problem is reminiscent of expectations raised by singular vs. plural definite descriptions.
Given (i) the structural parallelism between partially ordered sets of answers like (82) and
the domain of individuals in the Sharvy/Link tradition, and (ii) the similar felicity conditions
shared by definite descriptions and answers to questions, it is no surprise that a solution would
come from introducing maximality/uniqueness in the question denotations. Here I follow
Dayal (1996), who defines an operator A♬♱-Dw that essentially mimics the functions of a
definite determiner: it applies to a set of propositions (a Hamblin-set) and picks the maximum
of the true answers (see also Heim 1994 and Rullmann 1995).12
(87) ⟦A♬♱-Dw⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λw:ιp[p(w) ∧Q(p) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧Q(q)→ p ⊆ q]]
Coming back now to the weakly exhaustive interpretation of (83a) as expressed in (84), it
is well known that this interpretation is sometimes too weak (but see discussions in Heim
1994 and Beck and Rullmann 1999). It was Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) who brought
attention to this issue in the context of questions embedded under cognitive factives. The
12Notice that this operator applies to the full Hamblin-set and not just to the set of true answers. The truth
requirement on questions is introduced by the operator itself. See Dayal (1994, 1996, 2017) for arguments in
favor of this change.
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intuition is that, if Bill knows which books Liz read, he must know, for every book in the
domain, whether she read it or not. This is usually referred to as the strongly exhaustive
interpretation of questions. This is not what (84) means, however; (84) claims that for every
book that Liz actually read, Bill knows that Liz read that book. That is, (84) is compatible
with Bill believing of a book that Liz did not read that she actually read it. This seems too
weak.13 For this reason, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1984) argue for a strengthened
version of (84), where the alternatives that are not entailed are false. The authors propose a
system where this meaning is derived by assuming that questions denote equivalence relations
over sets of possible worlds:
(88) a. Bill knows who came
b. ⟦(88a)⟧ = λw′:λw′′[λx:came(w′)(x) = λx:came(w′′)(x)]
As Heim’s (1994) noted, however, the same results can be obtained by means of a second
answerhood operator. Then, the strengthening can be enforced either by establishing a par-
tition of possible worlds out of the set of true answers, or by explicitly denying non-entailed
alternative answers:
(89) a. Partition based strongly exhaustive answers⟦A♬♱S♲♰p⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λw:λw′[A♬♱-Dw(Q)(w) = A♬♱-Dw(Q)(w′)]
b. Negation based strongly exhaustive answers⟦A♬♱S♲♰n⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λw:ιp[p(w) ∧ ∀q[[Q(q) ∧ p ⊈ q]→ ¬q(w)]]
13It is widely accepted that the strongly exhaustive reading of (83a) is possible and easily accessible. There
is debate, however, as to whether (83a) also has, in addition, a weakly exhaustive interpretation. One position,
held by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), George (2011) and Uegaki (2015), holds that that weakly exhaustive
readings are not accessible for cognitive factives (although they are for other veridical responsive predicates); in
turn, Karttunen (1977); Heim (1994); Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) andKlinedinst and Rothschild (2011) believe
that weakly exhaustive interpretations are also available under cognitive factives. Part of the evidence that the
latter present are sentences like (i) (from Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007), which would be rendered inconsistent
under a strongly exhaustive interpretation of the subordinate question who came.
(i) Jack knows who came, but he does not know who did not come.
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4.3.1.2 The baseline theory
With the general background on questions introduced above, I briefly explain here how to
obtain those results compositionally. The syntax-semantic mapping I assume follows the LF-
oriented renditions of Karttunen’s (1977) semantics in Stechow (1996) and Bittner (1998).
First, wh-words denote existential quantifiers. For instance:
(90) a. ⟦who⟧ = λP:∃x[person(w)(x) ∧ P(x)]
b. ⟦what⟧ = λP:λQ:∃x[P(w)(x) ∧Q(w)(x)]
Following Stechow (1996), I define the denotation of the operator Q as an identity relation
between propositions:
(91) ⟦Q⟧ = λp:λq[p = q]
I will assume, with Karttunen (1977), that the locus of the question operator is on C○, akin to
his proto-question rule. With these pieces, the derivation of a simple question like (80a) is as
follows:
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(92) LF derivation of what books did Liz read?
CP1: ⟨st; t⟩
λp:∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(w′)(x;L)]
λp CP2: t∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(w′)(x;L)]
DP: ⟨et; t⟩
λP:∃x[∗book(x) ∧ P(x)] C’: ⟨et⟩λx[p = λw:read(w)(x;L)]
λe C’: t
p = λw:read(w)(x;L)
C○ ∶ ⟨st; t⟩
λq[p = q] TP: ⟨t⟩read(x;L)
Liz: e VP: ⟨et⟩
V: ⟨e; et⟩⟩
λx:λy:read(x; y) te
The wh-word, a quantifier, undergoes QR to [Spec,CP] and leaves an individual trace in TP.
The only departure from Karttunen (1977) is on the top level. Moved elements are coindexed
with their trace, in this case with a superscript that corresponds to the type of the trace. Notice
also that the type of a trace left by amoved element corresponds to the type this moved element
quantifies over. Finally, a variable left by a trace is λ-abstracted over immediately before the
element is interpreted in its displaced position.
The CP level is the level at which “intensionalization” happens. This requires Intensional
Functional Application, to allow the combination of the C○ headwhich requires a propositional
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argument, with the TP, which provides a truth-value. The result is again a truth-value, but
now the world variable has been introduced and abstracted over the predicate.
As in Karttunen’s (1977), the free propositional variable in CP2 is bound by a lambda
operator, effectively creating a set of propositions.14 The resulting interpretation of this LF
is the desired proposition-set denotation of the question what books did Liz read, i.e. the
Hamblin-set of propositions of the form “Liz read x”, where x is any book.15 The last step is
to filter out the false propositions. This is the task of the answerhood operator A♬♱-D, which
applies to the meaning in CP1 and returns the maximal true answer:
(93) CP: ⟨s; st⟩
λw:ιp[p(w) ∧ ∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(w′)(x;L)]]
A♬♱-D CP1: ⟨st; t⟩
λp:∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′:read(w′)(x;L)]
With respect to how many questions, the derivation proceeds in a similar fashion. The strategy
I adopt is along the lines of Higginbotham (1993), Cresti (1995), Romero (1998) and others.
The idea is to decompose how many NP phrases a wh-operator part and a many NP part.
Thus, while the wh-operator takes scope, the nominal can be interpreted at different parts
in the clause.16 This keeps the semantics of how many NP maximally similar to the scope
14This is known as Karttunen’s (1977) “WH-Quantification Rule”.
15This is the de re reading: the extensional value of the wh-complement is evaluated under the actual world. I
will not consider other interpretations of questions here; see Sharvit (2002) for a treatment of de dicto readings
and Dayal (2017) for discussion.
16This is required for ambiguities like the following (Kroch 1989, Cinque 1990):
(i) How many books does Chris want to buy?
a. What is the number n such that there are n books that Chris wants to buy?
b. What is the number n such that Chris wants it to be the case that there are n books that he wants to
buy?
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splitting structures usually assumed in the semantics of comparative quantifiers (e.g. Hackl
2000 a.o.). I define the two moving parts of how many NP as follows:
(94) a. ⟦how⟧ = λD⟨dt⟩:∃d[D(d)]
b. ⟦♫♟♬♷⟧ = λP⟨et⟩:λd:λQ⟨et⟩:∃x [P(x) ∧Q(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
Thus, the LF for a question like how many books did Liz read is the following:
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(95) LF derivation of how many books did Liz read?
CP
1:
⟨st;t⟩
λp
:∃d[p
=λw′
:∃x[∗
bo
ok
(x)∧
∣x∣=d
∧rea
d(w′ )
(x;L)
]]
λp
CP
2:
t
∃d[p
=λw′
:∃x[∗
bo
ok
(x)∧
∣x∣=d
∧rea
d(w′ )
(x;L)
]]
Op
wh
λD
dt
:∃d[D
(d)]
CP
3:
⟨dt⟩
λd
[p=λ
w′ :∃x
[∗boo
k(x)∧
re
ad
(w′ )(
x;
L)∧∣
x∣=d
]]
λd
C’
:t
p
=λw′
:∃x[∗
bo
ok
(x)∧
re
ad
(w′ )(
x;
L)∧∣
x∣=d
]
C○ ∶⟨
st;
t⟩
λq
[p=q
]
TP
:t
∃x[∗
bo
ok
(x)∧
re
ad
(x;L)
∧∣x∣=
d]
DP
:⟨et;t
⟩
TP
:⟨e;t⟩
λx
:re
ad
(x;L)
λe
TP
:t
re
ad
(x;L)
t d
NP
:⟨d;⟨
et⟩⟩
♫♟
♬♷
⟨et;⟨
d;
⟨et;t⟩
⟩⟩NP:⟨
et⟩
4.3.2 Compositional analysis of propositional ARs
We are now well equipped to dive into how to map structures like propositional ARs to
their semantic interpretation. Recall that the desiderata is to account for the wide range of
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interpretations that propositional ARs are capable of delivering when they are complements to
wh-constructions. I repeat here the relevant paradigm: a sentence like (8) may be interpreted
in four different ways:17
(8) No
not
sabes
know.2.♱♥
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
last
pasado
year
Lit.: ‘You don’t know the apples that Pedro brought last year
(9) a. O♠♨♣♡♲ interrogative
You don’t know what are the apples that Pedro brought last year.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲ interrogative
You don’t know what is the amount of apples that Pedro brought last year.
c. O♠♨♣♡♲ exclamative
The apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the speaker with
respect to some property of apples.
d. A♫♭♳♬♲ exclamative
The amount of apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the
speaker.
The plan for the rest of the section is the following: first I will spell out my proposed mean-
ing for the definite article in its propositional variant D♟♬♱, and then present my account for
propositional ARs when they are interpreted as subordinate questions. Then, I discuss the
case of exclamatives and how they tie in with the proposed semantics for interrogatives and
the definite article.
17I am abstracting away from the ♩♧♬♢ interpretation here and subsuming it under the ♭♠♨♣♡♲ reading.
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4.3.2.1 The semantics of the definite article
I have argued so far that propositional ARs are syntactically questions (and so different
in this respect from concealed questions). The obvious question, then, is what to do with
the definite article. This definite article, which I called D♟♬♱ earlier, must apply to a CP that
denotes a question.18 Its function, therefore, is similar to the Answerhood operators proposed
in Heim (1994) and Dayal (1996). The full lexical entry of D♟♬♱ is below.19
(96) ⟦D♟♬♱⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λw ∶ ∃p[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧Q(q)]→ p ⊆ q]]
: ιp[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧Q(q)]→ p ⊆ q]]
The semantic task of D♟♬♱ is the same as that of A♬♱1 in Heim (1994) and A♬♱-Dw in Dayal
(1996): it applies to a question denotation, the Hamblin-set Q, it presupposes the existence
of a true proposition p in Q that entails all other true propositions, and returns that p. The
similarities with the ordinary definite article are hard to miss.
4.3.2.2 Propositional ARs as answered questions
I have laid out my assumptions about the semantics of questions, and proposed an entry
for the definite article that is compatible with question semantics. In what follows I put all the
pieces together to show how they derive the range of interpretations observed in propositional
ARs.
4.3.2.2.1 Basicmeanings The compositional semantics of question-embedding sentences
adopted here states that propositional ARs denote precisely that, propositions. The target in-
terpretations of a sentence like (97) are in (98).
18See examples in (65) above showing that the definite article can also combine with propositions.
19I follow the convention of introducing presuppositions with a colon after the last lambda term.
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(97) Juan
Juan
sabe
know
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
last
pasado
year
Lit.: ‘Juan knows the apples that Pedro brought last year
(98) a. O♠♨♣♡♲ interrogative
Juan knows what are the apples that Pedro brought last year.
b. A♫♭♳♬♲ interrogative
Juan knows what is the amount of apples that Pedro brought last year.
The derivation of the propositional AR las manzanas que trajo Pedro on its ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interrogative
interpretation goes along the lines described above for constituent questions. Syntactically,
the only difference between propositional ARs and constituent questions is that (i) there is an
overt determiner playing the role of an answerhood operator, (ii) the wh-operator is covert,
and (iii) the complementizer is overt.
(99) [♢♮1 las [♡♮ [♢♮2 Opwh manzanas ]i [♡’ que[+♵♦] [ trajo ]j [♲♮ Juan tj ti ]]]]
From a semantic standpoint, however, there are no differences. The full derivation is sum-
marized below.
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(100) O࿯࿷࿲࿰ခ interpretation of propositional ARs
DP: ⟨s; st⟩
λw:ιp[p(w) ∧ ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = trajo(w)(x;P)]]
DP: ⟨⟨st; t⟩; ⟨s; st⟩⟩
D♟♬♱
CP1: ⟨st; t⟩
λp:∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = λw′:trajo(w′)(x;P)]
λp CP2: t∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = λw′:trajo(w′)(x;P)]
DP2: ⟨et; t⟩
λP:∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ P(x)]
Opwh manzanas
C’: ⟨et⟩
λx[p = λw:trajo(w)(x;P)]
λe C’: t
p = λw:read(w)(x;L)
C○ ∶ ⟨st; t⟩
λq[p = q] TP: ⟨t⟩trajo(x;P)
[Juan trajo te]
A similar derivation accounts for the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of propositional ARs. In this
case, the syntactic derivation echoes that of how many questions.
(101) [♢♮1 las [♡♮ [♢♮2 Opwh ♫♟♬♷ manzanas ]i [♡’ que[+♵♦] [ trajo ]j [♲♮ Juan tj ti ]]]]
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At LF, the cluster how many NP–cuanto NP in Spanish–is decomposed in a wh-operator and
a many NP part. The derivation is summarized below: first, consider the interpretation of the
how many NP phrase.
(102) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretation of propositional ARs –Part I
CP2: t∃d[p = λw′:⟦TP⟧(w′)]
Opwh
λDdt:∃d[D(d)]
CP3: ⟨dt⟩
λd[p = λw′:⟦TP⟧(w′)]
λd C’: t
p = λw′:⟦TP⟧(w′)
C○ ∶ ⟨st; t⟩
λq[p = q] TP: t∃x [∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ trajo(w′)(x;P)]
DP : ⟨et; t⟩ TP: ⟨e; t⟩
λx:trajo(x;P)
λe TP: t
trajo(x;P)
td NP: ⟨d; ⟨et; t⟩⟩
♫♟♬♷ manzanas
The rest of the derivation proceeds as before: Karttunen’s (1977) WH-quantification rule
applies first, and D♟♬♱ applies to the resulting set of propositions.
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(103) A࿺࿼ဂ࿻ခ interpretation of propositional ARs –Part II
DP: ⟨s; st⟩
λw:ιp[p(w) ∧ ∃d[p = ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ trajo(w)(x;P)]]]
DP: ⟨⟨st; t⟩; ⟨s; st⟩⟩
D♟♬♱
CP1: ⟨st; t⟩
λp:∃d[p = λw′:⟦TP⟧(w′)]
λp CP2: t∃d[p = λw′:⟦TP⟧(w′)]
In each case, (100) and (103), the result is a function fromworlds to propositions. The definite
article D♟♬♱ takes a CP denoting a set of propositions–either one of the CP1 in (100)/(102)–
and returns the intension of the maximally informative proposition from that set.
(104) ⟦DP⟧ = λw : ιp[p(w) ∧ ⟦CP1⟧(p) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ ⟦CP1⟧(q)]→ p ⊆ q]]
4.3.2.2.2 Embedding propositional ARs Propositional ARs denote propositions, they
are of type ⟨st⟩. The kind of predicates that can typically embed questions, however, usually
take complements that denote sets of propositions. For instance, the usual lexical entry for
question embedding know looks like this:
(105) ⟦know⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λxe:∀p[Q(p) ∧ p(w)→ ∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w)[p(w′)]]
The obvious solution to solve the second logical option is to lift the type of propositional ARs
to a set of propositions. This lifting may be carried out by adapting Partee’s (1987) I♢♣♬♲
operator to operate over propositions.
(106) ⟦I♢⟧ = λp⟨st⟩:λq[q = p]
(107) ⟦I♢⟧(⟦(100)⟧) = λq[q = λw:ιp[∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = trajo(w)(x;P)]]]
We can now work with standard definitions for rogative and responsive predicates. The full
interpretation of a propositional AR like (100) is as follows:
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(108) ⟦know⟧(⟦(100)⟧)(⟦Juan⟧) = ∀p[p = ιq[∃x[∗manzana(x)∧q = trajo(w)(x;Pedro)]→ ∀w′ ∈ Doxw;Juan[p(w′)]]]
In the case of ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations, we have the following.
(109) ⟦know⟧(⟦(100)⟧)(⟦Juan⟧)= ∀p[p = ιq[∃d[q = ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ trajo(w)(x;Pedro)]]→ ∀w′ ∈ Doxw;Juan[p(w′)]]]
An obvious question that remains unanswered concerns anti-rogative predicates like think and
believe, which only take propositional (declarative) complements, and yet they are incompat-
ible with propositional ARs.
(110) *Juan
Juan
piensa
thinks
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
el
the
año
last
pasado
year
In providing propositional ARs a propositional semantics we seem to lose the parallelism with
questions when it comes to embeddability.
♯♳♣♱♲♧♭♬: ⟨st; t⟩ ♮♰♭♮♭♱♧♲♧♭♬: ⟨st⟩ propositional ARs: ⟨st⟩
rogative
3 8 3(ask, wonder)
responsive
3 3 3(know, tell)
anti-rogative
8 3 8(think, believe)
Table 4.2. Distribution propositional ARs with embeddind predicates
The derivation of the differences between the three types of predicates has occupied seman-
ticists at least since Karttunen’s (1977) work, and I will not be able to address the issue here
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with the level of detail that it deserves.20 Different assumption about the semantics of in-
terrogative will face different aspects of this issue. An obvious alternative that goes around
this problem is to provide a semantics for propositional ARs where they simply denote sets
of propositions. This can be enforced either by incorporating I♢ into D♟♬♱ or by giving D♟♬♱
a different semantics altogether. Both these options however would take the meaning of D♟♬♱
away from its ordinary nominal counterpart D♬♭♫. Another option, suggested to me by Seth
Cable (pc.) is to place the burden of explaining the restriction of propositional ARs to anti-
rogative predicates on the [+♯] feature of the complementizer head. On this view, D♟♬♱ would
no longer be a syntactic head in the same way as other determiners are, and so it would not
block subcategorization into its sister node. I will leave the task of finding a better solution
than the one presented here for a future occasion.21
20For recent discussions, see Uegaki (2015), Spector and Egré (2015), Xiang (2016), Theiler et al. (2016)
and Dayal (2017).
21Predicates that embed exclamatives can also be explained in the terms of the analysis of propositional ARs
presented above. The price to pay, however, is the assumption that exclamative predicates can c-select for
propositions. Thus, what follows should be taken as a demonstration of one way to conciliate the semantics of
propositional ARs with exclamative predicates. As a case study, take factive emotive predicates with exple-
tives like it is surprising/amazing, that can take both question and declarative embedding complements, but not
ordinary DPs.
(i) a. It is amazing {who came to the party / that Liz came to the party / *the dog}.
b. It is surprising {who came to the party / that Liz came to the party / *the dog}.
With our current assumptions, we can make emotive predicates directly take propositional ARs. Assume for
instance a general entry for this type of predicates (where ExpSp;x stands for the set of worlds where the course
of events proceeds as expected by speaker Sp in the evaluation world).
(ii) ⟦EMO⟧ = λp⟨st⟩:λw:p(w) ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ Expw;Sp → ¬p(w′)]
The target interpretation states that the proposition denoted by the propositional AR is true in the evaluation
world, but not in the “expectation” worlds of the speaker. This serves well as a basis for a subordinate excla-
mative. On top of this, we may want to add the emotive component of exclamations (cf. Castroviejo 2006,
Chernilovskaya 2014 a.o.). The main takeaway is that we can directly extend our semantics of propostional ARs
to (at least some) exclamative predicates by, (i) following the tradition that exclamations may be built up from
question semantics (see Lahiri 2002, D’avis 2002, Abels 2007), and (ii) assuming that exclamative predicates
c-select for propositions.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides an account of ARs in Spanish when they appear as complements
to wh-embedding predicates. From a syntactic standpoint, I have argued that propositional
ARs are DPs with a full question embedded at the CP level. This conclusion is supported by
a number of criteria presented in §4.1.3 (which in turn speak against the superficially more
straightforward analysis in terms of concealed questions discussed in §4.5). From a semantic
point of view, propositional ARs have the semantics of (answered) questions, in the spirit
of Heim (1994), Dayal (1996) a.o. (and Zanuttini and Portner (2003) and Gutiérrez-Rexach
1996 for exclamatives). What is special about Spanish, then, is the presence of D♟♬♱, a version
of the definite article that applies to questions (or propositional properties) and returns the
maximally informative true answer. The conclusion is that ARs in Spanish belong to its own
kind, but one that is not very far from other more familiar constructions.
4.5 Appendix: concealed questions?
4.5.1 An alternative approach
Propositional ARs are special in their “hybrid” nature: they seem to be DPs that nev-
ertheless pattern with interrogatives. In these properties, they are reminiscent of concealed
questions. Concealed questions are DPs that can appear embedded under (certain) question
embedding verbs and have an interpretation equivalent to a question. As Baker (1968) orig-
inally noted, a sentence like (111a) is ambiguous between an acquaintance reading, which
states that John is familiar with Rome, and a concealed question reading, expressed by the
paraphrase in (111b).
(111) a. John knows the capital of Italy.
b. John knows what the capital of Italy is.
There are various tests showing that the DP in (111) in fact patterns with questions. For
example, the verb tell in English varies with respect to factivity depending on whether its
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complement is declarative or interrogative. Thus, whereas the embedded proposition in (112a)
may be true or false irrespective of the factual events, (112b) entails that John told Sue about
the actual state of affairs.
(112) a. John told Sue that it was raining.
b. John told Sue whether it was raining.
Using the same test, we can show that concealed questions pattern together with interrogatives.
Thus, if (113a) is true, then neither (113b) nor (113c) can be true at the same time.
(113) a. John told Sue that London is the capital of Italy.
b. John told Sue the capital of Italy.
c. John told Sue what the capital of Italy is.
The property of concealed questions that is pertinent here is that they are ordinary DPs that
appear in positions where questions (and exclamatives, see e.g. Grimshaw 1979) are ex-
pected, much like propositional ARs. This parallel raises the possibility that propositional
ARs in Spanish are in fact concealed questions/exclamations. If so, we would need to posit
no out-of-the-ordinary structure for propositional ARs: they are, syntactically, ordinary DPs
restricted by relative clauses. If so, the same semantic machinery that is used to interpret
concealed questions can yield the differences in interpretation, and account for the unusual
external distribution of such nominals. In what follows, I will first show that at least in terms of
the semantics, a concealed question analysis could derive the right interpretation for proposi-
tional ARs. However, such an account makes wrong predictions about the syntactic properties
of propositional ARs. As will be shown below, propositional ARs and concealed questions in
Spanish show very different patterns, suggesting that an interrogative semantics is insufficient
to capture the properties of propositional ARs; they must have the structural properties of
wh-constructions.
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4.5.2 Proof of concept
The goal of this subsection to show that a concealed question analysis for propositional
ARs can yield the right meaning for these constructions.
The general strategy of the approach I present proceeds in two steps: first, an individual
concept meaning is generated for the propositional AR (of type ⟨se⟩, a function from indices
to individuals), and then a type-shifter extracts a proposition meaning out of the individual
concept.22 Take for instance a DP with a relative clause like the following, assuming a simple
raising analysis of the relative clause (Kayne 1994).
(114) Pedro
Pedro
sabe
knows
[♢♮ las
the
[♬♮1 [♬♮2 manzanas
apples
]i [♡♮ que
that
[♲♮ Juan
Juan
trajo
brought
ti]]]]
The meaning of the highest NP is simply the property resulting from intersecting the NP
manzanas and the CP.
(115) ⟦NP⟧ = λx:λw[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(x; Juan)]
Assuming an intensional variant of the definite determiner, we can close the above property
to get at the desired individual concept interpretation.
(116) a. ⟦las⟧ = λP⟨e;st⟩ = λw:ιx[P(x)(w)]
b. ⟦DP⟧ = λw: ιx[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(x; Juan)]
The denotation of the DP consists of functions from world indices to plural individuals of
apples that Juan brought, where the apples that Juan brought vary from world to world.
Individual concepts cannot directly combine withwh-embedding predicates because there
is a sortal difference: these predicates cannot take complements of type ⟨se⟩ (nor type e either).
For instance, assume the following meaning for the predicate know:
22Employing type-shifters is not the only way to analyze concealed questions. For instance, evidence from
quantified and indefinite concealed questions suggests that the type-shifter analysis is at best insufficient. Those
matters do not concern us here however; see Nathan (2006) and Frana (2017) for discussion.
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(117) ⟦knowQ⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λxe:∀p[Q(p) ∧ p(w)→ ∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w)[p(w′)]]
Thus, we need some kind of repair. In this case, a type-shifter can do the job. We define a
function that applies to individual concepts and returns sets of propositions (Nathan 2006).
(118) ICtoP Shift ⟨se⟩→ ⟨st; t⟩:
λy⟨se⟩:λp⟨st⟩:∃xe[p = λw:[y(w) = x]]
Now the meaning of know above can be applied to the output of the application of ICtoP to
the DP.
(119) ⟦ICtoP⟧(⟦DP⟨se⟩⟧) = λp:∃x[p = λw:⟦las manzanas que Juan trajo⟧w = x]= λp:∃x[p = (λw:ιy[manzanas(w)(y) ∧ trajo(w)(y; Juan)] = x)]
The meaning of the resulting expression amounts to a set of propositions that vary only in the
specification of the apples that Juan brought in each evaluation world.
(120)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
The apples that Juan brought are a⊕ b⊕ c in w,
The apples that Juan brought are d⊕ e⊕ f⊕ g⊕ h in w,
The apples that Juan brought are i⊕ j in w,
…
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Applied to the meaning of know in (117), we get at the desired interpretation:
(121) ⟦ Pedro sabe ICtoP([♰♡ las manzanas que trajo Juan]⟧w)= ∀p[∃x[p = (λw′:⟦las manzanas que trajo Juan⟧w′ = x) ∧ p(w)→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ(w)[p(w′)]]]= ∀p[∃x[p = (λw′:ιy[manzanas(w′)(y) ∧ trajo(w′)(y; Juan)] = x) ∧ p(w)→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ(w)[p(w′)]]]
The resulting expression above is true iff for every proposition p of the form the apples that
Juan brought are x that is true in w, p is also true in all the worlds compatible with Pe-
dro’s beliefs. That is, Pedro knows the answer to the question: what are the apples that Juan
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brought? This strategy interprets the relative clause as a concealed specificational copular
question (Romero 2005, Frana 2017).
This accounts for the ♭♠♨♣♡♲ interpretation of propositional ARs, but a minimal extension
to ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations is possible as well. Intuitively, we need an “amount concept” to
achieve this result, a function from indices to degrees–of type ⟨sd⟩–from which we can extract
a question about an amount.
To do so, assume the presence of a silent ♫♟♬♷ predicate. This null ♫♟♬♷ applies to
properties and measures them along some dimension. For our purposes, it suffices to set
♫♟♬♷ to measure individuals and return their cardinality.
(122) ⟦♫♟♬♷⟧ = λP⟨e;st⟩:λQ⟨e;st⟩:λd:λw:∃x [P(w)(x) ∧Q(w)(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
Here ♫♟♬♷ is a higher-order predicate modifier that takes any two properties P and Q and
returns a function from degrees to propositions such that there is an x in the extension of
P and Q and x is of cardinality d. Syntactically, ♫♟♬♷ raises from the CP internal position
together with the NP and leaves a trace of the same type as the object it quantifies over (type
e in this case).
(123) [♢♮ Pedro [♴♮ sabe [♢♮ las [♬♮1 [♬♮2 ♫♟♬♷ manzanas ]i [♡♮ que [♲♮ Juan trajo ti]]]]]
Wemust provide now versions of the definite article and the type-shifter that are parametrized
to degrees, rather than individuals.
(124) ⟦las⟧ = λP⟨d;st⟩:λw:ιd[P(w)(d)]
(125) ACtoP Shift ⟨sd⟩→ ⟨st; t⟩:
λd⟨sd⟩:λp⟨st⟩:∃d′[p = λw[d(w) = d′]]
Taking these adjustments into consideration, the meaning of the full DP before the application
of the shifter ACtoP is represented below.
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(126) a. ⟦NP⟧ = λQ⟨e;st⟩:λd:λw:∃x [manzanas(w)(x) ∧Q(w)(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
b. ⟦NP⟧ = λd:λw:∃x [manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(Juan; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
c. ⟦DP⟧ = λw:ιd[∃x[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(Juan; x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]
After the application of the shifter, we arrive at (127b):
(127) a. ⟦ACtoP⟧(⟦DP⟨sd⟩⟧) = λp:∃d[p = λw:⟦las manzanas que Juan trajo⟧w = d]
b. λp:∃d[p = λw:(ιd′[∃x[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(x; Juan) ∧ ∣x∣ = d′]]) = d]
As before, the meaning of this expression is a set of propositions:23
(128)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
The number of apples that Juan brought is ,
The number of apples that Juan brought are ,
The number of apples that Juan brought are ,
…
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
This meaning can be taken by predicates like know, as defined in (117).
(129) ⟦ Pedro sabe ACtoP([♰♡ las manzanas que trajo Juan]⟧w)= ∀p[∃d[p = (λw′:⟦las manzanas que trajo Juan⟧w′ = d) ∧ p(w)→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ(w)[p(w′)]]]= ∀p[∃d[p = (λw′:ιd′[manzanas(w′)(y)∧trajo(w′)(y; Juan)∧∣y∣ = d′] = d) ∧ p(w)→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ(w)[p(w′)]]]
In this case, what Pedro knows is the answer to the question: what is the cardinality of the
apples that Juan brought? This is the correct target meaning for the ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretation, a
question not about individual apples, but about amounts of apples.
23The type shifters that we have introduced above in (118)/(125) rely on the semantics that Romero (2005)
provides for the copula in specificational copular sentences. Thus, in the set of propositions of (128), the number
after the copula cannot be predicative, it must be a number name. This is accordance with the fregean view that
noun phrases like the number of planets and simple numerals like eight are singular terms referring to numbers
as abstract objects (Frege 1884). There are, however, many criticisms to this position; see Knowles (2015) and
Moltmann (2016) for two recent ones.
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4.5.3 Assessment
A concealed question analysis, however feasible semantically, is not empirically adequate
in Spanish, as a comparison of propositional ARs and genuine concealed questions in Spanish
reveals. Syntactically, concealed questions are nothing more than the DP they outwardly seem
to be, and consequently, pattern with nominals and not with wh-constructions in the environ-
ments we had seen in §4.1.3. For instance, a DP that is interpreted as a concealed question
nevertheless triggers number agreement in the expected way, in contrast to propositional ARs,
where we find agreement mismatches.
(35b) Agreement mismatch in propositional ARs
Se
refl
le
PR.♢♟♲
ha
aux. 3.♱♥
olvidado
forgotten
los
the. ♫♱.♮♪
mejillones
mussel.♫♱.♮♪
que
that
ha
Juan
pedido
ordered
Juan.
‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered
(130) No agreement mismatch in concealed questions
Se
refl
le
PR.♢♟♲
{ han
aux.3.♮♪
/ *ha
aux.3.♱♥
} olvidado
forgotten
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
capitales
capital.♤♫.♮♪
de
of
Europa.
Europe
‘He has forgotten what are the capital cities of Europe
In addition, concealed questions, unlike propositional ARs and genuine interrogatives, do not
require obligatory inversion, as shown by the contrast below.
(131) a. SV inversion
Yo
I
sé
know
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
trajo
brought
Pedro
Pedro
‘I know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. No SV inversion
Yo
I
sé
know
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
manzanas
apples
que
that
Pedro
Pedro
trajo
brought
180
‘I know {what/#how many} Pedro apples brought’
These divergences in syntactic behavior suggests that a proper treatment of propositional ARs
involves not just a question interpretation, but also the internal structure of a wh-construction.
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CHAPTER 5
DEGREE NEUTER RELATIVE CLAUSES
In the previous two chapters, I discussed two types of ARs in Spanish that share a com-
mon core, but differ in whether they are propositional or nominal in nature. The duality of
ARs in Spanish, I argued, is reminiscent of the connection between wh-constructions and free
relatives. This chapter discusses yet another construction in Spanish which can be character-
ized as having dual forms, one propositional and one nominal. The construction in question is
a different sort of quantity-oriented relative clause, where the clause is headed by a gradable
predicate of any syntactic category and the form lo.1 Sentences involving such constructions
uniformly have a ♢♣♥♰♣♣ interpretation.2
(1) Juan
Juan
admiró
admired
lo
♪♭
hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
que
that
era
was
la
the
novela
novel.♤♫.♱♥
‘Juan admired how beautiful the novel was’
1The morpheme lo has received a great deal of attention in the Spanish literature. Its form, reminiscent
of the definite articles el and la, suggests that it is simply a neuter variant of the definite article. The lack of
neuter declensions in Spanish nominals, however, raises questions about why the language would have a neuter
determiner in the first place. There are at least three main analyses of lo that have been proposed:
(i) a. Lo is a definite article used as a nominalizer of adjective, adverb, prepositional and propositional phrases
(Gil y Gaya 1964, Alarcos Llorach 1967, Álvarez Martínez 1986, a.o).
b. Lo is a definite article that specifically applies to null heads (Contreras 1973, Plann 1980, a.o.).
c. Lo is a pronoun (Bello 1847, Ojeda 1982, Bosque and Moreno 1990, a.o.).
I will not take a stance on the best syntactic characterization of lo, glossing it simply as ♪♭ throughout. What
is important for our purposes is that the morpheme has definite semantics, which is something that all analyses
take for granted (for discussion, see Bosque and Moreno (1990), Ojeda 1993 and especially Gutiérrez-Rexach
(1999, 2014) with respect to Degree Neuter Relatives.
2Recall from the introductory chapter that ♢♣♥♰♣♣ and ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are two sides of the same coin:
amounts are simply ♢♣♥♰♣♣ interpretations in the cardinality scale.
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Following Rivero (1981) and Ojeda (1982), I refer to these constructions as Degree Neuter
Relatives (DNRs for short).
DNRs are interesting both for their cross-linguistic rarity and for their distribution within
Spanish. Regarding the first point, many languages, for instance English, lack DNRs alto-
gether, as exemplified by (2), and can only express the intended meaning using overt wh-
pronouns, as in (3).
(2) a. *Jose admired the beautiful the novel was.
b. *Jose did not understand the idiot that Mariano is.
(3) a. Jose admired how beautiful the novel was.
b. Jose did not understand what an idiot Mariano is.
Notice that Spanish also has the variant with overt wh-pronouns.
(4) Jose
Jose
admiró
admired
cuán
how
hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
era
was
la
the
novela
novel.♤♫.♱♥
‘Jose admired how beautiful the novel was’
Secondly, DNRs appear not only in positions where adjectival and nominal predicates can
ordinarily appear, but also in some environments where such expressions are normally illicit,
e.g. as complements to wh-embedding predicates. In raising this distributional puzzle, DNRs
are reminiscent of propositional ARs (vs. nominal ARs) and this parallelism will be my start-
ing point. The main goal of this chapter is to show that given the machinery I argued Spanish
must possess so as to construct ARs, the existence of DNRs in the language is unsurprising,
and DNRs can in fact be understood as a species of ARs. The only difference between DNRs
and the ARs discussed in Chapters 4 and 3 lies in what pieces of the structure get pronounced.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. Section 5.1 will discuss the internal
make-up and distribution of DNRs. In §5.2, I will argue that DNRs come in two varieties,
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much like ARs, and show in Section 5.3 how my previous analyses for nominal and proposi-
tional ARs can be readily extended to DNRs.
5.1 The basics
5.1.1 Two distinctive properties
Two syntactic properties of DNRs make them stand out among relativization strategies
found in natural languages, including Spanish. The first is the surprising determiner-noun
agreement pattern they show. Ordinarily in Spanish, definite articles that appear with headed
relative clauses must agree in number and gender with the head noun, as illustrated in (5).
(5) Juan
Juan
admiró
admited
{ las
the.♤♫.♮♪
/ *la
the.♤♫.♱♥
/ *los
the.♫♱.♮♪
} fotografías
photograph.♤♫.♮♪
que
that
mostró
showed
Jose
Jose
‘Juan admired the photographs that Jose showed’
DNRs, however, do not seem to abide by this requirement. They uniformly require lo, irre-
spective of the gender and number features on the fronted predicate.
(6) a. Juan
Juan
admiró
admired
{ lo
♪♭
/ *la
the.♤♫.♱♥
} hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
que
that
era
was
la
the.♤♫.♱♥
novela
novel.♤♫.♱♥
b. Juan
Juan
admiró
admited
{ lo
♪♭
/ *el
the.♫♱.♱♥
} hermoso
beautiful.♫♱.♱♥
que
that
era
was
el
the.♫♱.♱♥
cuadro
painting.♫♱.♱♥
The predicate heading the relative clause, however, must agree with material internal to the
relative clause, suggesting that agreement is not altogether disrupted in these constructions.
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(7) a. Juan
Juan
admiró
admired
lo
♪♭
{ hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
/ *hermoso
beautiful.♬♲
} que
that
era
was
el
the.♫♱.♱♥
cuadro
painting.♫♱.♱♥
b. Juan
Juan
admiró
admited
lo
♪♭
{ hermosas
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
/ *hermoso
beautiful.♬♲
} que
that
eran
was
las
the.♤♫.♮♪
novelas
novel.♤♫.♮♪
Rather, the patterns suggest that the head predicate has its origins inside the relative clause
and is, for some reason, inaccessible for φ-agreement for elements outside of that clause, like
the definite article.
The second unique property of DNRs is their syntactic flexibility: it is possible to construct
DNRs headed by predicates belonging to a variety of syntactic categories, as illustrated by (8)
below.
(8) a. Adjectival
Juan
Juan
no
not
entendió
understood
lo
♪♭
hermosa
beautiful.♤♫.♱♥
que
that
era
was
la
D.♤♫.♱♥
novela.
novel.♤♫.♱♥
‘Juan did not undestand how beautiful the novel was’
b. Adverbial
Juan
Juan
admiró
admired
lo
♪♭
rápidamente
rapidly
que
that
llegó
arrived
María.
María
‘Juan admired how fast María arrived’
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c. Nominal
Juan
Juan
vió
saw
lo
♪♭
idiota
that
que
idiot
es
is
Mariano.
Mariano
‘Juan saw what an idiot Mariano is’
d. Prepositional
Me
I.♢♟♲
molestó
annoyed
lo
♪♭
en
on
punto
point
que
that
llegó
arrived
Juan.
Juan
‘It annoyed me how punctually Juan arrived’
Restrictions, where they exist, seem to be semantic in nature. Whereas adjectives that are
predicative in nature can form good DNRs, non-predicative adjectives like alleged and former
cannot:
(9) a. *No
not
me
I.♢♟♲
creo
believe
lo
♪♭
supuesto
alleged
que
that
es
is
el
the
asesino
killer
del
of the
presidente.
president
‘I do not believe how alleged is the killer of the president’
b. *Lo
♪♭
{ anterior
former
/ final
final
} que
that
está
is
ese
that
hombre
man
en
in
la
the
fila.
line
‘How {former / final } is that man in the line’
Moreover, as suggested by Contreras (1973) and Gutiérrez-Rexach (1999), another necessary
factor for forming DNRs is the gradability of the predicate in question. In general, any pred-
icate phrase that is coercible into a gradable interpretation is grammatical, like, for instance,
American and red in the examples below.
(10) a. Es
be
gracioso
funny
lo
♪♭
Americano
American
que
that
se
refl.
ha
aux.
vuelto
become
desde
since
su
his
viaje.
trip
‘It’s funny how American he has become since her trip’
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b. No
not
vi
see
lo
♪♭
rojo
red
que
refl.
se
turn
puso.
‘I didn’t see how red he turned’
However, even predicative expressions cannot form DNRs if they are not easily coercible into
a gradable predicate.
(11) a. *lo
♪♭
ayer
yesterday
que
that
hemos
aux.
llegado
come
‘How yesterday we have arrived’
b. *lo
♪♭
casa
cous
que
that
me
I.♢♟♲
parece
seem
esta
this
constructión
construction
‘How house this building looks to me’
c. *lo
♪♭
desde
from
la
the
ventana
window
que
that
cayó
fell
la
the
botella
bottle
‘How from the window this bottle fell’
5.1.2 Syntactic distribution
DNRs can chiefly appear in two environments, in predicational copular sentences and as
complements to wh-embedding predicates. Henceforth, I will refer to DNRs appearing in
predicative positions as “predicative DNRs” and those appearing with wh-embedding verbs
as “propositional DNRs”.
In predicative DNRs, the DNR is predicated of some individual in a predicational copular
sentence, as in (12).
(12) a. Juan
Juan
no
no
es
is
lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
Pedro
Pedro
es.
is
‘Juas isn’t as tall as Pedro’
187
b. El
the
segundo
second
libro
book
es
is
lo
♪♭
entretenido
entertaining
que
that
fue
was
el
the
primero.
first
‘The second book is as entertaining as the first one’
But by far the more common use of DNRs is when they appear as complements to wh-
embedding predicates. They may appear with rogative and responsive predicates, but not
with anti-rogative predicates. As illustrated below, the meaning of DNRs in these construc-
tions is equivalent to that of their counterparts with overt wh-elements.3
(13) Rogative predicates
a. Subordinate questions
Me
I.♢♟♲
{ preguntó
asked
pregunto }
wondered
cuán alto
how
es
tall
el
is
edificio.
the
‘{He asked me / I wonder} how tall the building is’
b. Degree Neuter Relative
Me
I.♢♟♲
{ preguntó
asked
pregunto }
wondered
lo alto
♪♭
que
tall
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
(14) Responsive predicates
a. Subordinate questions
Yo
I
{ sé
know
/ te
you.♢♟♲
dije
told
} cuán
how
alto
tall
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
‘I {know/told you} how tall the building is’
3Throughout this chapter I use the wh-pronoun cuán for subordinate questions. This pronoun is more com-
monly used in American variants of Spanish; in Peninsular Spanish it is more often found in literary texts, and
the more common variant of the wh-pronoun is cómo de (cf. qué tanto in Central American varieties).
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b. Degree Neuter Relative
Yo
I
{ sé
know
/ te
you.♢♟♲
dije
tell
} lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
(15) Anti-rogative predicates
a. Subordinate Questions
*Yo
I
{ creo
believe
/ pienso
think
/ afirmo
claim
} cuán
how
alto
tall
es
is
el
the
edificio
building
Int.: ‘I {believe/think/claim} how tall is the building’
b. Degree Neuter Relative
*Yo
I
{ creo
believe
/ pienso
think
/ afirmo
claim
} lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
el
the
edificio
building
Finally, DNRs are also grammatical and felicitous as complements to predicates that embed
exclamatives (16).
(16) a. Post-verbal subjects
Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprised
{ cuán
how
alto
tall
/ lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
} es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
‘It surprised me how tall the building is’
b. Impersonal
Es
is
sorprendente
surprising
{ cuán
how
alto
tall
/ lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
} es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
‘It is surprising how tall the building is’
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5.2 Distributional puzzle
DNRs raise the same problems of composition that we grappled with in the previous chap-
ters with ARs: how does the same expression appear in positions that require fundamentally
different semantic objects? I suggest the problem with DNRs and ARs is one and the same,
and in the next section, a parallel solution is applied to DNRs.
There are several reasons to treat DNRs on par with ARs. First, DNRs, like ARs, require
the definite article, as shown in (17). Recall that the restriction to the definite article is a
definitional property of ARs generally (see e.g. Carlson 1977a and Chapter 1).
(17) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
{ lo
♪♭
/ *esto
this.♬♲
/ *mucho
much.♬♲
/ *algo
some.♟♪♥♭
} alto
tall
que
that
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
‘I wonder how tall the building is’
b. *Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
todo
all
lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
Second, the relative clause is obligatory in DNRs, as it is in ARs. In the case of DNRs,
what is left after dropping the relative clause is a nominalized gradable predicate, which is
ungrammatical either as a complement to awh-embedding predicate or in predicative position.
(18) a. Yo
I
me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
lo
♪♭
alta
high.♤♫.♱♥
*(que
that
es
is
la
the
casa).
house
‘I wonder how high is the house’
b. El
the
segundo
second
libro
book
es
is
lo
♪♭
entretenido
entertaining.♫♱.♱♥
*(que
that
fue
was
el
the
primero).
first
‘The second book is as entertaining as the first one’
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Propositional DNRs, furthermore, behave much like propositional ARs showing obligatory
SV inversion in the same environments.
(19) a. *Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
lo
♪♭
difícil
difficult.♫♱.♱♥
que
that
{ *el
the
examen
exam
es
be
/ es el examen} .
‘I wonder how difficult the exam is’
b. *Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
wonder
lo
♪♭
travieso
naughty.♫♱.♱♥
que
that
{ *ese
that
niño
child
es
is
/ es ese niño}.
‘It surprised me how naughty that child is’
Unsurprisingly, the counterpart to DNRs with overt wh-pronouns shows the same require-
ment.
(20) a. Me
I.♢♟♲
pregunto
wonder
cuán
how
difícil
difficult.♫♱.♱♥
{ *el
the
examen
exam
será
be.♤♳♲
/ será el examen} .
‘I wonder how difficult the exam will be’
b. Me
I.♢♟♲
sorprendió
surprise
cuán
how
travieso
naughty.♫♱.♱♥
{ *ese
that
niño
child
es
is
/ es ese niño}.
‘It surprised me how naughty that child is’
5.3 Extending the analysis to Degree Relatives
Previous analyses of DNRs, most notably Ojeda (1982, 1993) and Gutiérrez-Rexach
(1999), have treated DNRs as syntactically and semantically uniform and as ordinary rel-
ative clauses, which are then interpreted as a maximalized object of either type e (Ojeda
1982, 1993) or type d (Gutiérrez-Rexach 1999). In contrast to these analyses, and echoing
my take on ARs in the previous chapters, I suggest that DNRs come in two closely-related
but also fundamentally different variants: those that complement verbs that take nominal
complements, and those that complement verbs that typically take wh complements. In what
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follows, I show that the analysis of nominal ARs extends directly to predicative DNRs, and
the analysis of propositional ARs can be adopted wholesale to explain the distribution and
interpretive properties of propositional DNRs.
5.3.1 Predicative DNRs
For predicative DNRs in Spanish I propose a syntactic structure that is completely analo-
gous to the one defended in the previous chapter for nominal ARs. Thus, for a DNR like lo
alto que Juan es (“the tall that Juan is”), we have the structure in (21). Note that this structure
is very similar to the one proposed by Gutiérrez-Rexach (1999, 48) on his analysis of DNRs.
(21) Syntactic structure of predicative DNRs in Spanish
DP
D
lo
CP
APi
Opwh alto
C’
C○
que[+♰♣♪]
TP
DP
Juanj
T’
T○
es
vP
tj ti
From a semantic standpoint, I adopt a fairly standard degree approach to gradable predicates
where they denote relations between degrees and properties, of type ⟨d; et⟩ (for an extensive
overview, see Morzycki 2016). The meaning of tall can be represented as follows.
(22) ⟦tall⟧ = λd:λx:tall(d; x)
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Following the long tradition on ARs, we can take the CP in (21) to denote the set of degrees
d such that Juan is d-tall.
(23) ⟦[♡♮ Juan is d-tall]⟧ = λd:tall(d; Juan)
This result can be achieved in a number of ways. For simplicity, I will assume that the gradable
predicate is always interpreted in its base position, thus combining first with the trace of Opwh,
of type d. This is schematized below:
(24) CP: ⟨dt⟩
λd:tall(d; Juan)
λd TP: t
tall(d; Juan)
DP: e
Juan
T’: ⟨et⟩
λx:tall(d; x)
The last step is simply to interpret lo. In this case, I will give lo a semantics that applies to
sets of degrees (already defined in Chapter 3, §3.4). Following the lead of Gutiérrez-Rexach
(1996, 1999, 2014), I assume that lo has the semantics of the maximality operator discussed
earlier (see §3.4.1).
(25) ⟦♫♟♶⟧ = λN⟨dt⟩ : ιn[N(n) ∧ ∀n′[N(n′)→ n′ < n]]
The interpretation of the LF corresponding to (21) amounts to the maximal degree d to which
Juan is d-tall.
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(26) ⟦DP⟧ = ⟦♫♟♶⟧(⟦CP⟧) = ♫♟♶(λd:tall(d; Juan))
So far these results reproduce the results obtained by previous studies, which stop here
and do not consider how DNRs should further combine with the matrix predicate. That is,
what should we do with the maximal degree in (26) in a sentence like (12)?
(27) Pedro
Pedro
es
is
lo
the
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
Juan.
Juan
‘Pedro is as tall as Juan’
The solution I propose is the same as that we saw for nominal ARs. Thus, I suggest that the
role DP is to provide the degree that saturates the degree slot of a second, unpronounced
adjective.
(28) AP elision in predicative DNRs
AP
DP AP
⟨alto⟩D
lo
CP
DP
Opwh alto
C’
que[+♰♣♪] es Juan
Identity & Deletion
The role of the DP can be regarded as the contribution of a Measure Phrase, like in six-
feet tall.4 The existence of the unpronounced AP gains support from the fact that they are
sometimes pronounced, as pointed out earlier in §3.4.2.2 and repeated below.
4A common assumption in the literature is that measure phrases like six feet are names of degrees, of type
d. Under this view, the meaning of a simple sentence like Liz is six feet tall is straightforward with our current
assumptions.
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(29) Juan
Juan
no
not
es
is
lo
♪♭
que
that
es
is
Pedro
Pedro
de
of
alto.
tall
‘Juan is not as tall as Pedro’
Moreover, the matching between the two copies of the gradable predicate must absolute.
For instance, since predicative adjectives must agree with their subjects in Spanish, it is easy
to create a ♥♣♬♢♣♰ mismatch in examples like (12). These mismatches, however, result in
ungrammaticality:
(30) a. *Juan
Juan
no
not
es
is
lo
♪♭
{ alto
tall.♫♱
/ alta
tall.♤♫
} que
that
es
is
María.
María
‘Juan is not as tall as María’
b. *María
María
no
not
es
is
lo
♪♭
{ alto
tall.♫♱
/ alta
tall.♤♫
} que
that
es
is
Juan
Juan
‘María is not as tall as Juan’
What is important for us is that the present structure, independently motivated by nominal
ARs, does not require any further ado to derive the right semantics for predicative DNRs.
The full derivation is sketched below.
(i) a. ⟦six-feet tall⟧ = ⟦tall⟧(⟦′′⟧) = λx:tall(′′; x)
b. ⟦Liz is six-feet tall⟧ = ⟦is ′′ tall⟧(⟦Liz⟧) = tall(′′;Liz)
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(31) Interpretation of predicative DNRs
TP: t
tall(♫♟♶(λd:tall(d; Juan);Pedro)
DP: e
Pedro
AP: ⟨et⟩
λx:tall(♫♟♶(λd:tall(d; Juan)); x)
DP: d
♫♟♶(λd:tall(d; Juan)) AP: ⟨d; et⟩λd:λx:tall(d; x)
⟨alto⟩D: ⟨dt;d⟩ CP: ⟨dt⟩
λd:tall(d; Juan)
Opwh alto que es Juan
According to (31) Pedro is (at least) as tall as Juan. This is the right interpretation, since
(27) is compatible with both weak and strong interpretations (just like other equatives). In
addition, notice that (31) does not entail that Juan is tall, only that Juan has some height.
This is correct: even if both Juan and Pedro were 5 feet tall–a rather low height–, one could
truthfully utter (27).
5.3.2 Propositional DNRs
Analogously, propositional DNRs can be given an analysis along the same lines as propo-
sitional ARs. Consider the sentence (14b) again:
(14b) Yo
I
sé
know
lo
♪♭
alto
tall
que
that
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
‘I know how tall the building is’
The syntactic structure that I propose for the DNR lo alto que es el edificio is the following.
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(32) DP
D
lo
CP
DP[♵♦]
Opwh alto
C’
C○ TP
DP
el edificioj
T’
ti vP
tj ti twh
que[+♵♦]+ [T○+V○]i
es
The syntactic structure is identical to subordinate degree questions formed with overt wh-
pronouns. That is, both (14b) and and (14a) share the same structure up to the CP level.
(14a) Yo
I
sé
know
cuán
how
alto
tall
es
is
el
the
edificio.
building
Intuitively, the semantic interpretation of both (14a)/(14b) can be paraphrased as: I know
for what degree d, the height of the building is d. Following the same proposal discussed
extensively in §4.3.2 of Chapter 4, the interpretation of the CP in (32) proceeds as follows.
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(33) Interpretation of propositional DNRs
CP1: ⟨st; t⟩
λp:∃d[p = λw′:tall(w′)(d; the-building)]
λp CP1: ⟨t⟩∃d[p = λw′:tall(w′)(d; the-building)]
Opwh
λDdt:∃d[D(d)]
CP2: ⟨dt⟩
λd[p = λw′:tall(w′)(d; the-building)]
λd C’: t
p = λw′:tall(w′)(d; the-building)
C○ ∶ ⟨st; t⟩
λq[p = q] TP: ttall(d; the-building)
DP: e
the building
VP: ⟨et⟩
♠♣ AP: ⟨et⟩
λx:tall(d; x)
td AP: ⟨et⟩
λx:tall(d; x)
The meaning obtained in (33) is the set of propositions of the form the building is d-high.
These, of course, are many degrees. We have to weed out the propositions that are neither
true nor maximally informative. This is the task for D♟♬♱, the variant of the definite article
modeled after Heim’s (1994) and Dayal’s (1996) answerhood operator introduced in §4.3.2.1.
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(34) ⟦D♟♬♱⟧ = λQ⟨st;t⟩:λw ∶ ∃p[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧Q(q)]→ p ⊆ q]]
: ιp[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧Q(q)]→ p ⊆ q]]
Applied to (33), the definite article D♟♬♱ takes a CP denoting a set of propositions–the CP1 in
(33)–and returns the maximally informative proposition from that set.
(35) ⟦DP⟧ = ⟦lo⟧(⟦CP1⟧) = λw : ιp[⟦CP1⟧(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ ⟦CP1⟧(q)]→ p ⊆ q]]
This proposition now picks the only degree d such that the building is d-high in the evaluation
world and entails all other propositions with a degree d′ such that the building is also d′-high
in the evaluation world.5
The semantics provided here is in accordance to our intuitions. I have not commented
on two aspects of propositional DNRs: their interpretation under exclamative embedding
predicates, and how to fix their denotation so that it can be taken as complements by predicates
selecting for sets of propositions (e.g. rogative predicates like ask and wonder). These two
issues are discussed in §4.3.2.2 and, since every aspect of the proposal presented there can be
maintained as is, I will not repeat them here.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed an unusual type of degree-related relative clause construction
in Spanish and argued that they should be thought of as a subspecies of ARs. Like the more
familiar ARs discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, DNRs were shown to come in two varieties,
5Recall that the change from maximality (e.g. Rullmann 1995) to maximal informativity (Beck and Rull-
mann 1999, Abrusán 2014 a.o.) is necessary for examples with upward entailing predicates.
(i) Bill knows…
a. …how tall you have to be in order to get on the roler coaster.
b. …how fast you are not allowed to drive on this road.
None of the subordinate questions above require a maximal degree, but a minimal one: if you are not allowed
to drive at 80mph, then it is most likely that you are not allowed to drive at 81mph, or at 82mph, and so on.
Thus, there is no maximal degree to which you are not allowed to drive. Of course, similar examples can be
constructed with propositioal DNRs.
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predicational DNRs, which received a similar analysis as nominal ARs, and propositional
DNRs, which were given the same treatment as propositional ARs.
Thinking of DNRs in this way accounts for many of their syntactic properties. First, the
fact that they can only surface with lo is unsurprising if they are also ARs, which uniformly
require the definite article. On this analysis the superficial “head” of the relative clause is
in fact a displaced phrase embedded within a complex wh-phrase, which explains both the
agreement paradigm as well as the syntactic flexibility. The neuter article is uniformly required
because the underlying fronted DP is degree-denoting (not a nominal) and as such, it does not
constitute a goal for D. The syntactic flexibility reflects the flexibility inwh-question formation:
if a given category can be moved as part of an interrogative wh-phrase, it can be expected to
be able to form DNRs (modulo orthogonal semantic considerations).
The resulting general state of affairs is one where DNRs, like ARs, require a covert wh-
operator and lo which, on the surface, resembles a definite article and semantically conveys
definiteness. Unlike ARs, however, the gradable predicate introducing the measuring function
is overt. From a syntactic point of view, both ARs and DNRs make use of the same flexibility
of the definite article and lo, either to combine with clausal CPs–in propositional ARs/DNRs–
or to overtly show in free relatives–as in nominal ARs and predicative DNRs.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation argues that languages arrive at ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses
in at least two, fundamentally different ways. Amount Relatives, understood as constructions
involving syntactic and interpretive means ear-marked for constructing degree or amount ex-
pressions, exist in languages like Spanish. However, the term “Amount Relative” can be a
misnomer for languages such as English, where relative clauses receiving ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpre-
tations constitute a subtype of more general kind-referring relative clauses–at least the ones
discussed in this work. This is not to say that English lacks relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲
interpretations, but that they should not be analyzed as appealing to degree semantics.
6.1 Summary
The second chapter offers a new perspective on ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations of relative clauses
in English that does not appeal to degree semantics. Taking seriously the commonalities
between ♟♫♭♳♬♲ and ♩♧♬♢ interpretations and the lack of evidence for degree abstraction in
so-called English ARs, I proposed that they are all in fact ♩♧♬♢ interpretations, where the
particular subkind referenced are entities that are of a certain quantity or amount.
The third chapter looks into nominal ARs in Spanish, AR that appear as complements
to predicates that take nominal arguments. It argues that ARs constitute relative clauses that
denote maximalized sets of degrees, formally very close to cuanto (“how many”) free relatives.
The maximalized degrees serve the role of a Measure Phrase, in turn allowing reference to
particular degrees/amounts.
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In the fourth chapter I argue that when SpanishARs appear as complement towh-embedding
predicates they have the properties of subordinate questions and exclamatives. The chapter
develops an analysis of this type of ARs, which I dubbed propositional ARs, where their “hy-
brid” nature is explained: their wh-like properties come from the fact that they involve an
interrogative C○ and movement of a quantity wh-phrase, but their superficial DP-like appear-
ance comes from the fact that the definite article involved is akin to an Answerhood operator
and can therefore apply to sets of propositions. The syntactic structure required to obtain this
result is moreover very similar to that of nominal ARs, differing only in the specification of
the C○ head.
The fifth and last chapter extends the analyses of the previous two chapters to Degree
Neuter Relatives, which I argued are a kind of AR. As ARs, Degree Neuter Relatives come
in two varieties that differ exactly in the ways that propositional and nominal ARs are differ-
ent, and so the analyses of nominal and propositional ARs presented above can be applied
wholesale.
A comparison of the two languages shed light on the pieces required to form “genuine”
ARs and potential sources of variability in the availability and distribution of relatives with
♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations. Spanish, for instance, has both overt and covert variants of the quan-
tity wh-expression how many, which, moreover, can be used to form free relatives. These
properties, in addition to the fact that Spanish possesses a flexible definite article that can
apply to propositional objects, accounts for the distribution of ARs in the language. None of
this pieces are available in English, and if this analysis is on the right track, ARs are predicted
to be unavailable in English. I have argued that this prediction, in the strict sense, is borne
out. English relative clauses with ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations are a different species altogether
and, unsurprisingly, do not share the same distribution and availability of Spanish ARs.
202
6.2 Open questions & future work
6.2.1 Amount Relatives across languages
This dissertation is focused on a very specific type of relative clause–relative clauses that
permit ♟♫♭♳♬♲ interpretations–and argues that even within this narrow class, we find het-
erogeneity when we look at different languages. One of the goals of this dissertation was to
understand this variation in terms of the syntactic and interpretive tools independently made
available in a given language. But a more in-depth cross-linguistic examination of ARs is
needed. Future work might focus on closely inspecting a broader group of languages within
the Romance and Germanic language families. More interestingly, perhaps, an examination
of languages without degree morphology might shed light on the various ways that a language
might extract quantity-oriented interpretations without direct appeal to quantity-denoting el-
ements.
6.2.2 The nature of degrees
ARs are, on the face of it, constructions that describe amounts, quantities or degrees. As
such, one hope is that analyzing these constructions also bear on our understanding of degrees.
In this dissertation, I have referred to degrees in two ways. In Chapter 2 I used a conception
of degrees where they can be referenced as equivalence classes of individuals, i.e. as sets of
individuals that have the same measure along some dimension (height, size, spiciness, etc.).
Chapters 4, 3 and 5, however, make use of the standard view that degrees are atomic types, i.e.
they are points on a scale abstractly representing some measurement.1 An obvious question
arises: how are these two notions of degrees related? Could there be “one degree to rule them
all”?
My answer to the question depends on what counts as a degree. In some ways, the
equivalence-class view is not, strictly speaking, a degree-based theory: degrees are just names
1A popular alternative is to represent degrees as intervals on a scale; for the purposes of this discussion, I
will treat it together with the view of degrees as atomic types.
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for certain kinds of sets, a handy shortcut. If my approach to English ARs is on the right track,
this approach to degrees is empirically necessary. Moreover, it is metaphysically parsimo-
nious, in the sense that we need add nothing to a degree-less system so that we can talk about
degrees qua equivalence classes. On the other hand, there are many semantic tasks for which
equivalence classes of individuals are not well suited: adding and substracting degrees, modi-
fying them with measure phrases, accounting for antonyms, cross-dimension and cross-world
degree comparisons, all are problematic if we do not have degrees proper in our language
(for discussion, see Cresswell 1976, Klein 1980, 1991, Rullmann 1995 and Morzycki 2016).
In general, the arguments for including degrees in our ontology seem well grounded. Now,
if equivalence classes do not count towards the tally of degree theories, there is no reason to
choose between the two. We can have a single theory of degree semantics while still maintaing
that degrees can be represented as equivalence classes. One contribution of this dissertation
to our understanding of degrees is showing that this mode of representing degrees is better
suited for certain tasks than degree semantics proper. This result suggests that we need to
have both notions of degrees in our semantic toolbox.
The explanandum on such a view, however, is to understand how simplex degrees and
their complex, equivalence class counterparts are related. In my view, this question is a re-
statement of the old problem that degrees should include information about the objects they
are measuring. That is, the way we use degree expressions in natural languages, degrees are
always degrees of something, and oftentimes we require that information in order to write
their proper interpretation in our metalanguage. The way degree theories are built, however,
the type of d of degrees is opaque and this information is rendered inaccessible (with the
notable exception of Grosu and Landman 1998). But in a world were we have both, atomic
degrees and the ability of representing them as equivalence classes, there must be ways to get
from one to the other, offering a new venue to understand the behavior of degree expressions
in natural languages.
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